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Abstract 
This thesis is a collection of five empirical essays which examine microeconomic and 
macroeconomic aspects of high and volatile commodity prices. The first three chapters 
focus more on microeconomic issues of commodity prices. The second chapter 
examines the dynamic relationship between the commodity futures curve and inventory 
levels and finds a long-run cointegrating relationship between base metal spot prices, 
futures prices, inventories, and interest rates. This study presents some evidence that a 
temporary scarcity shock, modeled as a spot price shock which changes the slope of the 
futures curve, does cause a reaction in commodity markets. The third chapter 
investigates the gasoline price and income elasticities in the U.S. which confirms the 
structural change in the U.S. gasoline market where demand elasticity of gasoline price 
and income became more inelastic over the last decade. The fourth chapter examines 
the dynamic impact of demand and supply shocks in the U.S. and U.K. gasoline market 
where results show that the U.S. gasoline prices are impacted by the global demand 
shock. The last two chapters concentrate more on macroeconomic impacts of 
commodity prices on commodity exporting countries. The fifth chapter studies the 
fiscal behavior in developing oil-producing countries and examines whether it is 
procyclical. The results reveal that total expenditure is highly procyclical in the low and 
middle-income groups but countercyclical in high-income countries in the sample. The 
results confirm that political and institutional factors, as well as financing constraints, 
play a role in the cyclicality of fiscal policies in the oil producing developing countries. 
Finally, the sixth chapter examines the dynamic relationship between exchange rates 
and commodity prices to determine whether commodity prices Granger cause exchange 
rate or exchange rates Granger cause commodity prices for a group of advanced and 
developing commodity-exporting economies.  The study finds stronger evidence of in-
sample causality from exchange rates to commodity prices for most of the countries in 
the sample.  One of the key findings is the consistent significant causality from 
exchange rates to commodities for Korea.  
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Periodically the global economy experiences episodes of commodity booms and 
busts that are characterized by broad and sharp co-movements of commodity prices. 
Commodity booms and busts have substantial economic, political, social and 
macroeconomic impacts on commodity producing and consuming countries. Two 
major episodes have occurred since the 1950s; the first episode peaked in 1974 and was 
primarily supply-driven; the second episode peaked in 2008 which was mainly 
demand-driven. The 1970s commodity boom was sparked primarily by the 1973 
OPEC-imposed oil embargo on the United States and European countries, which led to 
energy shortages and a subsequent sharp rise in energy and a few other commodity 
prices. After the embargo was lifted in 1974, commodity prices started to decline and 
by the 1980s, they returned to the pre-embargo levels. 
  
Commodity prices remained low until the early 2000s, when most commodity 
prices began to rise and reached record high levels in mid-2008. But in the second half 
of 2008, the global financial crisis erupted, followed by severe recession; in 2009, 
commodity prices had crashed and a demise of the commodity boom appeared 
imminent. Instead, prices rebounded and by 2011, many commodities had matched or 
even exceeded their pre-crisis price peaks. Not only was this recent commodity boom 
relatively prolonged but also all commodity prices rose in unison. This contrasts 
markedly with the 1970s, when only a few commodity prices rose--energy, grains and 
vegetable oils; non-energy commodities never attained the extraordinary levels of 2008. 
The literature offers three major explanations for the noteworthy strength and duration 
of this commodity price boom. 
 
First is strong and prolonged global growth which boosted the demand for 
commodities. Beginning in 2000, rapid industrial development and urbanization in 
emerging economies especially in China and India increased demand for commodities. 
Second is prolonged low interest rates, which have contributed to increases in 
commodity prices. During 2001-2004, and again in 2008, the U.S. Federal Reserve 
Bank cut real interest rates sharply. This reduced the cost of holding inventories, which 
made stock-building more attractive, thereby contributing to increased demand. Third is 
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the most contentious explanation:  financialization of commodity markets or financial 
speculation. Due to low interest rates in the 2000’s, many investment funds explored 
other asset classes which would bring higher returns. Starting in the 2000’s, the index 
and other investment funds began increasing their exposure in commodity futures 
market. Their commodity related asset holdings rose in value from less than US$10 
billion in 2000 to around US$450 billion by mid- 2011. Some argued that fund’s 
frequent trading large amount of commodity assets supported the rise in commodity 
prices above fundamental values. 
 
Each explanation may have contributed individually and certainly the 
combination of the three contributed to the recent commodity price boom which was 
mainly driven by increased demand for commodities and differed from the previous 
supply-driven commodity boom during which demand was somewhat steady, while 
drastic drop in supply of commodities was the spark of the commodity price rise. The 
recent commodity boom however, was triggered by a sharp and persistent increase in 
demand while supply struggled to keep pace causing unexpected large draws on 
inventories. Subsequently, supply shocks have been a major determinant of short term 
price trends, while long term prices trends have been governed by lagging supply 
response to increased demand. All of these major global structural changes precipitated 
structural shifts in commodity market supply, demand and inventory dynamics. Hence, 
it is more important than ever to revisit and examine the interaction of commodity 
prices with the other market variables and the impact of volatile commodity prices on 
consumers and the economies of commodity producing countries.  
 
This thesis comprises five chapters that explore issues related to high and 
volatile commodity prices. The first three chapters focus on microeconomic aspects of 
commodity prices, while the last two chapters investigate macroeconomic impacts of 
volatile commodity prices. Chapter 2 examines the dynamic relationship between the 
commodity futures curve and inventory levels. Chapter 3 discusses gasoline price and 
income elasticities in the U.S. Chapter 4 examines the dynamic effect of demand and 
supply shocks on gasoline prices in the U.S. and the U.K. Chapter 5 investigates fiscal 
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behavior in developing oil-producing countries. Chapter 6 explores the dynamic 
relationship between exchange rates and commodity prices for a group of advanced and 
developing commodity-exporting economies. Detailed chapter descriptions are as 
follows. 
 
Chapter 2 examines implications of commodity inventory levels on futures price 
curves. The relationship between commodity spot and futures prices reflects a 
perception of short-term physical scarcity and prevailing inventory levels. Thus the 
slope of the futures curve can provide information on whether market participants 
anticipate relative abundance (an upward sloping curve) or scarcity (a flat or downward 
sloping curve) in the physical market. Price curves also provide incentives for market 
participants to change their exposure to commodity prices.  
 
Chapter 2 attempts to answer three key questions: Is there a long-run 
cointegrating relationship between base metal spot prices, futures prices, inventories 
and interest rates? In the event of a short-run shock, how does a commodity market 
adjust to a temporary scarcity shock which moves the price curve away from this 
equilibrium? How quickly do inventories and prices adjust following such shocks? The 
study focuses on temporary shocks to physical market balances that change the slope of 
futures curve; in contrast, permanent or long-lasting shocks should have an impact 
across the futures curve, which may change the level of the curve but leave the slope 
little changed.  
 
Chapter 2 provides several contributions to the literature. First, we adopt a 
comprehensive self-exciting threshold approach which includes both inventories and 
interest rates along with spot and futures prices, building on previous work, which has 
omitted one or more of these variables. Second, we compare the empirical results to 
predictions of a widely accepted theoretical model. Finally, we use higher-frequency 
daily data, which should provide important insights, given the relatively high liquidity 
and rapid adjustment patterns of major commodity markets. Until now, only few 
studies examined interactions between inventories and commodity prices at a daily 
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frequency, partly due to poor and infrequent data. Base metals, which include 
aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, tin and zinc, provide the richest data set, particularly as 
trading of spot, futures, and options is concentrated on the London Metals Exchange 
(LME).  
 
Chapter 3 investigates whether the demand elasticity of gasoline price and 
income in the U.S. has changed in recent years compared to earlier periods that 
experienced similar high gasoline prices. Understanding gasoline demand elasticity is 
especially important for a country such as the U.S., which relies heavily on crude oil 
and gasoline. In fact, the U.S. is the largest crude oil consumer in the world and more 
than half of total crude oil goes into gasoline consumption. The greenhouse gas 
emissions produced by the transport sector comprise nearly half of national total gas 
emissions. Among OECD countries, the U.S. has the lowest average fuel economy 
standards, the highest transportation fuel consumption per capita, and the lowest fuel 
tax and prices. 
 
Similar to the rest of the world, the U.S. experienced a wealth increase over the 
past decade that led to changes in demographics, habits, and lifestyles. Great distances 
between cities, dispersed urbanization, and limited public transportation services mean 
that American citizens rely heavily on personal vehicles for transport.  Over the past 30 
years, the share of public-transportation passenger miles relative to other types of 
transportation has steadily decreased, suggesting that American consumers may be 
more dependent on automobiles than during previous decades. However, since the 
financial crisis and subsequent recession, gasoline consumption and income began to 
show signs of decline.   
 
With these changes, identifying the patterns and evolution of responses of 
gasoline demand to shifts in gasoline prices and income is central to implementing 
effective fiscal, tax and environmental policies in the U.S. and has been studied 
extensively in the 1970s and the early 1980s when prices were very high and supplies 
were tight. In recent years there has been a renewed interest in price-based policies 
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such as gasoline or carbon taxes, as pressures increase to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions produced by the transportation sector. In this context, it is important to 
review whether gasoline demand elasticities have changed by incorporating recent 
developments using the latest data. 
 
Consequently Chapter 3 examines price and income elasticities of gasoline 
demand in the U.S. during 1975-2013. Since elasticity estimates in the literature vary 
according to data type and empirical model specification, using a consistent set of data 
and models during 1975-2013 makes the elasticities comparable over time. The sample 
is split into three sub-samples that cover periods of high gasoline prices. In addition to 
three sub-samples, the elasticity estimates are arrived at using the full sample to study 
long-term elasticity behaviors. Elasticities are estimated using several simple 
econometric models similar in form to those used in previous gasoline demand studies. 
These models include OLS, a partial adjustment dynamic model in which a lagged 
dependent variable is included to allow for adjustment to the equilibrium level, 
Instrumental Variable (IV) to correct for the endogeneity between gasoline price and 
consumption and a price-income interaction model. In addition to the simple 
econometric models, a dynamic time series approach involving a bivariate vector 
autoregression (VAR) is applied to estimate the short-run price elasticity of gasoline 
demand. The VAR method focuses on unpredictable changes in gasoline prices and on 
measuring gasoline demand responses. The gasoline consumption response to 1.0% 
shocks to gasoline prices within 12 months can be interpreted as short-run price 
elasticity of gasoline demand. The disadvantage of this approach, however, is that 
income changes very slowly over time making it difficult to estimate income elasticity. 
Hence, only demand price elasticity is estimated using this model on three sample 
periods as well as on the full sample as is done with the simple models explained 
earlier. The contribution of this study to the literature is to include the latest period of 
data and apply several econometric techniques to estimate gasoline demand 
responsiveness to price and income changes in the U.S. and compare results between 
periods that have high gasoline prices but differ in underlying economic conditions to 
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draw policy implications such as; implementing a gasoline tax would be a viable 
solution to reduce gasoline consumption. 
 
Chapter 4 is an extension of Chapter 3 and examines the dynamic effect of 
demand and supply shocks on gasoline prices in two very different markets:  the U.S. 
and U.K. Both the U.S. and the U.K. extract and refine crude oil to produce gasoline 
and both are close to self-sufficiency in terms of gasoline production. However they 
differ markedly in market and consumption structure. The U.K. has the highest excise 
tax rate among industrial countries and the U.S. has the lowest. In the U.K. public 
transportation is widely available; in the U.S. it is almost essential to own and drive a 
motor vehicle to be mobile. In the U.S. most vehicles run on gasoline; in the U.K. 
diesel fuel usage is higher than that of gasoline. Finally, fuel efficiency standards are 
stricter in the U.K. and more relaxed in the U.S. These structural dissimilarities account 
for differences among determinants of gasoline prices and the dynamics of supply and 
demand conditions during the recent commodity boom followed by a recession in both 
countries.    
 
The majority of work on gasoline markets focuses on determining the short-
term or long-term sensitivity of gasoline consumption to changes in prices or income 
level. Some studies link movements in crude oil and gasoline prices. For example, 
Kilian (2009a) develops a joint structural VAR model of the global market for crude oil 
and the U.S. market for gasoline during sample periods of 1975-2008 and 2002-2008. 
He finds that each demand and supply shock had distinct dynamic effects on the real 
price of imported crude oil and on the retail price of gasoline in the U.S. He concludes 
that the origin of the shocks mattered when assessing price and consumption responses 
because price and consumption responses differed in magnitude, pattern and 
persistence to each demand and supply shock. Kilian also shows that the surge in 
gasoline prices in the U.S. between 2002 and mid-2008 was due to positive demand 
shocks in the global commodity market.   
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Chapter 4 follows a similar approach but without linking the domestic gasoline 
market to the global crude oil market. Instead the focus will be on the domestic 
gasoline market in each country. The price and the supply of crude oil are included 
indirectly through gasoline supply, since gasoline production depends on crude oil and 
its availability. Any shock to crude oil supply or price will impact gasoline supply. 
Hence, in this study by adopting a structural VAR model, the real price of gasoline is 
disaggregated into three components:  gasoline supply shocks, global demand shocks 
and gasoline-specific demand shocks. It is important to split the effect of supply and 
two diverse demand shocks on gasoline prices but it is also important to understand the 
reverse: the response of supply and demand to shocks to gasoline prices. Because not 
only we attempt to explain the origin of the fluctuations in price of gasoline, but also to 
explain the consumer responses to price fluctuations in order to implement effective 
fuel or vehicle tax, energy and environmental policies.  
 
Chapter 4 contributes to the empirical literature by attempting to explain the 
dynamic effects of shocks on gasoline markets in two distinctly different markets; the 
U.S. and U.K. during 1983-2012 and 1998-2012, respectively. To date no study has 
applied this framework on two structurally different countries and compared the results. 
Applying the same model to the U.S. and U.K. is helpful to observe the different 
market dynamics.  
 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 focus on the impact of the volatility of commodity 
prices on the macroeconomic balances of the commodity producing countries.   
 
Chapter 5 examines the procyclicality of fiscal policies in developing countries 
that produce crude oil. These countries are especially vulnerable to oil price volatility; 
for example, a small fall in prices could lead to a substantial increase in financing needs 
due to the lack of diversification in exportsoil revenue accounts for a large portion of 
their total revenue. In addition, developing countries that produce oil are typically 
characterized by an inability to accumulate financial assets or to gain access to credit 
markets, plus political, institutional, or budget structures that force their governments to 
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react to oil price volatility by adopting procyclical fiscal policies. Many studies show 
that procyclical fiscal policies have damaging consequences for developing countries. 
When governments move to cut expenditures in response to a fall in oil revenue, poor 
people suffer the most due to the lack of social safety nets, and long-term economic 
growth is hampered as resources are withdrawn from productive projects.  
 
Few studies have examined the procyclicality of fiscal policies and observed the 
main structural driverssuch as credit constraints, political structures and institutional 
quality of developing countries that produce oil, particularly during the recent period of 
high oil prices. Chapter 5 examines whether fiscal behavior is procyclical in 28 
developing oil-producing countries (OPCs) by employing various econometric tests and 
using multiple variables to control for political structure, institutional quality and 
financial constraints. With this analysis, the study makes three contributions to the 
literature.   
 
First, fiscal behavior is studied among different groups of OPCs by 
disaggregating the country sample into three subgroups according to their level of 
development, then conducting the cyclicality tests on the full sample, as well as on the 
subsamples. Since the OPCs are not a homogenous group, it is likely that their fiscal 
policies respond differently to oil price shocks due to significant variations in the extent 
of their dependency on oil revenue, economic development, political and institutional 
structure, financial positions, the level of existing oil reserves, and the degree of 
maturity in oil production. These variations make it essential to study both large-group 
and smaller-group fiscal behavior to discover whether countries with particular 
characteristics exhibit consistent fiscal policy patterns, which could be useful for 
designing effective policies.  
 
Second, the cyclical behavior of several fiscal policy variables is tested:  total 
expenditure and its components, public consumption and investment; the non-oil 
primary balance; and non-oil revenue. Most studies use either expenditure or 
consumption as a dependent variable. However, this chapter examines total government 
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expenditure and its components, which will be a key contribution of the chapter for the 
following reason.  Focusing only on aggregates can be misleading if their 
subcomponent movements offset one another. Thus, looking at the subcomponents 
separately may further illuminate the preferred direction of fiscal policy and reveal 
important policy implications; for example, a government may change either 
consumption or investment more in response to a change in output.  Furthermore, the 
non-oil primary balance as a dependent variable will measure the injection/use of oil 
revenue in the economy and the overall level of fiscal effort.  Finally, non-oil revenue 
will be a useful measure of the tax collection mechanism.  
 
Chapter 6 examines another significant impact of commodity price volatility on 
the economies of commodity exporting countries: the volatility of their floating 
exchange rates. Their currencies appreciate when commodity prices increase due to 
sizeable export earnings which lead to a balance-of-payment surplus and accumulation 
of foreign reserves. Usually the reverse occurscurrencies depreciate during periods of 
commodity price declines, which subsequently reduces export revenues. High price 
volatility during the past commodity boom, which lasted more than 10 years, proved 
the key importance of forecasting commodity prices and understanding their effect on 
the exchange rates and economies of commodity producing countries. 
 
Most of the earlier research explaining commodity price and exchange rate 
interaction is based on fundamental exchange rate models. Commodity prices are one 
determinant for nominal or real exchange rate behavior. These studies show the long-
run effects commodity price changes on exchange rates as well as on macroeconomic 
fundamentals; interest rates, money supply, trade balance, wages, employment, and 
output. However these studies discovered that over the long run the link between 
fundamentals and exchange rates is insufficiently robust for consistent forecasting 
because the strength of the link varies among currencies and sample periods. Main 
explanation offered in the literature for this is that the fundamental variables are 
themselves endogenous to exchange rates and jointly determined with exchange rates in 
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equilibrium. For example exchange rates might Granger-cause money supplies because 
monetary policy makers react to the exchange rate in setting the money supply. 
 
To circumvent the endogeneity issue, recent studies pursue an asset-pricing 
approach. Instead of determining exchange rates through commodity prices, they argue 
that the exchange rates should be the predictor of commodity prices. Chen, Rogoff and 
Rossi (2010) (CRR thereafter) follow this approach, take the exchange rates as prices of 
forward looking financial assets and claim that exchange rates would better predict 
exogenous variables such as commodity prices than vice-versa, because exchange rates 
are fundamentally forward looking; i.e., incorporates expectations about the values of 
its future fundamentals whereas commodity prices tend to be very sensitive to small 
changes in current demand or supply balances. This would especially apply to 
currencies of commodity exporting small countries, because world commodity prices 
can reasonably be assumed independent of their exchange rates.  
  
Chapter 6 pursues the asset-pricing approach and explores Granger causality for 
both directions; from the exchange rates to commodity prices and from commodity 
prices to the exchange rates, checks for parameter instability in Ganger-causality tests 
and finally tests out-of-sample forecasting ability of the exchange rates and commodity 
prices.   
 
Chapter 6 makes two contributions to the literature.  First, it analyzes a broader 
range of emerging and advanced countries which have a significant portion of their 
production and exports in primary commodity products. The set of countries is 
expanded to include countries that have not been studied before such as Brazil, Mexico, 
Indonesia, Norway and Korea. Second, the focus is on the type of commodities that 
these countries produce to see if that creates different dynamics between commodity 
prices and currencies. For example, Korea heavily depends on semiconductor chip 
exports whereas countries such as Chile or Mexico predominantly produce one type of 
mineral source or others such as Brazil, Australia or Canada produce and export 
minerals as well as various crops.  
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Finally, Chapter 7 presents the concluding remarks and future research ideas. 
Some of the key findings are as follows. Chapter 2 found a long-run cointegrating 
relationship between base metal spot prices, futures prices, inventories, and interest 
rates. Chapter 3 confirmed the structural change in the U.S. gasoline market where 
demand elasticities of gasoline price and income became more inelastic over the last 
decade. Chapter 4 showed that the impact of a positive aggregate demand shock on the 
gasoline market was larger than that of the other shocks in the U.S. Chapter 5 found 
that total expenditure was highly procyclical in the low and middle-income groups but 
countercyclical in high-income countries in the sample. Chapter 6 found stronger 
evidence of in-sample causality from exchange rates to commodity prices for most of 
the countries in the sample.  One of the key findings was the consistent significant 
causality from exchange rates to commodities for Korea.  
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2 HOW COMMODITY PRICE CURVES AND 
INVENTORIES REACT TO A SHORT-RUN 
SCARCITY SHOCK  
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   Introduction 2.1
The relationship between commodity spot and futures prices reflects, in part, the 
perception of short-term physical scarcity and the prevailing level of inventories. The 
slope of the futures curve, measured here as the difference between the price of a 
futures contract at some given maturity and the spot price, can thus provide information 
on whether market participants anticipate relative abundance (an upward sloping curve) 
or scarcity (a flat or downward sloping curve) in the physical market. Price curves also 
provide incentives for market participants to change their exposure to commodity 
prices.   
 
A greater understanding of futures price curves and inventory dynamics can 
help market participants plan their responses to supply and demand shocks. It may also 
enrich the information that can be obtained from commodities futures markets, 
providing for a more informed interpretation of price developments. In this context, this 
chapter seeks to fill a gap in the existing literature and asks three key questions: In the 
event of a short-run shock, is there such a thing as a “normal” commodity market back 
towards which spot and futures prices and inventories adjust over time? How does a 
commodity market adjust to a temporary scarcity shock which moves the price curve 
away from this equilibrium? How quickly do inventories and prices adjust following 
such shocks? 
 
Our interest is in temporary shocks to physical market balances which cause 
changes in the futures curve slope; in contrast, permanent or long-lasting shocks should 
have an impact across the futures curve, which may change the level of the curve but 
leave the slope little changed. The slope of the futures curve can change for one of 
three reasons: a change in interest rates; a change in physical storage costs; or a change 
in the market’s perception of short-term scarcity and a compensating adjustment in the 
utility afforded by holding inventories. (Shifts in the risk premium afforded by holding 
commodity futures or in expected future spot prices should lead to a shift across the 
curve.)  
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Large changes in the futures curve slope are rarely caused by the first two 
explanations. Although both interest rates and storage costs can move significantly over 
time, the very large discrete changes required to steepen or flatten futures curves 
sharply and rapidly are unlikely. Our analysis thus pertains to the effects of changes in 
actual or expected scarcity over short horizons. In most cases, these shocks will reflect 
actual or expected supply disruptions, as most demand shocks exhibit a higher degree 
of persistence.   
 
We compare the adjustment of spot and futures prices and inventories to the 
predictions from a theoretical model developed by Pindyck (2001). In this framework, 
commodity cash and storage markets are interconnected and commodity market reaches 
equilibrium only when both markets clear via adjustment in spot and futures prices and 
inventory levels in case of a short-run demand or supply shock. Inventories play the 
role of a buffer to ease the pressure on spot and futures prices in response to a 
temporary shock.  
 
We also focus on the possible existence of asymmetries in market reactions to 
temporary shocks. A strong clue about the nature of base metal price adjustment to 
shocks in different market states (usually defined by the inventory cycle) is provided by 
the interest rate-adjusted difference between spot and futures prices (which is a measure 
of the slope of the futures curve). As Figure 2.1 shows for six metals, this variable 
appears to be stationary over time. There also appears to be a degree of nonlinearity 
when the variable deviates from its average value, with large but short-lived spikes 
higher (backwardation) coexisting with more sustained, yet less dramatic, declines 
(contango).1  
 
 
                                                 
1
 Descriptive statistics of interest-rate adjusted basis are presented in the Table 2.A.1 in Appendix which show the 
average basis across metals are very similar in magnitude. 
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Figure 2.1 Base Metals: Interest rate-adjusted Basis and Inventories  
 
The interest-adjusted basis is calculated as s(t) – f(t,T)  + r(t,T) , where s is the log spot price, f(t,T) is the log price of 
a futures contract at maturity T at period t, and r(t,T) is the interest rate for over the period T – t. 
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Theory also guides us to expect asymmetric adjustment in the relationship 
between these variables. To address possible nonlinearity in commodity market 
adjustment, we apply self-exciting threshold vector autoregression models, in which the 
thresholds are determined by the nature of the disequilibrium; in practice, this is largely 
determined by the slope of the futures curve itself, which often reflects current and 
expected levels of inventories, and is thus closely related to the inventory cycle. 
 
Most of earlier empirical studies which examined the relationship between 
commodity spot and futures prices ignored non-stationarity, even though it is now 
generally accepted that commodity prices are I(1) processes, at least over shorter-run 
samples. However, recent research work has focused on the cointegrating relationships 
between spot prices, futures prices, and inventories. There are only a few studies which 
applied an asymmetric threshold model to three base metals spot and futures prices 
without taking into account of the interest rate or inventory levels. Furthermore, these 
studies only used lower frequency data, i.e. monthly.  
 
This chapter provides a technical contribution to the literature in a number of 
ways. First, we adopt a comprehensive self-exciting threshold approach which includes 
both inventories and interest rates along with spot and futures prices, building on 
previous work which has omitted one or more of these variables. Second, we compare 
the results from an empirical model to the predictions of a widely accepted theoretical 
model. Finally, we use higher frequency daily data, which should provide important 
insights given the relatively high liquidity and rapid adjustment patterns of the major 
commodity markets. Until now, there have been few studies on the interaction between 
inventories and commodity prices at a daily frequency, partly due to poor and 
infrequent data. Base metals, which include aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, tin and 
zinc, provide the richest data set, particularly as trading of spot, futures, and options is 
concentrated on the London Metals Exchange (LME).  
 
The plan of the chapter is as follows.  In the next section, we will give a brief 
literature review then followed by a discussion of the methodology and description of 
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the model in section 3. We will discuss the data in section 4 and present and discuss the 
results in section 5 and finally conclude in section 6.  
 
   Literature Survey 2.2
The Keynes’ (1930) theory of normal backwardation was first to examine the 
relationship between commodity futures and spot prices; it argued that futures prices 
should be discounted to compensate for the risk of holding the contract, therefore they 
would be below expected future spot price. Kaldor (1939) disagreed with this simple 
transfer of risk to determine commodity spot and futures prices, instead suggested the 
theory of storage (or cost-of-carry). In this model, the price of futures must be high 
enough to offset the spot price plus costs of carrying before delivery, which include 
charges for interest, insurance, and storage. Working (1948, 1949) pointed out that if a 
futures contract matures more than one period ahead, its price is not necessarily 
equivalent to the price of stored commodity. Thus, he expanded the cost-of-carry theory 
by including the convenience of holding inventories, referred to as a convenience yield, 
which can be described as a liquidity premium for commodity inventories held to avoid 
the cost of interrupted production. Working also explained that marginal convenience 
yield should be a declining function of inventory levels—the convenience yield of each 
additional unit falls in proportion to rising inventory. Many studies tested this model: 
Brennan (1958), Telser (1958), Fama and French (1988), and Deaton and Laroque 
(1997), among others. In particular, Fama and French (1988) concluded that among 
agricultural commodities, futures prices varied less than spot prices when inventory 
was low. Pindyck (2001) developed a theoretical model showing how commodity 
market reaches equilibrium via equilibrium in two interconnected cash and storage 
market in response to a short-run shock and demonstrated the implication of the model 
in the crude oil market. We take this model as a base to verify our empirical results. 
 
Many earlier empirical studies used standard techniques such as ordinary least 
squares and ignored the non-stationarity in series, which produced spurious results even 
though it is recognized that futures prices are non-stationary. However, as new time 
series analysis techniques emerged, many studies incorporated them to test 
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relationships between commodity prices and inventories:  Heaney (1998), Watkins and 
McAleer (2006), and Crompton and Xiarchos (2008). Watkins and McAleer (2006) 
found cointegration between spot, futures, interest rates, and inventory levels for seven 
metals. Crompton and Xiarchos (2008) confirmed the cointegration among inventories, 
cash, and futures prices, and found causality from inventories to prices for aluminum, 
copper, lead, and zinc. 
 
Studies similar to ours have been carried out only by McMillan (2005), and 
Koussie (2008). McMillan (2005) applied an asymmetric threshold model to three 
metals (aluminum, copper, and zinc) and found non-linear cointegration relationships 
between spot and futures prices where more rapid adjustment to equilibrium occurred 
when futures prices are greater than spot prices. However, interest rate and inventory 
levels were not included in this model. Similarly, Kouassie (2008) examined the 
dynamic and asymmetric interaction between inventories and prices of six metals by 
using Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) model and momentum TAR where he found 
cointegration with asymmetric adjustment between price and stock for all metals in the 
sample. However, Kouassie (2008) employed monthly data and excluded the interest 
rate, which is essential to determine metal prices. 
  
 Our study offers a more comprehensive approach to understanding non-linear 
behavior of commodity—metal—prices depending on the level of inventories. We base 
our estimation on a theoretical framework which incorporates all of the components 
that determine the dynamics between spot and futures prices which were omitted in the 
earlier studies. Furthermore, in the current digital age, information transmission is very 
fast which enables market participants to take action quickly in response to the news on 
changes in inventories. Therefore, it is important to observe the changes in a higher 
frequency data set. Earlier studies employed monthly data which is a much lower 
frequency during which many changes take place. The results based on the monthly 
data may fail to reveal the responses of prices on immediate changes in the market. 
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   Methodology 2.3
We employ two theoretical models in our analysis. The first model is a modified 
version of spot and futures price arbitrage framework in a way that incorporates 
inventories and provides a base for empirical testing. The second one is the theoretical 
model developed by Pindyck (2001) which we build our empirical hypothesis on. With 
these models, we aim to test asymmetries in commodity market reactions to temporary 
shocks; futures prices adjust to changes in inventory levels much slower when market 
is in contango with abundant inventories while it adjusts much faster when in 
backwardation with lower inventories.  
  
2.3.1 Spot and Futures Price Arbitrage for Financial Assets 
Before analyzing the dynamics of market adjustment, it is worthwhile reviewing 
the theory behind the relationship between spot and futures prices. In particular, the 
well-known arbitrage condition that determines the relationship between spot and 
futures prices for financial assets rarely holds for commodities. The role of 
commodities as consumption and processing goods, and the pivotal importance of 
physical inventories, among other factors, lead to a more complex and dynamic 
relationship. To elaborate, we first present the cost-of-carry relationship for a financial 
asset, ignoring coupon or dividend payments, in a market without frictions. This states 
that the price of a futures contract at time t which specifies delivery at T > t denoted by 
F(t,T) is equal to the current spot price S(t) multiplied by the continuously compounded 
interest rate r for the period t to T: 
 
      tTrtSTtF  exp,  (1) 
 
2.3.2 Commodity Market Arbitrage between Spot and Futures 
This relationship tends not to hold for commodities, for two main reasons. Spot 
and futures prices must take into account the costs of holding physical inventory, e.g., 
warehousing and insurance, which increases the “cost of carry” (which for financial 
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assets includes only the interest rate). Also, market participants may hold physical 
inventory of a commodity for its value as a consumption good, rather than as a financial 
asset. The benefit that accrues to the inventory holder is often referred to as the 
“convenience yield”.  
 
We incorporate the physical storage costs, denoted by k, as a constant 
proportion of the spot price and this serves to create a small and—assuming that storage 
costs do not vary too much—a fairly stable wedge between the two sides of equation 
(1). The inclusion of the convenience yield for the marginal unit of inventory, denoted 
by ψ, leads to more profound changes. A number of theoretical models indicate that 
there should be a strong and non-linear relationship between the current and expected 
future level of inventories, which we denote by N, and the value of ψ. This nonlinearity 
reflects a declining marginal utility of inventories. In particular, as the level of current 
and expected future inventories falls, the probability of experiencing a physical “stock 
out” increases, and ψ should rise, at an increasing rate as inventories fall towards their 
zero bound (e.g., Deaton and Laroque, (1992) and Williams and Wright, (1991)). Stock 
outs can be very costly for the producers and users of the physical commodity as it can 
interfere with production and customer delivery schedules. This nonlinear relationship 
between convenience yield and current and future inventory levels (denoted by N) is 
summarized by Figure 2.2. This shows that the effect of a given change in inventories 
on the convenience yield is dependent upon the starting level of inventories: 
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Figure 2.2 Commodity Convenience Yield and Current and Expected Future 
Inventories 
  
 
Incorporating these two features of commodity markets, storage costs and marginal 
convenience yields, into equation (1) obtains an arbitrage condition that is written as:  
 
        tTNkrtSTtF  exp,  (2) 
 
As described by Markert and Zimmermann (2006), these features of the commodity 
markets imply that there exists an arbitrage “upper bound” for commodity futures, 
when expressed in the form of standard financial asset interest rate arbitrage condition: 
 
      tTrtSTtF  exp,         where         0 kN  (3) 
 
2.3.3 Price and inventory adjustment in backwardation 
Equation (3) shows that current and expected future inventories play a key role 
in determining the shape of the futures curve. When inventories N are very low or 
expected to decline significantly and the probability of a physical stock out is relatively 
high, the marginal convenience yield ψ will be high. In other words, commodity 
producers, consumers, and processors will value highly the marginal unit of physical 
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inventory. In this case, the futures curve may be in “backwardation”, with spot prices S 
higher than futures prices F. (When the spot price is higher than the futures price, the 
market is defined as “strongly backwardated”. When the spot price is below the futures 
price, but equation (3) holds as a strict inequality—i.e. the spot price is higher than the 
discounted value of the futures price—the market is defined as “weakly 
backwardated”.) 
 
In a backwardated market, it is often assumed that the sensitivity of the 
marginal convenience yield net of storage costs (ψ-k) to changes, or expected changes, 
in inventories is very high (i.e. from Figure 2.2 we can see that ∂ψ/∂N is large). Starting 
from an initial condition of a tight physical market, with the inventory cycle near its 
low point (consistent with a backwardated market), small changes in expectations 
regarding the future path of inventories should have very large effects on the shape of 
the futures curve. In the case of a temporary supply shock which causes a large rise in 
the convenience yield and the spot price, expectations of a return to more “normal” 
physical market conditions should lead to a rapid reversal in these moves. 
  
2.3.4 Price and Inventory Adjustment in Contango 
When inventories are abundant and, conditional on demand projections, the 
probability of a physical stock out is low, the net marginal convenience yield (ψ-k) will 
be very low. In this case, assuming that physical storage costs are not too large, the spot 
price S will be lower than the futures price F and the futures curve will be in contango. 
As ψ reaches its zero lower bound, then interest rate arbitrage forces will limit the 
steepness of the curve. In particular, if S is lower than the discounted value of F, then 
the incentive and capacity to place an interest rate-based arbitrage trade will exist. 
Arbitrageurs will be able to take a long position in the spot market with a cost-of-carry 
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equal to r + k and take an offsetting short position in the futures markets, earning risk-
free profits.2  
 
In a contangoed market, the sensitivity of the net marginal convenience yield to 
changes, or expected changes, in inventories is very low (i.e. from Figure 2.2 we can 
see that the first derivative ∂ψ/∂N is small). Starting from an initial condition of a well-
supplied physical market, with the inventory cycle near its high point (consistent with 
steep contango), even large changes in expectations regarding the future path of 
inventories should have relatively little effect on the shape of the futures curve. In this 
case, a temporary supply disruption would have only a modest effect on convenience 
yields and spot prices, as inventories would be sufficient to absorb the shock. In turn, 
the adjustment back towards equilibrium should also be more gradual. 
 
2.3.5 A Nonlinear Price-Inventory Adjustment Model 
In this section, we will propose an empirical model for this system of variables. 
The endogenous variables in our system, spot and futures prices and inventories, are all 
jointly determined and reflect current physical market conditions, but also expectations 
for the future. A natural question to ask is whether these variables share a stable long-
run relationship; to put it differently, is there a futures market curve and level of 
inventories that together reflect “normal” or steady-state market conditions? During a 
normal market, it might be presumed that inventories, or stock-use ratios, are close to 
their average levels and the futures market curve reflects a steady-state perspective on 
the outlook, in particular with regard to the evolution of inventories in future periods. In 
other words, the system is anchored over the long-run by a steady-state level of 
inventories. 
 
                                                 
2
 Mabro (2009) provides an example in oil markets where ample oil supplies in August 1997 and in 2008 moved the 
term structure of futures prices into a very steep contango.  The increasing differential between spot and futures 
contracts gave sufficient incentives for traders to buy physical oil to add to inventories and sell a futures contract.  
This resulted in an inventory build-up subsequently pressuring prices flattening the term structure in 1998 and 2009, 
respectively. 
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We can test the hypothesis of long-run equilibrium existence by assessing 
evidence for a long-run cointegrating relationship between the endogenous variables S, 
F, and N and the exogenous variable that theory suggests should also determine curve 
slope, the interest rate r. We can write such a hypothesized relationship using the log-
levels of each of these variables (with the exception of interest rates which are in 
levels) and normalizing with respect to the spot price s as: 
 
tTttTtt zrnfs  ,43,21   (4) 
 
In (4), st is the log of the spot price, ft,T is the log of the futures price, nt is the log of 
inventories, and rt is the interest rate level. The constant β1 can be interpreted 
approximately as a mean net marginal convenience yield and the unconditional 
expectation of z is zero. The β1 can only be interpreted as an approximate mean net 
marginal convenience yield due to the presence of inventories on the right-hand side of 
equation (4). 
 
How can we interpret the residual z? Comparing (4) with (2), it can be seen that 
the residual z is closely related to the concept of the net marginal convenience yield 
and, in our specification with current inventories as an explanatory variable, it 
approximately represents deviations from the average convenience yield. Because we 
have included current inventories on the right-hand side as an endogenous variable, this 
deviation in convenience yield arises from unobserved variables, principally 
expectations of future inventories and spot price volatility. The absolute values of the 
estimated coefficients may also diverge from unity, which means that a direct 
comparison with convenience yields cannot be made. 
 
Equation (4) has implicitly assumed that the convenience yield over the long-
run is a linear function of inventories; the nonlinearity in our model will instead emerge 
from the short-run dynamics of adjustment back to equilibrium. In particular, we test 
whether the initial level of z captures information regarding expected inventories and 
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whether this in turn will affect how z converges back to zero. In other words, z is the 
self-exciting threshold process in this model. 
   
2.3.6 Empirical Specification of the Nonlinear Adjustment 
One way to model the potential nonlinearity of the process {z} from equation 
(4) is suggested by Figure 2.2; that is, to follow Martens, Kofman, and Vorst (1998) 
and hypothesize that it might be described by a threshold autoregressive model, with 
the speed of adjustment determined by lagged values, such as: 
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In this model, j indexes the thresholds separating regimes, d is the lag of z 
which determines the threshold, and k denotes the value of the thresholds. This 
specification provides a linear approximation for the adjustment process in each 
regime; in other words, in each regime it assumes a different linear adjustment process, 
characterized by varying autoregressive parameters   and speeds of adjustment. 
 
One of the hypotheses we wish to test is whether there is a band around the 
equilibrium (i.e. a “middle regime”) which is characterized by a random walk and two 
outer regimes in which the process converges back towards equilibrium.  This is a 
common finding for financial assets and is often interpreted as a mispricing that is not 
sufficiently large and profitable to arbitrage away due to transaction costs (e.g., 
Martens, Kofman, and Vorst, (1998)).  
 
A priori, we can only hypothesize about the value of the thresholds and the 
nature of the regimes; the thresholds will be estimated from the data. For now we 
assume that the forward curve process summarized by {z} from equation (4) is subject 
to two thresholds and three regimes which are determined by the value of z itself (i.e., 
the threshold process is self-exciting). We hypothesize that these regimes are: (i) a 
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lower regime, in which z is negative and the forward curve is upward sloping and steep 
(contango); (ii) a middle regime in which z is close to zero and the system is close to 
equilibrium; and (iii) an upper regime in which z is high and the forward curve is either 
relatively flat or inverted (backwardation). We can now write this model as: 
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Where each of the regimes is listed respectively. 
 
2.3.7 Applying a Threshold Vector Error-Correction Model 
The system described by (6) allows us to test formally for the existence of 
nonlinearities, but it does not provide any guidance related to which variable (spot or 
futures prices or inventories) takes the burden of adjustment when the system deviates 
from equilibrium. A natural way to understand these features is by applying a threshold 
vector error model (T-VECM). In this model, global behavior is defined by the 
cointegrating vector and its residual z. Local behavior (or short-run dynamics) is 
described by the adjustment coefficient on the cointegrating vector and the coefficients 
on the lagged first-differences. This model can then be written as: 
 
          
 
 
K
k
j
t
L
l
lt
j
lt
j
kt
j
k
j
t rz
1 0
10 ECβXAAX                       (7) 
 
where: the superscript j indexes the regime, X is the (3x1) vector of endogenous 
variables, including the spot price, futures price, and inventories; Δ is the first 
difference operator; β is the (3x1) vector of adjustment coefficients; zt-1 is the lagged 
value of the variable described in equation (4); C is a (3x1) vector of coefficients on the 
exogenous interest rate r; and E is the (3x1) vector of reduced form residuals.  
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   Data 2.4
The source of the base metals spot prices, futures prices, and inventories data is 
the London Metal Exchange (LME) which accounts for the largest share of trading in 
base metal spot and futures markets. For example, about 95 percent of the total world 
trade in copper futures occurs through the LME. The LME also provides storage 
facilities to make it possible for market participants to take or make physical delivery of 
metals. For futures prices we use two different contract maturities: three and six 
months. The interest rates are the three-month and six-month London interbank offered 
rates (Libor), as calculated by the British Bankers’ Association. The sample period 
spans from July 23, 1997 to June 19, 2009. The start date is determined by the 
availability of all the data series at a daily frequency. The data were downloaded from 
Bloomberg L.P. Summary statistics are provided in Table 2.1. in which inventories are 
in metric tons and prices are in USD per metric tons. Prices of the base metals vary 
according to their rarity and extraction costs, ranging from around $15,000 per ton 
(nickel, tin), through $5,000 per ton (copper) down to around $1,500 per ton 
(aluminum, lead, zinc), observed in mid-2009. 
 
Annual production of aluminum reached 38 million tons in 2008 which exceeds 
the output of all other industrial and precious metals combined. Copper, zinc and lead 
are the metals that are produced largest after aluminum; 18, 11 and 8.1 million tons, in 
2008 respectively. The production of nickel and tin are much smaller in the same year 
than the previous four metals 1.4 and 0.4 million tons, respectively. The magnitude of 
production reflects the level of global demand. Aluminum, copper and zinc are the 
most commonly used base metals in various consumer products such as automobiles, 
building and infrastructure construction, electronics and packaging. Similar to 
production levels, volume of base metals traded on the LME is dominated by the 
aluminum, copper and zinc contracts, which combined represent around 85% of all turn 
over on the exchange. Aluminum is the most actively traded metal on the LME. The 
annual volume of LME aluminum trade in 2008 was 30 times the physical production. 
Although less than 1% of contracts are settled with physical delivery, all LME contracts 
are backed by physical metals, allowing those in the industry to sell excess stock in 
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times of over-supply and source material in times of shortage. As a result, in order for 
this system to function efficiently, the LME has arranged a system for storing and 
delivering metals. The average level of LME inventories in Table 2.1 represents the 
overall magnitude of production for each metal. Average stocks can be ranked from the 
highest to the lowest as aluminum, copper, zinc, lead, nickel and tin. In addition to 
LME inventories, there are stocks held by the commercial companies but it is very hard 
to keep track of. Hence, the LME inventories are used in the market as a gauge of 
immediate availability of metals. Furthermore, unlike many commodities, the base 
metals show negligible seasonal variation in their supply, stock levels and only minor 
seasonal variation in demand. Due to high spread between spot and futures prices, 
investors went long and accumulated LME aluminum stocks which reached the record 
levels in 2009 and increased the average of stock figures further shown in Table 2.1. 
 
As the initial step of our analysis, we assess the order of integration of the 
endogenous variables and interest rates using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and 
Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests. There are no theoretical reasons to suggest that the 
endogenous variables should be stationary. Interest rates should be expected to remain 
bounded over the very long run, but it is widely reported in the literature that interest 
rates follow integrated processes, a result which may be due in part to the low power of 
standard unit root tests in small samples (see Wu and Zhang, 1997). Overall, we were 
unable to reject the null that all of the log levels of each of these series, including 
interest rates, contain a unit root at standard levels of confidence, although there was 
clear evidence of stationarity for the first-differenced data (see Appendix Table 2.A.2). 
These results are consistent with those for base metal data as presented in McMillan 
(2005), Kouassie (2008), and Watkins and McAleer (2006).  
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Table 2.1 Base Metal Price and Inventory Series: Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
   Estimation and Results 2.5
Ideally, testing for cointegration and thresholds could be achieved using a single, 
consistent approach. However, as pointed out by Balke and Formby (1997), the 
threshold variable itself is determined by the cointegrating vector, which itself must be 
estimated. In other words, some of the alternative hypotheses have “nuisance” 
parameters—namely the thresholds—that do not form part of the null of no 
cointegration/linearity, which results in a nonstandard inference problem. 
Levels First differenced logs
Standard Standard
Mean deviation Skew Kurtosis Mean deviation Skew Kurtosis
Aluminum
spot price 1,787     526          1.0 2.7 0.00 0.01 -0.30 5.92
futures price (3-month) 1,804     529          1.1 2.7 0.00 0.01 -0.30 6.28
futures price (6-month) 1,811     529          1.1 2.8 0.00 0.01 -0.38 6.42
inventories 935,013 597,629   3.3 15.9 0.00 0.01 4.63 47.40
Copper
spot price 3,368     2,309       1.1 2.7 0.00 0.02 -0.12 7.84
futures price (3-month) 3,350     2,280       1.1 2.7 0.00 0.02 -0.13 8.01
futures price (6-month) 3,316     2,241       1.1 2.7 0.00 0.02 -0.13 8.40
inventories 402,435 285,122   0.4 1.8 0.00 0.01 5.18 91.29
Lead
spot price 976        739          1.8 5.9 0.00 0.02 -0.18 6.84
futures price (3-month) 975        732          1.8 5.8 0.00 0.02 -0.21 7.53
futures price (6-month) 966        721          1.9 5.8 0.00 0.02 -0.25 8.12
inventories 101,671 50,669     0.3 1.9 0.00 0.02 10.04 240.87
Nickel
spot price 13,515   10,151     1.7 5.6 0.00 0.02 -0.12 6.97
futures price (3-month) 13,367   9,817       1.6 5.2 0.00 0.02 -0.16 7.09
futures price (6-month) 13,123   9,449       1.6 5.0 0.00 0.02 -0.16 7.16
inventories 32,674   23,950     1.0 3.6 0.00 0.02 1.19 23.95
Tin
spot price 8,022     4,522       1.6 5.1 0.00 0.02 -0.09 11.81
futures price (3-month) 8,011     4,511       1.6 5.1 0.00 0.02 -0.12 12.13
futures price (6-month) 7,979     4,478       1.7 5.2 0.00 0.02 -0.13 12.16
inventories 13,069   7,988       1.6 5.1 0.00 0.03 2.96 38.18
Zinc
spot price 1,493     896          1.6 4.6 0.00 0.02 -0.37 7.19
futures price (3-month) 1,502     887          1.6 4.5 0.00 0.02 -0.32 7.15
futures price (6-month) 1,500     862          1.6 4.4 0.00 0.02 -0.30 7.04
inventories 385,746 208,802   0.3 1.8 0.00 0.01 6.21 92.51
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Consequently, we follow their suggestion to approach the analysis in two stages: first, 
an assessment of global behavior, with tests for cointegration; and second, assessing the 
local behavior of the time series, which tests for nonlinearity.  
 
2.5.1 Testing for Cointegration 
An inspection of Figure 2.2 suggests that a reasonable starting point is to 
assume that the spot price, futures price, relevant financing interest rate, and possibly 
the level of inventories, are cointegrated, in the form of equation (4). Although the 
relationship may change based on the shape of the futures curve—which could 
influence the local behavior of the equilibrium error z—the system should be eventually 
drift back towards equilibrium. There is no well-developed model that would suggest 
inventories should share a long-run linear relationship with the other variables; rather, a 
short-run nonlinear relationship is often suggested. For now, we include inventories in 
all of the cointegration tests to ensure our specification does not suffer from omitted 
variable bias. 
 
We test for cointegration using the Philips-Perron and Engle-Granger tests 
based on the residuals from equation (4). Although the Johansen (1988) test has 
become the standard procedure for multivariate systems, Balke and Formby (1997) 
present evidence that this procedure may have particularly low power for asymmetric 
systems when compared to the Philips-Perron test. Enders and Siklos (2001) construct a 
direct test for asymmetry in a cointegrated system, but they acknowledge that this also 
suffers from particularly low power for a standard Threshold Autoregressive Model 
(TAR) model.  
 
2.5.2 Strong Evidence in Favor of Cointegration 
In fact, regardless of the tests used, we find strong evidence for cointegration 
(Appendix Tables 2.A.2 and 2.A.3). The estimates of equation (4) obtain coefficients 
that, in most cases, are statistically significant and close to what theory predicts based 
on equation (2) (Table 2.2). For example, after normalizing on the spot price the 
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coefficients on the futures prices are close to one. The coefficients on interest rates are 
negative, but for the most liquid contracts (aluminum and copper) they are greater than 
one in absolute value. Inventory coefficients are negative, indicating that higher 
physical stocks are consistent with lower spot prices (keeping all else constant), 
although the economic significance of these coefficients is very low.  
 
The constants in all cases (β1 from equation (4)), except zinc are positive, which 
means the futures curve is flatter (steeper) when in contango (backwardation) than 
standard interest rate arbitrage relationships would predict. This reflects the constant 
component of the non-zero average convenience yield (net of storage costs) which is 
independent of inventories; even when inventories are high, there remains a non-zero 
probability of stock-outs and together with other utilities obtained from holding 
physical stocks.  
Table 2.2 Long-Run Cointegrating Relationships between the System Variables 
 
Significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels denoted by ***, **, and * respectively 
 
Aluminum Copper Lead Nickel Tin Zinc
Constant 0.13*** 0.31*** 0.51*** 0.14*** 0.12*** -0.23***
(0.01) (0.005) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Futures 1.01*** 0.99*** 0.99*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 1.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Inventories -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Interest rate -1.44*** -1.12*** -1.16*** 0.61*** -0.76*** 0.64***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R-squared 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Durbin-Watson stat 0.12 0.21 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.09
Observations 3108 3108 3108 3108 3108 3108
Constant 0.30*** 0.70*** 0.98*** 0.28*** 0.20*** -0.58***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Futures 1.02*** 0.98*** 0.98*** 1.01*** 1.00*** 1.05***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Inventories -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.04*** -0.02*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Interest rate -1.38*** -0.97*** -0.93*** 0.61*** -0.78*** 0.91***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R-squared 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Durbin-Watson stat 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03
Observations 3108 3108 3108 3108 3108 3108
Three-month
Six-month
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2.5.3 Testing for and Locating Thresholds 
Does the adjustment depend on the initial slope of the curve?  In particular, we 
are interested in the speed with which the market adjusts to scarcity shocks, and which 
variables take the burden of adjustment. To achieve this, we implement the ordered 
autoregression described by Tsay (1989) in which the cases are arranged according to 
the values of a particular regressor.  
 
To identify the appropriate autoregressive structure, we assessed both partial 
autocorrelation functions and information criteria and find that the AR process is 
strongly determined by the first lag (see Appendix Tables 2.A.5 and 2.A.6). This is not 
surprising given that commodity markets assimilate all new information quickly, 
weakening the influence of lags greater than one period. As a result, we assume no 
delay and a simple AR(1) process, which involves ordering the regressions according to 
the values of last period’s equilibrium error, or zt-1. This allows us ensure that the 
observations in a particular group follow the same AR process, conditional upon 
accurate identification of the thresholds.3  
 
2.5.4 Strong Evidence in Favor of Nonlinearity 
We conduct two tests for non-linearity of the ordered autoregressions: the 
Andrews-Quandt breakpoint test and the Tsay (1989) test.4 We find clear evidence of at 
least one break in all of the commodity relationships and proceeding iteratively, we find 
evidence for two or more breaks (see Appendix sections 2.A.2 and 2.A.3 for detailed 
results). The evolution of the equilibrium error over time, and the location of the 
thresholds is shown in Figure 2.3 for the six-month relationships. These breaks indicate 
                                                 
3
 We also ran the threshold identification procedure for AR(3) processes, consistent with Akaike information criteria, 
and found that the results were mostly identical (or very close) to those obtained from an AR(1). 
 
4
 We supplement this approach less formal analysis of AR(1) coefficient t-ratio scatter plots, obtained from recursive 
least squares regressions. This yielded less clear-cut conclusions, but tended to support the number and location of 
the thresholds obtained from the formal methods described. Details are available on request from the authors.  
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that the speed of adjustment back towards equilibrium is conditional upon the size and 
sign of the deviation itself (Table 2.3). 
 
The threshold locations are similar across each of the metals and correlated 
significantly with the slope of the futures curve (Table 2.3). When the equilibrium error 
z is below the lower threshold, the market is very likely to be in contango, with the spot 
price below the futures price. In contrast, when z is above the upper threshold, the 
market is much more likely to be in backwardation, with spot prices above futures 
prices. 
 
Table 2.3 Threshold Values and Curve Slope: Percent of Time in Contango5  
 
 
We do not find evidence of a “no arbitrage” band in metals markets similar to 
that typically found for financial assets. The autoregressive structure of z is stable in all 
three regimes and the speed of convergence is typically faster in the middle regime 
which is closest to equilibrium. This indicates that transaction costs do not play a 
significant role in the commodity market adjustment. For the remainder of the analysis, 
we continue to divide the adjustment paths based on these three regimes, however. 
Assessing whether adjustment to temporary shocks is significantly different from when 
                                                 
5 Defined as the futures price at the given maturity being above the spot price. 
 
When equilibrium error z is:
below lower between upper above upper Correlation of z
threshold and lower threshold with curve slope
Aluminum 100.0 94.7 22.1 0.91
Copper 74.5 59.4 48.1 0.42
Lead 88.3 69.9 13.8 0.65
Nickel 56.9 67.1 22.7 0.64
Tin 76.7 48.9 0.0 0.77
Zinc 94.6 88.2 46.9 0.89
Aluminum 96.6 55.6 8.2 0.85
Copper 65.3 56.8 42.7 0.36
Lead 73.2 35.3 3.2 0.61
Nickel 53.5 6.1 24.7 0.55
Tin 69.0 4.8 0.0 0.71
Zinc 88.3 77.7 48.8 0.76
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the market is initially close to equilibrium will provide an important insight into the 
nature of commodity market dynamics.  
 
Figure 2.3 Deviations from Equilibrium and Identification of the Thresholds 
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2.5.5 Adjustment to Temporary Shocks 
We assess how the system of spot and futures prices and inventories responds to 
temporary shocks by estimating separate VECM models for each of the three regimes. 
The cointegrating vector for each commodity (i.e., the coefficients on the level 
variables in the VECM) is the same in each regime, with the estimates taken from 
equation (4) we used to test for cointegration. We proceed to estimate the system (7), 
using the optimal lag lengths identified in Appendix Table 2.A.4. The results that 
follow use the six-month futures contract; the results with the three-month contract are 
qualitatively similar but less pronounced. 
 
2.5.5.1 Describing the Curve Shock—a short-term spot price shock 
Our main interest is in the behavior of the three variables when the relationship 
between them is in a disequilibrium caused by a temporary shock in the physical 
market; to create this condition, we apply a shock to the slope of the futures curve for 
the VECM in each regime. As discussed above, the most likely cause of a sharp and 
rapid change in the slope of the futures curve is a shift in actual or perceived short-term 
physical scarcity and a corresponding change in the marginal convenience yield. 
Interest rates and storage costs, the other two factors which explain the gradient, are 
unlikely to experience discrete jumps sufficient to match the observed volatility in 
curve slopes. 
 
Why should the change in scarcity premium be confined to the short-term? If 
expectations of changing long-term scarcity emerged, then we should expect to see a 
permanent change in spot prices and, as a result, a shift across the entire futures curve. 
This would leave the slope constant (or at least little changed) and the system would 
remain in, or very close to, equilibrium.  
 
The implication of these arguments is that these short-term futures curve shocks 
are most likely characterized by spot price shocks. Futures prices will be anchored by 
expectations that the supply shock should eventually dissipate and that market 
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participants will be able to smooth the adjustment over time, in part by managing their 
inventories. Ideally, we would want to impose a structural spot price shock to the 
VECM system. One method would be to impose a Choleski ordering on the system, but 
this approach runs into some difficulties due to the challenges in disentangling spot and 
futures price shocks. The contemporaneous correlation between log changes in spot and 
futures prices is very high (above 0.9 for all metals), while the correlation when one of 
the price changes is lagged one period is very low and statistically insignificant. The 
correlation between the reduced form VECM residuals for the spot and futures price 
equations is also above 0.9 for all metals.  
 
Alternative restrictions are suggested by theory and the nature of the data. For 
the system with four variables, we require at least (n
2
-n)/2 = 6 restrictions. The first set 
of restrictions we apply is that interest rates are exogenous to all other variables in the 
system. The second set of restrictions is that there are no contemporaneous effects from 
inventories to prices (or vice versa). Inventory data, which may affect prices, are only 
available from the LME with a one day lag, while movements in physical inventories 
are unlikely to respond to price signals during the same day, in large part due to 
logistical constraints. One final restriction that we apply is that the futures curve moves 
in parallel in response to a futures price shock; in other words, the contemporaneous 
coefficient on the futures price change in the spot price equation is 1. The justification 
for this restriction is that the futures price can rise or fall as a result of changes in either 
the expected future spot price or the risk premium, which compensates the holder of the 
futures contract for holding the exposure to commodity price volatility. Arbitrage then 
links the spot price to the futures price, ensuring that these changes are reflected one-
for-one in the spot price. For example, if the risk premium declines, leading to higher 
futures prices, then for unchanged carrying costs and convenience yield, the spot price 
must also increase by the same amount. This is because at the time of the futures 
contract’s specified physical delivery; there is no difference between holding the spot 
or the future. Today’s spot price can then be discounted back from the futures price by 
the carry cost and the convenience yield. 
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We apply a 1 percent positive shock to the spot price which, given the 
restrictions described above, implies shocks to the reduced form residuals in the spot 
and futures price equations of 1/(1-b) and b/(1-b). The parameter b is the 
contemporaneous coefficient of the log change futures price on the log change spot 
price. For all commodities and all regimes, the estimate of this coefficient from the 
estimated VECM is between zero and one, implying that futures prices respond 
positively, but less than one-for-one to spot price shocks. In almost every case, the 
sensitivity of the futures to the spot price is highest in regime 1 when the curve is 
upward sloping (average 0.6) and lowest in regime 3, when the typical curve is 
backwardated (average 0.3). This difference likely reflects the dominant effects of the 
convenience yield on spot prices in backwardation. 
2.5.5.2 A Theoretical Framework to Assess the Empirical Results 
In this section, we compare the dynamics of adjustment as implied from our 
empirical approach to those of the theoretical model outlined by Pindyck (2001). 
Pindyck characterizes commodity market equilibrium as the outcome of interactions in 
the cash and storage markets. Total demand (denoted by Q) in the cash market is a 
function of the spot price (P), other demand shift variables zQ (e.g., the effect of 
macroeconomic policies), and random shocks εQ (e.g., tastes and technologies). The 
supply of a commodity in the cash market (denoted by X) is also a function of the spot 
price, other variables affecting supply zX (e.g., input costs), as well as random shocks 
εX, such as strikes or other unexpected supply disruptions. In equilibrium, net demand, 
which is the demand for production in excess of consumption, must equal the change in 
inventories ΔN by identity, so that we can write the cash market equilibrium as: 
 
   ; , ; ,t t Xt Xt t Qt QtN X P z Q P z     (8) 
 
The inverse net demand function can then be written as: 
 
 ; , ,t t Xt QtP f N z z    (9) 
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The inverse net demand function is upward sloping in ΔN; in other words, an increasing 
rate of inventory accumulation requires higher spot prices to increase supply and reduce 
demand.  
 
In storage market equilibrium, as described by Figure 2.2 above, the marginal 
convenience yield ψ is a function of inventory levels N and other variables, including 
price volatility σ, future and current consumption rates z3 and random shocks ε3. This 
can be written as: 
 
 ; , ,g N z     (10) 
 
Given the values for σ and zψ equilibrium in the storage market gives ψt and Nt. Then 
given the values and Nt-1, zX, and zQ, we can find ΔN and solve for P.  
 
What does the model predict in the event of a temporary supply shock? We will 
assume that a particular metal market is in a steady-state equilibrium with ΔN = 0. Now 
consider that the effects of an unanticipated strike at a particularly large mine. This will 
decrease supply X and cause the net demand function to shift upwards and the spot 
price to rise (see Figure 2.4). Because the shock is seen as temporary, inventories will 
be run down, limiting the increase in spot prices, and the marginal convenience yield 
will increase. Futures prices will likely rise, but by less than the spot price, which will 
flatten or even invert the futures curve. Once the strike ends, the net demand curve will 
shift lower, but until the marginal convenience yield returns back to ψ0, spot prices will 
fall but remain above the initial level to ensure that production exceeds consumption 
and inventories are rebuilt. The futures curve will move back towards its equilibrium 
slope as spot prices fall by more than futures prices.  
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Figure 2.4 Effect of Temporary Supply Shock 
 
Source:  Pindyck (2001) 
 
2.5.5.3 Comparison between Theoretical Predictions and Empirical 
Results 
How well does this theory predict the effects of short-term supply shocks in 
metal markets? Figure 2.5 presents the cumulative impulse responses from the 
estimated VECM models in each regime. A 1 percent spot price shock leads to a 
change in the log level of spot prices by more than the initial shock. This is because the 
spot price contemporaneously affects the futures prices, which in turn has feedback 
effects on the spot price, and so on. Initially, the curve flattens or inverts as spot prices 
increase by more than futures in each case, but the dynamics thereafter contrast sharply 
in each regime.  
 
In many cases, the increase in spot and futures prices is gradually and partially 
reversed over time, as predicted by Pindyck’s model. This pattern is strongest in 
regimes 2 and 3, where the market started out close to equilibrium or was already in a 
state of relative short-term scarcity. Inventories also tend to fall, as predicted, albeit 
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more gradually than prices, as market participants run down stocks in response to 
scarcity in the physical market. In some respects, the empirical results confirm the 
predictions of the theoretical model, but there are three important discrepancies: the 
behavior of prices in steep contango (regime 1); the permanence of the effects on price 
and inventory levels of an initial spot price shock; and different outcomes for specific 
metals. 
What can explain the apparent permanent change in spot and futures prices and 
inventories following a spot price shock? In our framework, we have interpreted an 
identified spot price shock as the result of a scarcity shock. This is an intuitive approach 
consistent with the predictions of most theoretical commodity price models for the 
instant response to a supply disruption. However, our results indicate that some of the 
effects from a spot price shock are permanent. In particular, in contango for many 
metals, a spot price shock leads to: a permanent shift higher across the futures curve; a 
modest flattening in the futures curve, with spot prices relatively higher than futures 
prices as compared to before the shock; and a compensating permanent decline in 
inventories. (In the long-run equations, the coefficient on inventories is small, which 
means that a relatively large decline is accompanied by only a small change in the slope 
of the futures curve.) 
 
These results suggest that some spot price shocks have a permanent effect, 
perhaps due to learning over time. An initial supply disruption may, over time, be 
recognized as a more persistent impairment of supply capacity. Examples might include 
deteriorating ore quality in well-established mines or strikes which persist for months 
rather than weeks. In these cases, the market would learn gradually about the new 
supply environment, preventing a decline in prices to the levels which prevailed before 
the shock. This suggests that alternative identification methods may also be useful in 
exploring the effects of temporary scarcity shocks, including Blanchard-Quah 
decompositions. 
 
When the futures curve is steeply upward sloping (regime 1), a spot price shock 
has relatively large effects on the futures price (albeit less than one-for-one). This 
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means that given the same initial shock to the curve originating in the spot price, the 
entire curve shifts much higher than in other regimes. This suggests that in a market 
with abundant inventories and steep contango, markets perceive that spot price shocks 
are more likely to reflect longer-lasting changes in market conditions.  
 
Figure 2.5 Impulse Responses from a Spot Price Shock 
 (Equivalent to a one percentage point futures price curve shock) 
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Second, the confidence intervals around impulse response estimates are much 
wider in regime 1 (contango) compared to regimes 2 and 3 (close to equilibrium and 
backwardation, respectively) for all commodities (Appendix figures 2.A.1 through 
2.A.6). To generate standard errors for the impulse responses, we bootstrapped the 
residuals from each sample, produced 500 replications, and then calculated the standard 
deviation of the impulse responses from these estimations. These findings are less easy 
to interpret, but to some extent, they may reflect the large sample sizes for regime 1, 
with perhaps a greater range of conditions in this sample as compared to regime 3. A 
more detailed discussion of this particular results lies outside the scope of this chapter.   
 
2.5.5.4 Different Pace of Adjustment in Each Regime 
A key result from this chapter is that the adjustment path back towards 
equilibrium, for a given percentage point shock to spot prices, is generally more 
gradual when the futures curves is in contango and steeply upward sloping (regime 1). 
The adjustment is more rapid when the futures curve is relatively flat or inverted 
(regime 3). The most rapid adjustment occurs when the system is close to equilibrium 
(regime 2). This result holds especially for nickel in regime 3.   The only metal for 
which this result does not hold is zinc (Figure 2.6). The different results on zinc may be 
due to a large outlier in the beginning of the data sample or the characteristics of the 
metal. Zinc can be substituted by aluminum or plastics. Rapid as opposed to expected 
gradual adjustment in contango can be a result of substituting other materials in place 
of zinc. Similarly, zinc spot prices may not go as high up during backwardation due to 
existing substitutes given that prices of substitutes would remain unchanged. In most 
cases, spot prices share much of the burden of adjustment and in backwardation, spot 
prices adjust particularly rapidly. This likely reflects the convexity of the marginal 
convenience yield with respect to inventories; in other words, when inventories are 
already low, the effect of supply disruptions on the marginal utility of inventories is 
significantly higher. A 1 percentage point shock to spot prices may reflect only a small 
supply disruption in terms of actual quantities, given the much higher sensitivity of the 
system to spot prices in backwardation. As inventories are rapidly drawn down, 
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expectations for a more stable path for inventories allows the spot price to fall quickly 
and the futures curve to return to a more “normal” slope.  
 
In contrast, a 1 percentage point spot price shock in a contangoed market may 
represent a very significant supply disruption since it will have little effect on the 
marginal convenience yield as inventories are already abundant. Inventories are drawn 
down more gradually and the price adjustment is slower. Mechanically, the adjustment 
coefficients for the VECMs in contangoed markets (regime 1) are much lower than in 
backwardation, which leads to a much more gradual error-correction process. 
Figure 2.6 Adjustment Back to Equilibrium Following a 1% Spot Price Shock 
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   Conclusions 2.6
In this chapter, we ask three questions: Is there such a thing as a “normal” 
commodity market, in which the relationship between spot and futures prices and 
inventories settles down to a long-run stable equilibrium? How does a commodity 
market adjust to a temporary scarcity shock which moves the price curve away from 
this equilibrium? How quickly do inventories and prices respond to such shocks? 
 
Our answer to the first question is “yes”. We find that the relationship between 
base metal spot prices, futures prices, inventories, and interest rates is cointegrating; to 
put it another way, it is possible to consider whether a commodity market is in 
“equilibrium” based on the relative values of each of these variables. When the system 
is away from equilibrium in response to a temporary shock, we should expect it to 
adjust back towards the steady state over time. The dynamics of this adjustment, 
however, vary across metals and depend on the initial state of the market. 
 
To the second question, we find some evidence that a temporary scarcity shock, 
modeled as a spot price shock which changes the slope of the futures curve, does cause 
a reaction in commodity markets somewhat consistent with a theoretical model, such as 
Pindyck (2001). In particular, inventories are drawn down and spot prices gradually fall 
back towards their initial level. However, the initial state of the market is an important 
conditioning factor for the subsequent adjustment. In a contangoed market with 
abundant inventories, spot price shocks produce a much more gradual inventory 
response, while the effect on price levels can be permanent. In contrast, in a 
backwardated market the inventory drawdown occurs much faster and the rise in both 
spot and futures prices are temporary.   
 
Our answer to the final question is that the adjustment of prices and inventories 
back towards equilibrium is much more gradual in a contangoed market. This may 
reflect the diminishing marginal utility of inventories and the resulting sensitivity of 
spot prices to supply disruptions in different initial states. For example, a 1 percentage 
point shock to spot prices may reflect only a small supply disruption in a tight, 
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backwardated market, but a significant disruption when inventories are abundant and 
spot prices are much less sensitive to perceptions of scarcity. In summary, in a tight 
physical market, even a small supply disruption can have large price effects, but these 
typically prove to be short-lived.  
 
These results are important for consumers, producers and inventory holders of 
commodities. In particular, they suggest that market participants should condition their 
response to market signals during periods of unusual conditions—or disequilibrium as 
we have defined it in this chapter—on the state of the inventory cycle, which is 
typically reflected in the slope of the futures curve.  
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2.A Appendix  
Table 2.A.4 Interest Rate-adjusted Basis 
 
Table 2.A.5 Unit Root Tests 
 
ADF denotes Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and PP denotes the Philips-Perron test. Various lag lengths were used 
for the ADF tests and Table A1 show the results from tests with a lag length of six. 
 Mean  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  Observ.
 Aluminum 0.95 0.47 -0.18 1.53 3108
 Copper 0.96 0.46 -0.22 1.54 3108
 Lead 0.96 0.46 -0.21 1.53 3108
 Nickel 0.97 0.47 -0.17 1.55 3108
 Tin 0.96 0.47 -0.18 1.52 3108
 Zinc 0.95 0.47 -0.18 1.53 3108
Log levels . First differenced logs
ADF PP . ADF PP
t-statistic p-value t-statistic p-value t-statistic p-value t-statistic p-value
Libor interest rates
3-month -0.68 0.85 -0.54 0.88 -14.90 0.00 -43.89 0.00
6-month -0.61 0.87 -0.61 0.86 -16.78 0.00 -48.70 0.00
Aluminum
spot price -1.38 0.59 -1.34 0.61 -57.49 0.00 -57.49 0.00
futures price (3-month) -0.45 0.90 -0.52 0.89 -59.54 0.00 -59.41 0.00
futures price (6-month) -0.60 0.87 -0.61 0.87 -53.92 0.00 -53.90 0.00
inventories -1.14 0.70 -1.13 0.70 -55.37 0.00 -55.37 0.00
Copper
spot price -0.45 0.90 -0.39 0.91 -53.71 0.00 -53.72 0.00
futures price (3-month) -1.12 0.71 -1.07 0.73 -57.64 0.00 -57.68 0.00
futures price (6-month) -1.34 0.61 -1.34 0.61 -57.90 0.00 -57.90 0.00
inventories -0.43 0.90 -0.51 0.89 -59.74 0.00 -59.60 0.00
Lead
spot price -0.51 0.89 -0.54 0.88 -54.20 0.00 -54.19 0.00
futures price (3-month) -1.12 0.71 -1.11 0.71 -55.93 0.00 -55.95 0.00
futures price (6-month) -0.39 0.91 -0.35 0.92 -53.77 0.00 -53.77 0.00
inventories -1.09 0.72 -1.04 0.74 -57.94 0.00 -58.00 0.00
Nickel
spot price -1.26 0.65 -1.24 0.66 -57.63 0.00 -57.63 0.00
futures price (3-month) -0.40 0.91 -0.49 0.89 -60.05 0.00 -59.89 0.00
futures price (6-month) -0.44 0.90 -0.46 0.90 -54.29 0.00 -54.28 0.00
inventories -1.08 0.73 -1.06 0.74 -56.01 0.00 -56.02 0.00
Tin
spot price -0.45 0.90 -0.39 0.91 -54.01 0.00 -54.03 0.00
futures price (3-month) -1.03 0.74 -0.97 0.77 -57.85 0.00 -57.93 0.00
futures price (6-month) 2.27 1.00 1.56 1.00 -14.28 0.00 -50.45 0.00
inventories -1.22 0.67 -1.23 0.66 -11.98 0.00 -57.17 0.00
Zinc
spot price -1.51 0.53 -1.71 0.42 -20.33 0.00 -51.57 0.00
futures price (3-month) -1.18 0.69 -1.26 0.65 -20.01 0.00 -47.20 0.00
futures price (6-month) -1.91 0.33 -1.90 0.33 -21.69 0.00 -48.60 0.00
inventories -0.83 0.81 -0.90 0.79 -15.96 0.00 -53.62 0.00
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2.A.1 Cointegration Tests 
For the Engle-Granger procedure, we tested the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration by estimating the following regression, using the residuals from equation 
(6): 
ttt ua  11 ˆˆ   (A1) 
 
Table 2.A.3 presents the t-statistics from these regressions for each commodity using 
the 3-month and 6-month futures contract and interest rate, together with the 5 percent 
Engle-Granger critical values. In all cases, we were able to reject the null of no 
cointegration. 
Table 2.A.6 Engle-Granger tests of Cointegrating Residuals  
 
The null hypothesis is for a unit root in the residuals of the equation and no cointegration. The test statistic is 
calculated using the Philips-Perron procedure and the critical values are taken from MacKinnon (1991). 
 
For the VECM estimations, we use the lag length identified by standard 
selection criteria for the VAR in log-levels for each commodity and based on the 
variables in equation (4) (Table 2.A.4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Critical Test statistic
values 3-month model 6-month model
 Aluminum -4.12 -9.11 -4.88
 Copper -4.12 -12.73 -6.37
 Lead -4.12 -10.09 -6.91
 Nickel -4.12 -9.52 -6.71
 Tin -4.12 -8.25 -5.53
 Zinc -4.12 -8.00 -5.94
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Table 2.A.7 Vector Autoregression Lag Length Tests  
 
Information criteria include Aikaike (AIC), Schwarz-Bayesian (SIC), and Hannan-Quin (HQ). We base our 
decisions on the AIC. 
 
2.A.2 Tsay’s Test for Threshold Nonlinearity 
The first stage is to assess the autoregressive structure of the equilibrium error. 
We find that partial autocorrelations decline rapidly after the first lag, although they 
remain statistically significant (Table 2.A.4). Although information criteria indicate that 
the optimal AR order varies between 2 and 5 (Table 2.A.5), running the threshold tests 
on AR(1) or these optimal AR orders produced either identical or very similar results, 
underscoring the dominant influence of the first lag.  
 
Table 2.A.8 Partial Autocorrelation Functions for the Equilibrium Errors 
 
 Autocorrelations significant at the 95 percent level. 
 
Akaike Schwarz-Bayes Hannan-Quinn
Three-month model
Aluminum 7 3 6
Copper 8 3 7
Lead 7 2 3
Nickel 7 2 4
Tin 8 2 3
Zinc 11 2 3
Six-month model
Aluminum 7 2 5
Copper 7 3 7
Lead 7 2 3
Nickel 7 2 3
Tin 7 2 3
Zinc 7 2 7
Lag order
1 2 3 4 5
3-month
Aluminum 0.94 0.07 0.14 0.03 -0.06
Copper 0.89 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.01
Lead 0.93 -0.05 0.07 0.03 0.04
Nickel 0.94 0.00 0.05 0.05 -0.04
Tin 0.95 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.00
Zinc 0.97 -0.06 -0.14 0.00 -0.03
6-month
Aluminum 0.98 -0.04 0.06 0.00 0.02
Copper 0.97 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.03
Lead 0.97 -0.10 0.05 0.06 0.03
Nickel 0.97 -0.10 0.01 0.00 0.00
Tin 0.97 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.04
Zinc 0.98 -0.15 -0.12 0.05 0.00
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Table 2.A.9 Information Criteria for Equilibrium Error AR(p) Equations   
 
Minimum criteria values in bold. 
 
As a result, we arrange the data such that it is increasing in the value of the 
AR(1) regressor, in our case the equilibrium error in the previous period zt-1. The least 
squares estimates of the AR(1) regressor in equation (5) will be consistent for each set 
of cases, if the value of the thresholds were known. Since the value of the thresholds is 
unknown, we proceed sequentially. The predictive residuals from equation (5) will be 
white noise asymptotically and orthogonal to the regressor until zt-1 reaches a threshold, 
at which point the predictive residual will be biased and a function of the regressor. To 
test this, we obtain the standardized predictive residuals from an ordered 
autoregression, where πi is the time index of the tth smallest observation, and run the 
least squares regression: 
 
1101   ttt vz    (A1) 
 
We do this for all sample periods i = k + 1,…,T – 1, where k is the number of 
explanatory variable (on our case 1) and compute Tsay’s statistic, which is the F-
statistic of the resulting regression: 
 
AR order
1 2 3 4 5
3-month
Aluminum -8.2896 -8.2942 -8.3125 -8.3123 -8.3151
Copper -8.5228 -8.5309 -8.5431 -8.5439 -8.5430
Lead -7.6642 -7.6653 -7.6689 -7.6691 -7.6694
Nickel -7.9656 -7.9647 -7.9658 -7.9676 -7.9682
Tin -9.2667 -9.2663 -9.2733 -9.2725 -9.2716
Zinc -8.2470 -8.2505 -8.2685 -8.2682 -8.2685
6-month
Aluminum -8.7211 -8.7229 -8.7271 -8.7271 -8.7276
Copper -8.6499 -8.6498 -8.6526 -8.6536 -8.6534
Lead -7.3551 -7.3640 -7.3653 -7.3683 -7.3680
Nickel -7.7603 -7.7702 -7.7696 -7.7686 -7.7677
Tin -8.7312 -8.7312 -8.7330 -8.7322 -8.7315
Zinc -8.2937 -8.3254 -8.3421 -8.3624 -8.3723
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In equation (A2), d is the delay parameter (in our case 1), p is the order of the 
autoregression, and h is obtained from max{1, p + 1}.This test statistic follows an F 
distribution with p + 1 and T – d – k – p – h degrees of freedom. Implementing this 
procedure on the residuals from the cointegrating equations for each commodity 
obtains the following test statistics and p-values for the null hypothesis that the 
standardized recursive residuals are not a function of the regressor. Table 2.A.7 shows 
the results of these tests. In all cases (with the exception of 6-month zinc), it was 
possible to reject the null hypothesis of linearity at the 1 percent level of confidence. 
Although 6-month zinc was an exception, other tests for structural breaks suggested 
that there is a significant degree of nonlinearity. 
 
2.A.3 Quandt-Andrews Tests for Structural Breaks 
This procedure performs a Chow test at every observation between two dates, or 
observations. We then identify the maximum Wald F statistic from each individual 
Chow test and assess whether it is possible to reject the null of no structural break at the 
95 percent confidence level. We then perform the same procedure for the largest 
remaining sub-sample to check for another breakpoint. In all cases, we found it was 
possible to reject the null hypothesis of no structural break at the 1 percent level for the 
overall sample and the sub-sample constructed by removing the smallest section of the 
sample split by the first threshold. We used these F statistic maxima to identify the 
threshold locations.   
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Table 2.A.10 Tsay’s Nonlinearity Test Results 
 
 Probability that the null hypothesis of linearity (no thresholds) is true. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3-month 6-month .
Test statistic p-value 1/ Test statistic p-value 1/
Aluminum
full sample 72.16 0.0000 32.2 0.0000
sub-sample 98.37 0.0000 161.4 0.0000
Copper
full sample 300.36 0.0000 174.4 0.0000
sub-sample 11.52 0.0000 324.89 0.0000
Lead
full sample 83.94 0.0000 29.31 0.0000
sub-sample 50.53 0.0000 16.41 0.0000
Nickel
full sample 53.39 0.0000 13.07 0.0000
sub-sample 122.05 0.0000 177 0.0000
Tin
full sample 27.64 0.0000 32.36 0.0000
sub-sample 14.16 0.0000 197.02 0.0000
Zinc
full sample 6.01 0.0025 0.46 0.6313
sub-sample 74.2 0.0000 122.98 0.0000
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Figure 2.7 Aluminum: Impulse Responses to 1 percent Spot Price Shock 
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Figure 2.8 Copper: Impulse Responses to 1 percent Spot Price Shock 
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Figure 2.9 Lead: Impulse Responses to 1 percent Spot Price Shock  
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Figure 2.10 Nickel: Impulse Responses to 1 percent Spot Price Shock 
 
 
 
 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
0 10 20 30 40 50
Days
Regime 1
Spot price
Standard error bounds
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
0 10 20 30 40 50
Days
Regime 1
Futures price
-7.0
-6.0
-5.0
-4.0
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
0 10 20 30 40 50
Days
Regime 1
Inventories
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
0 10 20 30 40 50
Days
Regime 2
Spot price
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0 10 20 30 40 50
Days
Regime 2
Futures price
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
0 10 20 30 40 50
Days
Regime 2
Inventories
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0 10 20 30 40 50
Days
Regime 3
Spot price
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0 10 20 30 40 50
Days
Regime 3
Futures price
-3.0
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0 10 20 30 40 50
Days
Regime 3
Inventories
   
67 
 
Figure 2.11 Tin: Impulse Responses to 1 percent Spot Price Shock 
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Figure 2.12 Zinc: Impulse Responses to 1 percent Spot Price Shock 
 
  
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
0 20 40 60 80 100
Days
Regime 1
Spot price
Standard error bounds
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
0 20 40 60 80 100
Days
Regime 1
Futures price
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
0 20 40 60 80 100
Days
Regime 1
Inventories
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
0 20 40 60 80 100
Days
Regime 2
Spot price
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
0 20 40 60 80 100
Days
Regime 2
Futures price
-1.5
-1.3
-1.1
-0.9
-0.7
-0.5
-0.3
-0.1
0.1
0.3
0.5
0 20 40 60 80 100
Days
Regime 2
Inventories
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0 20 40 60 80 100
Days
Regime 3
Spot price
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 20 40 60 80 100
Days
Regime 3
Futures price
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
0 20 40 60 80 100
Days
Regime 3
Inventories
   
69 
 
                                                
 
 
 
3 PRICE AND INCOME ELASTICITY OF THE 
U.S. GASOLINE DEMAND 
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 Introduction 3.1
Crude oil and gasoline play an important role in the U.S. economy. The U.S. is 
the largest crude oil consumer in the world making up 21% of total oil consumption. 
Gasoline accounts for over 50 percent of U.S. oil consumption. Understanding the role 
of income and gasoline prices on demand is an integral part of effective fiscal, tax and 
environmental policy-making in the U.S. and has been studied extensively in the 1970s 
and the early 1980s when prices were very high and supplies were tight. In recent 
years, there is a renewed interest in price-based policies such as gasoline or carbon 
taxes, as pressures increase to reduce greenhouse gas emissions produced by transport 
sector. In this context, it is important to review whether gasoline demand elasticities 
have changed by incorporating recent developments using the latest data. 
 
From the mid-2000s to 2008 commodity prices in general and gasoline prices in 
specific increased continuously reaching record levels in real and nominal terms. In the 
U.S., gasoline prices exceeded unprecedented levels of 4 dollars per gallon in mid-2008 
(right panel of Figure 3.1). High commodity prices were a result of increased world 
demand in the 2000s during which the U.S. as well as other advanced and emerging 
economies experienced high level of economic growth and wealth. The rise in income 
increased automobile ownership and demand for gasoline. The left panel of Figure 3.1 
illustrates the steep climb in real disposable income since the early 2000s and increase 
in motor gasoline consumption in the U.S. With the onset of financial crisis in the 
second half of 2008, gasoline prices, income and gasoline consumption fell sharply. 
Gasoline prices started to recover in 2009, but they did not revert back to the levels of 
2008. Despite recovery in real disposable income in the last few years, gasoline 
consumption continues to fall (left panel).  
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Figure 3.1 Gasoline Consumption, Disposable Income and Real Gasoline Prices  
 
 Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
In addition to rising income levels, low interest rates during the 2000s enabled 
many U.S. consumers to gain access to cheap credit to purchase new vehicles--
especially large size vehicles which consume more fuel--increasing the total number of 
motor vehicles to record levels in 2007 as well as the demand for gasoline. Left panel 
of Figure 3.2 illustrates the number of motor vehicles per 1000 people in the U.S. 
which is highest in the world. The number has come down as income fell and 
unemployment increased with the start of financial crisis in 2008. However, the U.S. 
still remains a country with the highest transportation fuel consumed per capita and the 
lowest fuel tax and prices in the OECD countries as shown in the right panel of Figure 
3.2.
6
 Per capita miles travelled in European countries are between 35 to 45 percent of 
U.S. miles travelled.
7
  Great distances between cities, disbursed urbanization and 
limited public transportation services make the U.S. citizens rely heavily on 
                                                 
6
 Size of the circle is proportional to population. The line is fitted value from a regression of the log of consumption 
on the log price. This chart is taken from Knittel (2012). 
 
7
Knittel (2012). 
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automobiles as means of transport.  Polzin and Chu (2005) find that the share of transit 
passenger miles traveled relative to other types of transportation has steadily decreased 
over the past thirty years suggesting that U.S. consumers may be more dependent on 
automobiles than in previous decades.  
 
Figure 3.2 Motor Vehicles and Transportation Fuel in the US 
     
Source: World Bank, World Indicator Database  Source: World Bank 
 
The heavy usage of motor vehicles in the U.S. causes high amount of carbon 
dioxide emission. The 33.8% of total carbon dioxide emissions are derived from the 
transportation sector in the U.S. Shortly after the oil prices shocks of the 1970s, the 
U.S. adopted Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, which set minimum 
average fuel economy thresholds for the new vehicles sold by an automaker in a given 
year. As the left panel of Figure 3.3 shows, there was a small improvement on the 
average fuel economy of new fleet vehicles in the past two decades up until the run-up 
in gasoline prices beginning in 2005, fleet fuel economy increased however, this rise 
appears to have subsided by 2010. Overall miles-per-gallon standards in the U.S. are 
not as high as in other OECD countries. After accounting for differences in the testing 
procedures, the United Nation estimated that the European Union standard was roughly 
17 miles-per-gallon more stringent in 2010 than the U.S. standard (An et al., 2011). A 
new Corporate Average Fuel Economy standard in place for 2011 seeks to increase 
average fuel economy further by 2016 (right panel in Figure 3.3). In addition, new 
Transportation Fuel Consumption per 
Capita versus Fuel Price 
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standards will evaluate the mileage standards based on the greenhouse gas emissions of 
the vehicle and on the area of the footprint of its tires. 
Figure 3.3  U.S. Vehicle Fuel Economy and CAFE Standards 
 
 
 
This chapter examines the price and income elasticities of gasoline demand in 
the U.S. from 1975 to 2013 based on the methodologies in Hughes et al. (2008) and in 
Davis and Kilian (2010). Hughes et al. (2008) estimate the short-run elasticities in two 
different periods: 1975-1980 and 2001-2006 during which gasoline prices were high.
8
 
Since elasticity estimates vary according to data type and empirical model 
specification, they use a consistent set of data and models between the two periods to 
make the elasticities comparable over time. They show that the short-run gasoline price 
elasticity declined over time compared to the results of earlier studies. They attribute 
this change to structural and behavioral changes occurred in the U.S. gasoline market. 
We also estimate the elasticities in these two periods but include a third sample period 
from October 2008 to February 2013 during which the U.S experienced a severe 
recession while gasoline prices remained high. It is imperative to examine the 
                                                 
8 Goodwin et al. defines the short term 1 year and long term as the asymptotic end state when responses are 
completed, for much of the transport literature, periods of 5–10 years are estimated empirically, within which the 
greatest part of the response is in the first 3–5 years. 
 
U.S. New Vehicle Fuel Economy  
 from 1979 to 2011 
U.S. CAFE Standards 
   from 1978 to 2016 
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elasticities and consumer behavior during this most recent yet difficult period for 
consumers in terms of determining the future tax and environmental policies. In 
addition to three subsamples, we also estimate the models using the full sample to study 
the long-term behavior of elasticities. Elasticities are estimated using several simple 
econometric models similar in form to those used in previous studies of gasoline 
demand including Hughes et al. (2008). These are OLS, partial adjustment dynamic 
model where we include a lagged dependent variable to allow slow adjustment to the 
equilibrium level, Instrumental Variable (IV) to correct for the endogeneity between 
gasoline price and consumption. 
 
In addition to the simple econometric models, we explore a dynamic time series 
approach involving a bivariate vector autoregression (VAR) developed by Davis and 
Kilian (2011) to estimate the short-run price elasticity of gasoline demand and handle 
the endogeneity between gasoline price and gasoline consumption. The increases in the 
demand for gasoline cause the price of gasoline to increase, resulting in a spurious 
correlation between the price and the regression error producing biased estimates. The 
endogeneity can be addressed with the right instrumental variables. However, finding 
the proper instruments is always a challenge. Instead of using instruments in identifying 
exogenous movements in gasoline prices, we focus on unpredictable changes in 
gasoline prices and measure responses of gasoline demand employing the VAR model 
in which the percent change in gasoline prices is ordered first and the percent change in 
gasoline consumption is ordered second. This ordering implies that gasoline prices do 
not react to gasoline consumption shocks within the same month but with one month 
delay while gasoline demand responds to gasoline price shocks immediately. The 
response of gasoline consumption to 1% shocks to gasoline prices within 12 months 
can be interpreted as short-run price elasticity of gasoline demand. The disadvantage of 
this approach, however, is that since income changes very slowly over time, it is very 
difficult to estimate the income elasticity in this specification. Hence, we only estimate 
the price elasticity using this model on three sample periods as well as on the full 
sample as is done with the simple models explained earlier.  
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The contribution of this study to literature is to include the latest period of data 
and use a number of various models to estimate the gasoline demand responsiveness to 
price and income changes in the U.S. and compare the results to draw policy 
implications. 
 
The plan of the chapter is as follows.  In the next section, we present a brief 
literature review followed by the section 3 which includes the description of data to be 
used in estimations. In section 4, we discuss the methodology and description of the 
models. Section 5 covers the estimation results and discussion of the results. Finally, 
we conclude and offer policy implications in section 6. 
 
  Literature Survey 3.2
A large body of econometric studies focused on understanding gasoline demand 
during the 1970s and the early 1980s when fuel prices were high and concerns about 
energy conservation and energy security were at peak. Sterner and Dahl (1992), Dahl 
(1995), Espey (1998) and more recently Graham and Glaister (2002) provide thorough 
reviews based on a large number of gasoline demand studies.  
 
Dahl and Sterner (1991 and 1992) first, examine nearly 300 studies and classify 
them by the type of model and report the price and income elasticities of gasoline 
demand for OECD countries over the period 1960-1985.  The short run price elasticity 
of gasoline demand varies between -0.10 to -0.24 depending on the model estimated. 
The equivalent long run figure is between -0.54 and -0.96. Averaging these estimates 
gives a short run value of -0.23 and a long run figure of almost three and half times as 
large, -0.77. The average income short run elasticity is given as 0.39 and the long run as 
1.17. Dahl and Sterner note the higher absolute value of income elasticity than the 
value of price elasticity suggests that gasoline prices must rise faster than the rate of 
income growth if gasoline consumption is to be stabilized at existing levels. 
 
Second, they compare dynamic, static and pooled model estimates of long-run 
elasticities by testing the models with the same data set, since different model 
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specifications may give very different estimates. The dynamic models give estimated 
price elasticities within the range -0.80 to -0.95, and income elasticities of between 1.1 
and 1.3. Static models for cross-section data give roughly unitary elasticities for both 
price and income. Pooled data model estimates price elasticities as high as -1.3 or -1.4.   
 
Dahl (1995) moves the review period further and focuses on a number of 
gasoline demand surveys conducted since 1977 on the U.S. to explore if and how the 
magnitude of elasticities  have changed. She finds that static models estimate long run 
price and income elasticities of –0.16 and 0.46 from studies based on recent data, 
somewhat smaller in magnitude compared to previous estimates of –0.53 and 1.16.  The 
review of dynamic models shows no substantial reduction in the magnitude of the 
elasticity estimates. Dahl (1995) argues that elasticities have become smaller in 
magnitude over time, particularly for income. While previous studies show long run 
price and income elasticities of around –0.8 and 1.0, recent studies suggest a price 
response of around –0.6 and a slightly inelastic income response.  
 
Espey (1998) carries out ‘meta-analyses’ of international gasoline demand 
elasticities to explain the variation in the magnitude of estimated price and income 
effects. This work makes a novel contribution to the literature since it examines and 
explains empirically why variation in estimates exists, whereas the major other reviews 
identify the variation. Espey’s study is based on an extensive review of articles 
published between 1966 and 1997 which gave 277 estimates of long run price 
elasticity, 245 estimates of long run income elasticities, 363 estimates of short run price 
elasticity, and 345 estimates of the short run income elasticity. The author shows that 
variation in the short and long run income and price elasticities can be explained by 
demand specification, data characteristics, ‘environmental’ characteristics (i.e. the level 
of the data, the setting, time span analyzed etc.) and the estimation method. 
 
Espey’s (1998) results show that elasticity estimates are sensitive to a number of 
different aspects of model structure. In terms of price effects, the inclusion of vehicle 
ownership and fuel efficiency variables serves to lower estimates of the short, but not 
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the long-run price elasticity. Static models tend to produce larger short run price 
elasticities and lower long run price elasticities. No differences are found for price 
elasticities across different dynamic specifications, nor are differences in long run price 
elasticity estimates found among time series, cross-sectional and cross-sectional-time 
series studies. 
 
As regards income effects, Espey’s (1998) analysis finds that the inclusion of 
vehicle ownership and vehicle characteristics substantially influences results. Models 
that include some measure of vehicle ownership estimate significantly lower short and 
long run income elasticities. No statistically significant differences are found for long 
run estimates between static and dynamic models, or between different dynamic 
specifications.  
 
There are studies that examine disaggregated household data to measure the 
impact of fuel price changes on consumption. Puller and Greening (1999) is a good 
example of such studies which reviews short run estimates of price elasticities of 
gasoline demand from a number of studies that are conducted from 1980 to 1995 based 
on dissagregated household data. They summarize the short run price elasticities that 
range from -0.67 to -0.43. In addition, the authors construct a panel of US households 
over 9 years to examine household adjustment to changes in the real price of gasoline. 
They apply a variety of estimation techniques and lag structures to their data which are 
different from the studies they reviewed to estimate the short-run price elasticity of 
gasoline around –0.35, a figure they believe to be consistent with estimates from the 
literature.  
 
Kayser (2000) estimates household demand for gasoline and the corresponding 
price and income demand elasticities by using household level data from the 1981 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics PSID which include the living environment of the 
household such as living in rural or urban area and availability of public transportation 
to commute to work. Economic factors are the household’s income, the price of 
gasoline for the household, and the employment status of the head of the household. 
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Gasoline demand is calculated by deflating the reported miles traveled by the imputed 
household-specific fuel efficiency.  
 
Kayser’s empirical results from a selection corrected gasoline demand 
regression suggest low short-run price (-0.23) and income (0.48) elasticities and clear 
differences in gasoline demand across the population. The living environment has a 
significant effect on gasoline consumption; living in the presence of good public 
transportation tends to significantly lower gasoline consumption. On the other hand, 
living in a rural setting increases gasoline consumption. As for income, the results 
indicate that households with higher incomes tend to consume more gasoline but that 
the additional consumption comes at a decreasing rate.  
 
Kayser uses an interaction term between the price of gasoline and income which 
implies that the income elasticity is lower when prices are higher, and that the price 
elasticity is greater at higher levels of income. The coefficient of the interaction terms 
indicates that households with lower incomes do not respond as much to higher 
gasoline prices as wealthier households. It is not unreasonable to assume that low 
income households cannot reduce their driving and gasoline consumption further in 
response to increasing prices as their driving and consumption is at the level of 
necessity where there is very little room for significant decline. The wealthier 
households on the other hand are probably able to reduce some of the consumption 
which is less of a necessity. Furthermore, the fuel efficiency regression shows that 
income is a significant explanatory variable for the fuel efficiency of a household’s car 
fleet. Also there is a consistently positive relationship between income and fuel 
efficiency for each of the chosen subgroups. It appears that higher income allows 
households to purchase newer cars that will on average be more fuel-efficient because 
cars in 1981 are subject to the corporate fuel efficiency standards. Overall results 
suggest that a gasoline tax is not likely to result in large decreases in gasoline 
consumption.   
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Nicol (2003) estimates gasoline demand elasticities for six different household 
groups varying by family size and housing tenure status, for different regions in Canada 
and the United States. The results show that gasoline demand is generally more 
responsive to price and income changes in Canada, but this is not universally true for 
all household types. Also, while regional differences in elasticities are observed in both 
Canada and the United States, family size and housing tenure status have larger impacts 
on differences in elasticities across households. 
 
In their review of studies on gasoline price elasticities, Graham and Glaister 
(2002) conclude that the consensus from the studies that use disaggregated household 
data is that short term price elasticity effects do exist and are of the order of magnitude 
suggested by the majority of the articles. There is evidence, however, that income 
effects are more difficult to determine in the short run.  
 
Graham and Glaister (2002) review fuel elasticity studies which are conducted 
until early 2000’s.  They admit that the use of specific data or methodological 
approaches in addition to geographical area of study can create crucial differences in 
the magnitude of elasticity estimates.  However the overwhelming evidence from their 
survey suggests that long run price elasticities typically tend to fall in the –0.6 to –0.8 
range. Specifically the long-run elasticity in the US ranges from –0.23 to –0.8, and 
within the OECD ranges from –0.75 to –1.35. In many cases authors explicitly claim to 
find similarities and not differences between countries in the size of long run price 
elasticities. Individual studies, which apply a variety of different estimation techniques 
to the same data, also produce long run estimates within the same range. These same 
studies show that short run price elasticities normally range from –0.2 to –0.3. Again, 
this is fairly consistent across different empirical studies. 
 
As for income elasticity, the long run income elasticity of fuel demand is 
typically found to fall in the range 1.1 to 1.3. Short run income elasticities are in the 
range 0.35 to 0.55. Overall, studies find that the U.S. has lower fuel consumption 
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elasticities than Europe with respect to both price and income. Graham and Galister 
summarize the elasticity results as in the Table 3.1 below. 
 
Table 3.1 Summary of Elasticities across Studies 
 Price elasticity Income elasticity 
 Short Long Short Long 
Fuel  Consumption -0.2 to -0.3 -0.6 to -0.8 0.35 to 0.55 1.1 to 1.3 
 
They confirm and conclude that as fuel prices rise, abstracting from other 
changes, fuel consumption will fall by a less than proportionate amount. As economic 
activity and real incomes increase, abstracting from other changes, fuel consumption 
will increase by a slightly greater proportion. In all cases it takes time for people to 
adjust, so the initial impact effects are smaller than effects in the long term. 
Improvements in the fuel efficiencies of vehicles have significantly changed fuel 
consumed and the fuel costs of travelling a given distance. Fuel taxation can play a 
significant part in fuel consumption and the volume of emissions, especially over the 
long term. However, as several of the authors surveyed point out, an implication of the 
relative magnitudes is that real fuel prices would have to rise faster than real incomes in 
order to offset their effect.  
 
Small and Van Dender (2007) investigate the short and long run price 
elasticities of gasoline demand by factoring in the endogenous changes in fuel 
efficiency and using annual cross-sectional time-series data at the U.S. state-level from 
1966 to 2001. The authors model explicitly the simultaneous aggregate demand for 
vehicle miles traveled, vehicle stock and fuel economy. They distinguish between the 
cost per mile of travel and the cost per gallon of fuel and therefore can estimate the 
price elasticity of gasoline in addition to exogenous and endogenous changes in fuel 
efficiency. In general, as energy efficiency improves, the cost of consumption becomes 
cheaper, thereby providing an incentive to increase its use. Thus total energy 
consumption changes less than proportionally to changes in physical energy efficiency. 
For the full sample, they find the short run elasticities at -0.05 and long run elasticities 
at -0.22. Their estimates for short and long run elasticities decline to -0.02 and -0.11, 
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respectively when 1997 – 2001 data period is tested. They attribute the decline in 
elasticities in the last five years of the sample to rising real income and lower real fuel 
prices. The decline in consumption as a result of efficiency gains gets smaller as 
income increases. They conclude that the responses of gasoline demand to increases in 
prices are considerably smaller than values typically assumed for policy analysis. 
 
Hughes et al. (2008) estimate the average per capita demand for gasoline in the 
U.S. for the period from 1974 to 2006. They investigate two periods (1975 -1980) and 
(2001-2006) which have similar gasoline price increases to demonstrate changes in 
short-run elasticities over time. They find that the majority of literature overestimates 
gasoline demand elasticities for the past decade. They show that the short-run gasoline 
price elasticity shifted down considerably from a range of −0.21 to −0.34 in the late 
1970s to −0.034 to −0.077 in the early 2000s. They argue that the change in price 
elasticity of demand is likely due to structural and behavioral changes in the U.S. since 
the 1970s which might include the implementation of Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy program (CAFE), changing land-use patterns, growth in per capita and 
household income and an increase in public transportation. Hughes et al. (2008) 
suggest that it is likely that long-run elasticities have decreased over time in contrast to 
Espey (1998) who argues that short-run elasticities have increased over time. 
 
Wadud et al. (2009) assess the cointegration between gasoline consumption, 
gasoline price and income in US data using an annual time-series from 1949 to 2004. 
The results indicate that no stable and meaningful long-run relationship exists between 
these three variables for the whole period. Dividing the sample into two subsets, pre-
1974 and post-1978, similar tests indicate that cointegration exists between the three 
variables for the post-1978 sub-sample, but not for the pre-1974 sub-sample which may 
suggest that there may have been a structural break in the data between 1974 and 1978, 
coinciding with the oil supply and price shocks, as well as introduction of fuel economy 
standards in the US. 
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Davis and Kilian (2010) examine the impact of a gasoline price tax increase on 
the gasoline consumption in the U.S. at the state and national level using monthly data 
from 1998 to 2008.  They first estimate the price elasticity of gasoline demand 
deploying a single-equation specification to find a price elasticity of -0.10 at the 
national level. Second, they model gasoline consumption at the state level using panel 
data methods which help overcome the price endogeneity with respect to quantity. With 
this specification they find a price elasticity of -0.19. Third, they construct an 
instrument variable by using changes in gasoline taxes by state and month to tackle 
further the endogeneity issue. The resulting panel IV estimates are substantially larger 
than the OLS panel estimates. They find that a 10 cent tax increase would be associated 
with a 3-4% decrease in gasoline consumption. Finally, they implement a bivariate 
vector autoregression (VAR) model to measure the response of gasoline demand to the 
shock to percent change in gasoline prices as price elasticity of demand. The authors 
find a one-year price elasticity in the range of -0.07 to -0.12, implying that a 10 cent tax 
increase would be associated with a reduction in gasoline consumption between -0.22 
and -0.37. If the change in prices in this VAR model is replaced with the change in 
taxes, however, that estimate increases to between -3.39 and -3.91, similar to the panel 
IV estimate. 
 
Overall, the results of Davis and Kilian (2010) suggest that gasoline 
consumption is more sensitive to increases in gasoline taxes than to increases in the 
gasoline prices due to the fact that changes in taxes are much more persistent than 
typical changes in prices. However, gasoline tax increases of the magnitude that have 
been discussed would have only a moderate impact on total U.S. gasoline consumption 
and carbon emissions based on the estimates. In addition, the adjustment to tax increase 
takes very long time and the reduction achieved with it is very small to make a big 
impact on U.S. carbon emissions which falls far short of the emissions reductions 
targets. They conclude that there is no statistical evidence to suggest that a gasoline tax 
increase of the magnitude considered by policymakers would reduce carbon emissions 
enough to have a substantial effect on global warming.  
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Lin and Prince (2013) follow similar approach to Hughes et al. (2008) to 
examine the price elasticity of gasoline demand but include gasoline price volatility 
into static and dynamic models. They split the sample into periods by price volatilities 
and observe how gasoline price volatility impacts consumers' price elasticity of demand 
for gasoline. Their results show that volatility in prices decreases consumer demand for 
gasoline in the intermediate run. They also find that consumers appear to be less elastic 
in response to changes in gasoline price when gasoline price volatility is medium or 
high, compared to when it is low. Moreover, the authors find that when controlled for 
variance in the econometric model, gasoline price elasticity of demand is lower in 
magnitude in the long run. 
 
The methodology in this chapter is built on the methodologies from the earlier 
studies to examine the elasticity of gasoline demand in the U.S. We employ a cross-
sectional as well as a time-series analysis and take endogeneity problem into account. 
The most of studies use either cross-sectional or time series analysis and may not 
address the endogeneity issue properly which may undermine the results.   
 
  Data 3.3
The data used in the analysis are U.S. aggregate monthly data reported by 
several U.S. government agencies for the period from January 1975 to February 2013. 
Gasoline consumption is approximated as monthly “product supplied” reported by the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, which is calculated as domestic production 
plus imports, less exports and changes to stocks. Gasoline prices are U.S. city average 
prices for unleaded regular fuel and are converted to real values by using Consumer 
Price Index (All Urban Consumers, U.S. city average 1982-84=100) which was re-
indexed to 2005 to be consistent with the real income series. The data source is the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics for both series. Real Personal disposable income (based in 
2005 prices) is from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Economic 
Accounts. Total gasoline consumption and income are converted to per capita by 
dividing them by mid-year total population, which is from the Census Bureau's 
Population Estimates Program (PEP). As for macroeconomic variables; unemployment 
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rate is from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1 and 10-year interest rates are 1 and 
10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate from the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System.  
 
  Model Specifications 3.4
3.4.1 Basic Model  
The basic model is based on the previous studies including Hughes et al. (2008) 
which is in double-log form and assumes that the elasticity is constant over each 
analysis period. 
In Gjt = β0 + β1 ln Pjt +  β2 lnYjt +   εj +  εjt  (1) 
where Gjt is per capita gasoline consumption in gallons in month j and year t, Pjt is the 
real retail price of gasoline in month j and year t, Yjt is real per capita disposable 
income in month j and year t, εj  represents unobserved demand factors that vary at the 
month level and εjt  is a mean zero error term. Both Yjt and Pjt are in constant 2005 
dollars. We model the εj’s as fixed month effects to capture the seasonality present in 
gasoline consumption. The price and income elasticities are β1 and β2 . 
 
δ In Gjt   = β1   and     δ In Gjt   = β2    
δ In Pjt          δ In Yjt 
 
In this set up, since there are no lags included, the elasticity estimates only account for 
adjustments in the current time period and produce short-run estimates.  
 
Although some, including Hsing (1990), have rejected the double-log functional 
form, it is a common specification used in a large number of previous studies. It is 
adopted here as it provides a good fit to the data and allows for direct comparison with 
previous results from the literature. Regardless, we also present results for linear and 
semi-log specifications.  
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3.4.2 Alternative Specifications 
We use a number of alternate model specifications to check for robustness of 
the price and income elasticities that are estimated by the basic model.  In addition, by 
factoring in other variables such as macroeconomic variables, we check whether there 
is omitted variable bias. With this robustness check, we attempt to verify the changing 
value of elasticities in the early and recent periods. 
 
3.4.2.1 Recession and Estimation with Macroeconomic Variables 
We examine the possibility that elasticity estimates are biased upward because 
of omitted variables. The period of high gasoline prices from 1975 to 1980 and 2008 to 
2013 coincided with an economic recession in the United States. It is important to 
account for macroeconomic conditions in our elasticity estimates as factors such as 
high unemployment and inflation may have contributed to changes in gasoline 
consumption during these periods. Following the specification in Hughes et al. (2008), 
we use the basic double-log model and estimate price and income elasticities including 
explanatory variables that represent macroeconomic variables such as unemployment 
rate (UNEMP), interest rate (INT) and inflation rate (INF) in addition to real price, 
income and fixed month effects. If the economic recession contributed to a decrease in 
gasoline consumption during the period from 1975 to 1980 and 2008 and 2013, failure 
to account for this effect would artificially inflate the estimated price elasticity.  
 
3.4.2.2 Price Income Interaction Parameter Model 
We specify a simple interaction model of the form (2) to examine the 
interaction between the price elasticity of demand and income. We use the interaction 
term, lnPjt lnYjt which measures the responsiveness of consumers to price changes in 
the event of income changes.
9
 Namely, whether the responsiveness of gasoline 
                                                 
9
 We use a linear interaction term as multicollinearity is lower.  Hughes et al.(2008) finds that using a 
quadratic interaction term was impossible as lnPjt(lnYjt)
2 
due to high collinearity between lnYjt  and 
(lnYjt)
2
. 
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consumption will increase or decrease in case of a price change when income rises. In 
this specification, the price elasticity of gasoline demand is equal to Ep = β1 + β3 lnYjt. 
Since the price elasticity is less than zero, a positive coefficient β3 on the interaction 
term indicates a decrease in the price response as income rises. That is, price elasticity 
will be more inelastic as income increases. 
 
 Ln G = β0 + β1 ln Pjt + β2 lnYjt + β3 ln Pjt lnYjt + εj + εjt     (2) 
 
3.4.2.3 Simultaneous Equations (Instrumental Variable) Models 
It is well known that demand equation estimates are prone to the endogeneity 
issue as price and quantity are jointly determined through shifts in both supply and 
demand resulting in biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. The major challenge 
in these cases is to find appropriate instruments. An ideal instrumental variable for 
determining gasoline demand is one that is highly correlated with the price of gasoline 
(the endogenous variable) but not with unobserved shocks to gasoline demand. It is 
even more challenging in our case as we try to compare the elasticities in three different 
periods.  
 
Ramsey et al. (1975) and Dahl (1979) used the relative prices of refinery 
products such as kerosene and residual fuel oil as instrumental variables. The problem 
with this approach is that the relative prices of other refinery outputs are likely to be 
correlated with gasoline demand shocks. Since gasoline demand and oil price are 
correlated, gasoline demand is likely correlated with the prices of other refinery outputs 
via the price of oil. Hughes et al. (2008) use two types of instrumental variables: crude 
oil quality and crude oil production disruptions. Crude oil production disruptions are 
represented for three countries, Venezuela, Iraq and the United States. Because each 
country has had its production of crude oil that are affected by external shocks that are 
unlikely to be related to gasoline demand shocks. Unfortunately, crude oil quality does 
not prove to be an appropriate instrumental variable, as the coefficients on sulfur 
content and specific gravity are not significant. As for the production disruption, only 
disruptions in U.S. production were significant.  
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Davis and Kilian (2010) use changes in gasoline taxes by state and month as an 
instrument. Even though tax legislation may respond to current prices, the 
implementation of tax changes typically occurs with a lag making it reasonable to 
believe that changes in tax rates are uncorrelated with unobserved changes in demand. 
In constructing the instrument they exclude ad valorem gasoline taxes (used in many 
states) because they are functionally related to price, violating the endogeneity 
assumption. For the national data the instrumental variable (IV) estimates rely on the 
historical variation in gasoline taxes over time. They find a price elasticity that is much 
larger, but not statistically distinguishable from zero, even after accounting for weak 
instruments.  
 
The results of previous studies show that the challenge of finding a robust 
instrument remains. We try a different variable as an instrument in this study which has 
not been used before which is the change of the cost of crude oil to the refineries. In 
general gasoline price is linked to crude oil price as it is the raw material to produce 
gasoline. However, the monthly change in the cost can also be related to the refinery 
specific problems which will determine the gasoline price in the short-run. 
Furthermore, gasoline demand would not be correlated with the cost of crude oil in the 
short-run as refineries plan the production of gasoline for a medium or long term 
following the trend of consumption.
10
 
 
3.4.2.4 Dynamic Lag Model (or Partial Adjustment Model) 
Another common approach to modeling gasoline demand is through the use of a 
dynamic lag or partial adjustment model (Houthakker et al. (1974), Basso and Oum 
(2007) and Lin and Prince (2013)). This model includes a lagged dependent variable 
                                                 
10
 Borenstein and Shepard (2002); refineries operate most efficiently when the product and input mixes are constant 
over planned period of time since adjusting output proportions is costly. For example, from May until September 
more gasoline is produced during high driving summer months. From September onwards, more heating oil is 
produced during the winter months. Although refinery output might be tweaked slightly in response to price changes, 
refiners spread substantive adjustments in production over time. 
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(gasoline demand) which represents the desired change necessary for the adjustment 
back to the equilibrium level in case of a shock to gasoline demand. In this chapter, we 
estimate models with both 1-month (t - 1) and 12-month (t - 12) lags with and without 
fixed month effects. In this specification, the short-run price and income elasticities are 
given by the coefficients β1 and β2, respectively.   
 
In Gjt = β0 + β1 ln Pjt + β2 lnYjt + β3 lnGjt-1 +  εjt                         (3) 
 
The fully adjusted coefficients on the price and income terms, β1/1−β3 and 
β2/1−β3 are generally interpreted as long-run elasticities. The speed of adjustment 
(1/1−β3) depends on the magnitude of β3. A large β3 implies a slower, while a small β3 
indicates a faster adjustment. 
  
3.4.2.5 Vector Autoregressive Models (VAR) 
A bivariate VAR model is an effective way of circumventing the endogeneity 
between gasoline prices and consumption of gasoline. In this specification, changes in 
gasoline prices are assumed to be predetermined with respect to the factors that drive 
gasoline consumption and the response of gasoline consumption to such changes in 
gasoline prices can be estimated as elasticity. This approach is especially appealing 
when working with high frequency data such as monthly data, as we do in this chapter, 
but less suitable for data measured at lower frequency such as annual. The VAR models 
are widely used for measuring dynamic short-run responses of model variables to 
structural shocks to the model. As we examine the short-run elasticities of gasoline 
demand, the VAR method comes especially handy to obverse the response of gasoline 
demand to a given one-time structural shock to prices in several months up to 12 
months.  
 
Let Δpt denote the percent change in real gasoline prices of gasoline and Δgt the 
percent change in real gasoline consumption. Consider the model 
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where ε1t and ε2t are mutually uncorrelated  errors. In this representation, all 
deterministic terms and the dependence of both variables on lagged observations are 
suppressed. Predeterminedness in this model means that θ = 011, implying no 
contemporaneous feedback from gasoline demand Δgt to gasoline price Δpt. This is 
only possible; when gasoline supply curve is assumed to be flat; perfectly elastic i.e. 
gasoline price is determined only when gasoline supply curve shifts in the same month 
and responds to gasoline demand with a delay of one-month. In addition, it is assumed 
that there are no other exogenous innovations outside of the model that are correlated 
with the innovation in the real price of gasoline. Then the coefficient δ may be 
interpreted as the contemporaneous causal effect of the price innovation on real 
gasoline consumption. 
 
The same logic applies in the more general VAR(p) model that allows for 
additional unrestricted delayed feedback between real gasoline consumption growth 
and real gasoline price changes up to some lag order p.  If xt ≡ (Δpt    Δgt )′ and ϵ t ≡ (ϵ1t   
ϵ2t )′, then the structural representation of the VAR(p) model would be  
 
A0 xt =∑           
 
    
 
The lag order for each sample period is selected by the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC). Predeterminedness in this VAR model implies an exclusion restriction 
on the upper right element of A0. The reduced form representation of this model is 
                                                 
11
 See, for example, Cooley and LeRoy (1985). 
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     ∑       
 
        ,   (4) 
 
where Bi = A0
−1
 Ai ,  i=1,….,p and et =A0
-1ϵt  
 
The reduced form may be estimated by the least squares method. Applying a 
lower triangular Cholesky decomposition to the estimate of the 2 × 2 variance-
covariance matrix Σ   = A0
−1
 A0
-1′ 
of the reduced form VAR errors allows us to 
estimate A0
−1
 subject to the identifying restriction of predetermined changes in gasoline 
prices. Given an estimate of A0
−1
, it is straightforward to construct the dynamic 
responses of gasoline consumption to an exogenous change in the price of gasoline 
from this model.
12
 
 
The structure of VAR model—the identifying assumption of predeterminedness 
of gasoline prices and the order of the variables-- comes from the economic argument 
related to this specification. A recursive ordering provides sufficient restrictions on the 
contemporaneous relationships between the variables to exactly identify the structural 
shocks from the reduced-form residuals. The order of the variables in the VAR; 
changes in gasoline price being first and changes in gasoline demand being second 
mean that while unanticipated shifts in gasoline demand in the model do not move the 
price of gasoline instantaneously, they are allowed to affect the price of gasoline with a 
delay of one month. The reasoning behind this assumption is the difficulty of 
distinguishing a temporary variation in gasoline demand from a change in long-term 
trend. Only if a change in demand is sustained and hence is expected to persist, will a 
gas distributor respond by raising the price of gasoline. Recognizing such persistent 
shifts in expected demand by construction requires time, justifying the delayed price 
response.  
 
                                                 
12
 This is an identification strategy widely used in literature as in Edelstein and Kilian (2007) and Hamilton (2009). 
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The price of gasoline reflects gasoline supply shocks immediately either arising 
at the refining stage or changes in the price of imported crude oil representing costs 
shocks for U.S. refiners. The model assumes that the retail supply curve for gasoline is 
perfectly elastic in the short run due to existing inventories. Refineries plan their 
production based on the consumption trend and keep extra supplies in inventories. 
Under these assumptions, the model can estimate the elasticity as dynamic response of 
U.S. gasoline consumption to a 1% gasoline price increase, as discussed above. 
 
Davis and Kilian (2010) argues that the inclusion of U.S. macroeconomic 
variables is not required for the identification of the gasoline price shock, as long as 
changes in gasoline prices are predetermined with respect to all omitted variables. 
Kilian and Vega (2011) have recently shown using daily data that there is no evidence 
of feedback from exogenous U.S. macroeconomic news to the U.S. retail price of 
gasoline or the price of crude oil within one month of such shocks, suggesting that the 
assumption that U.S. gasoline prices are predetermined with respect to U.S. 
macroeconomic aggregates. Furthermore there is no loss of generality in restricting the 
analysis to a bivariate model in prices and quantities, as U.S. gasoline prices are 
predetermined with respect to these macroeconomic aggregates. Because we can view 
the bivariate model as a marginalized representation in which all additional variables 
other than the percent change in gasoline consumption have been integrated out.  
 
   Estimation Results and Discussions of the Results 3.5
The descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 3.2.  
Before we move on to present the estimation results, we first check the 
existence of unit roots and present them in Table 3.3. Overall, we were unable to reject 
the null that the log levels of each of these series contain a unit root at standard levels 
of confidence, except for gasoline consumption per capita which may not have a unit 
root at 10% level, although there was clear evidence of stationarity for the first-
differenced data. Since gasoline consumption is at the border line, we can still treat it as 
it has a unit root as other variables.  
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 3.3 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
 
 
It is common to find that demand, income, and price in Eq. (1) are all 
nonstationary, they are integrated of order 1, i.e. I(1). If all variables in the model are 
integrated of the same order, then a linear combination of non-stationary variables may 
be stationary (they become I(0)), such that co-integration exists. As autocorrelation 
plots in Figure 3.4 suggest the residuals are stationary, smaller than 1, only the 
residuals of the full sample are slightly higher than that of the other samples but even 
those residuals are less than 1.There is little evidence in these figures to suggest 
existence of non-stationarity so we reject a unit root in residuals for all samples. Based 
on these results, our demand model can be viewed as a cointegrating regression model.  
 
Variables  Mean  Median  Max. Min.  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis # of Obs.
Levels
Gasoline consumption per 
capita 0.91 0.91 1.10 0.72 0.06 -0.08 3.26 458
Real gasoline price 2.03 1.97 3.67 1.13 0.56 0.66 2.45 458
Real income per capita 25441 24446 34648 16573 5201 0.04 1.65 458
Unemployment rate 6.52 6.10 10.80 3.80 1.61 0.53 2.50 458
1-year treasury bill rate 5.75 5.59 16.72 0.10 3.61 0.52 3.18 458
10-year treasury bill rate 6.97 6.80 15.32 1.53 2.97 0.55 2.88 458
Inflation 4.16 3.30 14.80 -2.10 2.94 1.53 5.33 458
Cost of oil production 32.91 23.75 129.03 9.48 26.15 1.71 5.02 458
Logs
Gasoline consumption per 
capita -0.10 -0.09 0.09 -0.33 0.07 -0.30 3.38 458
Real gasoline price 0.67 0.68 1.30 0.12 0.27 0.28 2.02 458
Real income per capita 10.12 10.10 10.45 9.72 0.21 -0.17 1.74 458
Unemployment rate 1.84 1.81 2.38 1.34 0.24 0.09 2.20 458
1-year treasury bill rate 1.37 1.72 2.82 -2.30 1.13 -1.63 4.97 458
10-year treasury bill rate 1.84 1.92 2.73 0.43 0.47 -0.59 3.25 458
Cost of oil production 3.26 3.17 4.86 2.25 0.65 0.71 2.63 458
t-statistics p-value t-statistics p-value
Gasoline consumption per 
capita -2.61 0.09 -15.62 0.00
Real gasoline price -1.97 0.30 -15.52 0.00
Real income per capita -1.48 0.54 -16.75 0.00
Unemployment rate -2.30 0.17 -7.75 0.00
Inflation -1.45 0.56 -7.90 0.00
Cost of oil production -1.49 0.54 -12.29 0.00
10-year treasury bill rate 0.02 0.96 -15.71 0.00
1-year treasury bill rate 0.76 0.99 -13.99 0.00
Log levels First differenced logs
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3.5.1 Basic Model Results 
The basic double-log model as specified in equation (1) along with 11 monthly 
seasonal dummies is estimated for each period using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  
The summary of estimated parameters for three sample periods: 1975-1980, 2001-2008 
and 2008-2013 as well as for the full sample is presented in Table 3.4 with 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation corrected Newey-West standard errors. The 
model provides a good fit for the three sub-samples with R-squares of 0.88, 0.89 and 
0.90 and small sum of squared residuals. However, the fit for the full sample is weaker 
with R-squares of 0.54 and a large sum of squared residuals. The monthly fixed effects 
demonstrate the strong seasonality present in the demand for gasoline. Normally 
gasoline demand increases in the summer months after schools close in June and stays 
high until schools re-open early September. Positive signs in coefficients for the high 
demand months are consistent with the expectation of high gasoline demand.  
Similarly, months of expected low demand have negative signs. The magnitudes of 
seasonal effects are similar between the three periods although the winter effect is 
somewhat smaller in the last two periods than the earlier period. Also summer effect 
seems to have increased in the later periods especially in the last sub-sample (2008-
2013). 
Figure 3.4 Autocorrelation Plot for Residuals of the Basic Double-Log Model 
 
   
94 
 
Table 3.4 OLS Regression Results-Double-Log Basic Model 
Dependent variable: Log gasoline demand; ln(Gt) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
1975-2013 1975-1980 2001-2008 2008-2013
β0 0.17 -3.90*** -3.19*** 5.33*
 (0.28) (1.25) (0.93) (3.16)
ln(P) -0.04*** -0.36*** -0.05** -0.10***
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(Y) -0.02 0.42*** 0.31*** -0.52*
 (0.03) (0.13) (0.09) (0.30)
Jan -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.05***
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Feb -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.11***
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Mar -0.02** -0.02*** -0.02** 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Apr -0.03*** -0.03 -0.04*** 0.00
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
May 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.04***
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Jun 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.02
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Jul 0.03*** 0.03* 0.03*** 0.04***
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Aug 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.05***
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Sep -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.02
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Oct 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Nov -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.03***
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
R-squared 0.54 0.88 0.89 0.90
S.E. of regression 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02
Durbin-Watson stat 0.34 1.74 0.54 1.04
Sum squared resid 0.91 0.03 0.02 0.01
Number of obs. 458 63 91 91
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We present the results from two alternative functional forms together with 
double-log functional form in Table 3.5. The monthly seasonal dummy variables have 
been excluded to simplify the presentation of the results. The coefficients on price and 
income are significant for the first (1975 – 1980) and the second (2001–2008) samples 
in the linear and double-log form estimations. The R-squares are high. The Durbin-
Watson statistics for the later sample is lower suggesting positive serial correlations in 
residuals. Only the price elasticity in the full and the last (2008-2013) samples is 
significant in three models.  Overall the fit of the full sample is much weaker compared 
to the other sample periods indicating changing market structure in the time period 
starting in the mid-1970’s, therefore varying coefficients. As a result, the R-squared is 
lower and the Durbin-Watson statistics is close to zero which is an indication of 
positive autocorrelation in residuals.  
 
Table 3.5 OLS Regression Results – Basic Model 
 
  Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 3.6 summarizes the elasticities estimated by the three models. The price 
and income elasticities for the linear and semi-log models are calculated by using the 
coefficients from the estimations presented in Table 3.5. The coefficient in the linear 
model denotes the change in demand in response to change in price or income. Hence 
to calculate the elasticities, the respective coefficient is multiplied by the ratio of price 
to either demand or income; namely price/demand or price/income. For the semi-log 
1975-2013 1975-1980 2001-2008 2008-2013 1975-2013 1975-1980 2001-2008 2008-2013 1975-2013 1975-1980 2001-2008 2008-2013
β0 0.98*** 0.88*** 0.63*** 1.34*** -0.02 -0.12 -0.40 0.41 0.17 -3.90*** -3.19*** 5.33*
(0.03) (0.13) (0.08) (0.28) (0.03) (0.13) (0.08) (0.32) (0.28) (1.25) (0.93) (3.16)
P -0.02*** -0.14*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.15*** -0.03 -0.04***
(0.006) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Y 4.91E-07 2.34E-05*** 1.25E-05*** 1.15E-05 -4.25E-07 2.37E-05*** 1.34E-05 -1.34E-05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ln(P) -0.04*** -0.36*** -0.05** -0.10***
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(Y) -0.02 0.42*** 0.31*** -0.52*
 (0.03) (0.13) (0.09) (0.30)
R-sq 0.53 0.87 0.91 0.90 0.55 0.88 0.91 0.90 0.54 0.88 0.89 0.90
S.E. of reg. 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02
Durbin-Watson st. 0.33 1.70 0.67 1.06 0.34 1.72 0.69 1.07 0.34 1.74 0.54 1.04
Sum squared resid 0.76 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.90 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.91 0.03 0.02 0.01
Basic Model:Linear Basic Model:Semi-Log Basic Model:Double-Log
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model, the estimated coefficient for the price can be shown as    
     
  
  
    
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 .  To calculate the price elasticity of demand we multiply it by the price level as:  
Ep 
  
  
 
 
 
.  
 
Table 3.6 Price and Income Elasticities – Basic Model 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
The price elasticity of gasoline demand ranges from -0.36 to -0.34 consistently 
across the three different specifications in the period 1975-1980 which is slightly higher 
than the estimates of Hughes et al. whose findings range from -0.31 to -0.33. The 
elasticity declines in the next period (2001–2008) to a range of -0.073 to -0.053 and 
increases to about -0.11 in the last sample period.  Hughes et al. (2008) find a price 
elasticity of -0.042 for the sample 2001-2006. Their elasticity during this period may be 
smaller because their sample period excludes the record high gasoline prices. The 
elasticity in the full sample is lower than the elasticities in the sub-samples; ranging 
from -0.042 to -0.038. Income elasticity of gasoline demand is positive and around 0.43 
across specifications in two sub-samples: 1975-1980 and 2001-2008. However, the sign 
turns negative in both the last sample (2008-2013) and the full sample. Negative 
income elasticity in the sub-sample of 2008-2013 may reflect the energy saving efforts 
with increasing fuel efficient vehicles as shown in the left panel of Figure 3.1, gasoline 
consumption continues to decline although income steadies and then increases slowly 
in 2012 onwards. 
 
Ep Ei Ep Ei Ep Ei Ep Ei
Linear -0.041 -0.014 -0.337 0.447 -0.073 0.419 -0.113 -0.431
(0.001) (0.000) (0.009) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Semi-Log -0.042 -0.011 -0.335 0.434 -0.073 0.419 -0.112 -0.435
(0.001) (0.000) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Double-Log -0.038 -0.022 -0.359 0.425 -0.053 0.307 -0.100 -0.517
(0.015) (0.028) (0.038) (0.127) (0.021) (0.091) (0.017) (0.305)
1975-2013 1975-1980 2001-2008 2008-2013
Basic Model 
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In order to test whether the subsamples from each period are independent, we 
perform a Student’s t-test on the estimation of price and income elasticities for each 
model between subsamples and present the results in Table 3.7. We calculate the t-
statistics as between two periods as:
  
            
         
√   
               
           
. We reject the null 
hypothesis that the elasticities are the same in the two periods for all periods and 
models except for two cases with double-log estimations. The first one is when the t-
statistics is 2; we fail to reject the null that the price elasticities between the periods 
2001-2008 and 2008-2013 are the same. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of the 
same income elasticities between 1975-1980 and 2001-2008, for which the t-test value 
is 1.  
Table 3.7 The Student t-tests on the Elasticity Estimates
13
  
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.5.2 Alternative specifications 
We employ a number of alternative model specifications to test the robustness 
of the price and income elasticity estimates produced by the basic model. We present 
the results in the sections a through d and discuss the results in section e. 
 
3.5.2.1 Recession and Estimation with Macroeconomic Variable 
In this section we include some macroeconomic variables in the basic-log 
model to investigate whether there was an upward bias in the elasticity estimations 
because of omitted variables especially during the periods when high gasoline prices 
                                                 
13
 1st period refers to 1975-1980, 2nd period refers to 2001-2008 and the 3rd period refers to 2008-2013.  
1st and 2nd 2nd and 3rd 1st and 3rd 1st and 2nd 2nd and 3rd 1st and 3rd 
Linear -28 10 24 5 200 -154
Semi-Log -38 11 31 6 432 -448
Double-Log -7 2 6 1 3 -3
tp ti
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coincided with an economic recession in the United States. It is important to include 
such macroeconomic factors because as a result of recession, high employment and 
inflation may contribute to changes in gasoline demand. These recession periods are the 
first (1975-1980) and the last (2008-2013). Nevertheless we conduct the tests for the 
other periods as well as for the full sample for comparison purposes. We estimate price 
and income elasticities by including unemployment rate, interest rate and inflation rate 
in addition to real price, income and fixed month effects. We repeat the tests with the 1-
year and 10-year interest rates. If the economic recession has a significant effect and 
decreases the gasoline consumption during the recession periods, we would expect 
smaller elasticities because in the original form, without the macroeconomic factors, 
model would artificially inflate the estimated price elasticity.  
 
Results presented in Table 3.8 indicate that only inflation rate is statistically 
significant at 1% in the full and first sample when regressed with 1-year and 10-year 
interest rates. It is also significant at 10% in the last sub-sample when regressed with 
10-year interest rate. Unemployment rate is only significant in the full and first sample 
when regressed with 10-year interest rate. Coefficients of both unemployment and 
inflation rate are negative which is expected as both high unemployment and inflation 
reduce gasoline demand due to declined purchasing power. Only 1-year interest rate 
coefficient is significant at 10% in the full sample. Overall interest rate coefficients are 
small and close to zero. However, the high F-statistics in each regression implies that 
the variables are jointly significant. 
 
Our results are comparable to those estimated by Hughes et al. for the period of 
1975-1980 as they only test this sample. Their price elasticities become more inelastic; 
-0.22 and -0.21 for the 1-year and 10-year interest rate models, respectively. The 
estimated income elasticities are also more inelastic at 0.33 and 0.38. The price 
elasticities we obtain for the same period are close to their values (-0.21 and -0.23). 
However, our income elasticities were smaller than their estimations which are 0.20 
and 0.31, respectively. Nevertheless they are still lower than the estimated values 
without macroeconomic variables. The elasticities in the other recession period (2008-
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2013) also decline with macroeconomic variables. We compare the elasticities in Table 
3.9.     
 
In the other recession period (2008-2013) both price and income elasticities 
become more inelastic. The elasticities in the non-recession period (2001-2008) nearly 
remained unchanged, except for the price elasticity estimate with 10-year interest rate 
which declined. This supports the idea that during the recession periods 
macroeconomic factors have a dampening effect on gasoline demand, whereas during 
growth periods their impact is subdued. The price elasticity in the full sample estimate 
remains unchanged however income elasticity gets larger.  
 
Table 3.8 OLS Regression Results – Macroeconomic Variables14 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                 
14
 Inflation rate was negative in 9 months of 2009. So instead of the log value of inflation, the inflation rate is used in 
samples include 2009.  
Regression with 10-year U.S. Treasury Bonds
1975-2013 1975-1980 2001-2008 2008-2013 1975-2013 1975-1980 2001-2008 2008-2013
β0 -5.68*** -1.39 -3.15*** 4.64 -5.52*** -2.53 -2.84** 5.38
(0.54) -2.83 -1.58 (4.01) (0.61) (2.13) (1.20) (3.80)
ln(P) -0.04*** -0.21*** -0.06 -0.01 -0.04*** -0.23*** 0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
ln(Y) 0.72*** 0.20 0.31*** -0.18 0.71*** 0.31 0.27** -0.20
(0.06) (0.28) (0.15) (0.30) (0.07) (0.21) (0.12) (0.28)
ln(UNEMP) -0.03 -0.14 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04*** -0.10* 0.02 -0.06
(0.02) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04)
ln(INF) -0.39*** -0.06*** 0.00 -0.60 -0.38*** -0.05*** -0.01 -0.68*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.27) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.39)
ln(Int1) 0.01* -0.01 0.00 0.01
0.00 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
ln(Int10) 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
R-squared 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.94 0.88 0.90 0.96 0.94
S.E. of regression 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
Durbin-Watson stat 1.34 2.06 0.54 1.69 1.33 1.96 1.48 1.72
Sum squared resid 0.24 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.24 0.04 0.01 0.01
F-statistic 204.13 23.64 39.48 38.14 202.13 29.46 90.53 36.96
Number of obs. 458 62 90 53 458 62 90 53
Regression with 1-year U.S. Treasury Bonds
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3.5.2.2 Price Income Interaction Parameter Model 
The regression results of the price-income interaction model are presented in 
Table 3.9. The price and income elasticities are calculated based on the coefficients 
from the regressions as   
Ep= β1 + β3 lnYt   and   Ei= β2 + β3 lnPt    
and presented in Table 3.12 along with the elasticities produced by the other alternative 
specification models. The elasticities are close to the values of Hughes et al. in the 
subsample of 1975-1980. Our price and income elasticities are much more inelastic 
than their elasticities in the second subsample but again their sample ends in 2006 while 
ours include months until 2008. All of the coefficients are statistically significant at 1% 
in the period 2001-2008 during which the U.S. economy witnessed a strong income 
growth.  
 
If increasing income results in a decrease in the consumer response to gasoline 
price changes, we would expect a positive coefficient on the interaction term of the 
model. However, in all periods, we find the sign of coefficient on the interaction term is 
negative suggesting that on average, gasoline consumption is more sensitive to price 
changes as income rises. This somewhat counterintuitive result is supported by the 
findings of Hughes et al. and Kayser (2000).  There are a few hypothesis offered in 
literature. First, Kayser (2000) argues that for high income households a greater 
proportion of automobile trips are discretionary which potentially can be reduced. Low-
income households, however, are not able to reduce their consumption and amount of 
travel further as they already it to the minimum leaving little room for adjustment to 
higher prices. Second, Kayser (2000) also states that in response to increasing gasoline 
prices, high-income households can afford to purchase newer cars that will on average 
be more fuel-efficient. Along the same line, another explanation is that the number of 
vehicles per household increases with income. When the number of household vehicles 
exceeds the number of drivers, there is the possibility for drivers to shift to more fuel 
efficient vehicles within the household stock as gasoline prices rise. Whatever the 
explanation, the overall decrease in price elasticity despite growth in incomes suggests 
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that these effects are relatively small compared to other factors affecting gasoline 
demand. 
Table 3.9 OLS Regression Results- Interaction Variable 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.5.2.3 Dynamic Lag Model (or Partial Adjustment Model) 
We estimate the equation (2) including 1-month and 12-month lags of gasoline 
demand separately along with the monthly seasonal dummies. As results show in Table 
3.10, the price elasticity is significant at 1% in all samples; the income elasticity is 
significant only in two subsamples. The magnitudes of the elasticities are smaller than 
the values in basic log model. The coefficients of the lagged dependent variable are 
significant in both set of estimations for all samples. Usually including a lagged 
dependent variable as a regressor increases the risk of serial correlation in error terms. 
Since the Durbin-Watson test is not an appropriate test when lagged dependent 
variables included, we perform a Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange-Multiplier (LM) test for 
serial correlation up to order 12 (end of Table 3.10). We are able to reject the null 
hypothesis of serial correlation for the three subsamples, except for the full sample, in 
the estimation with 1-month lag.  For the 12-month estimation we are able to reject the 
null of serial correlation for the first (1975-1980) and last sample (2008-2013).  
 
 
 
1975-2013 1975-1980 2001-2008 2008-2013
β0 -0.02 -31.31* -11.39*** -15.87
(0.90) (16.37) (1.51) (13.87)
ln(P) 0.19 36.27 11.28*** 23.68
(0.97) (22.01) (1.43) (16.71)
ln(Y) 0.00 3.21* 1.10*** 1.52
(0.09) (1.66) (0.15) (1.33)
ln(P) * ln(Y) -0.02 -3.72 -1.09*** -2.29
(0.09) (2.24) (0.14) (1.61)
R-squared 0.54 0.88 0.95 0.90
S.E. of regression 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.02
Durbin-Watson stat 0.34 1.83 1.31 1.14
Sum squared resid 0.91 0.03 0.01 0.01
F-statistic 37.42 25.62 96.16 25.17
Included observations 458 62 90 53
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Table 3.10 OLS Regression Results- Dynamic Lag 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.5.2.4 Simultaneous Equations (Instrumental Variable) Models 
We estimate the basic-log model using the log of crude oil cost to the refinery 
and its second lag via two-stage least square (2SLS). We test the equation with 
different lags of oil cost as well as changes in crude oil cost but the second lag 
produced slightly better results which are presented in Table 3.11. Yet, they fail to 
produce much improvement. Only significant price elasticity at 1% is for the 1975-
1980 period. Both the price and income elasticities are significant at10% for 2001-2008 
sample but with the wrong signs. Overall the R-squares are low indicating a poor fit. 
This again proves the difficulty of finding a good instrument for the gasoline price. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1975-2013 1975-1980 2001-2008 2008-2013 1975-2013 1975-1980 2001-2008 2008-2013
β0 0.08 -3.25*** -1.10** 3.42 0.13 -1.69 -2.71*** 5.21**
(0.06) (1.16) (0.55) (2.66) (0.14) (1.65) (0.89) (2.16)
ln(P) -0.01*** -0.31*** -0.02*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.34*** -0.05** -0.07***
 (0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
ln(Y) 0.00 0.36*** 0.11** -0.33 -0.01 0.20 0.26*** -0.51**
(0.01) (0.12) (0.05) (0.26) (0.01) (0.17) (0.09) (0.21)
ln(Gt-1) 0.83*** 0.14*** 0.73*** 0.42*
(0.03) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
ln(Gt-12) 0.78*** 0.28** 0.35* 0.32**
(0.07) (0.14) (0.20) (0.14)
R-squared 0.86 0.88 0.95 0.91 0.82 0.89 0.90 0.91
S.E. of regression 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Durbin-Watson stat 2.83 2.06 2.17 1.89 1.17 1.93 0.76 1.26
Sum squared resid 0.29 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.36 0.03 0.02 0.01
F-statistic 188.48 24.77 93.01 28.95 142.55 27.45 47.25 28.52
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM  Tests
F-statistic 33.66 1.61 0.66 0.50 30.75 1.07 4.23 0.94
Prob. F-Stat 0.00 0.13 0.79 0.89 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.52
12-moth Lag w/ Month Dummies1-moth Lag w/ Month Dummies
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Table 3.11 2SLS Regression Results - Instruments: loilcost and loilcost(-2) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.5.2.5 Summary of Alternative Specifications Results  
The estimated price and income elasticities of gasoline demand for alternative 
model specifications as well as the basic model are presented in Table 3.12.  From all 
alternative model results, the price elasticities range from -0.41 to -0.21 in 1975-1980 
and from -0.004 to -0.06 in 2001-2008 and from -0.07 to -0.11 in 2008-2013. There 
are positive price elasticities from the estimations with the macroeconomic variables 
with 10-year bond and from the IV estimations. The elasticity remains small in the 
full sample from -0.04 to -0.01 with the exception of IV estimation. The income 
elasticity is positive and varies from 0.18 to 0.86 in 1975-1980, from 0.11 to 0.31 in 
2001-2008. However, it turns negative consistently across all models in 2008-2013 
period which can be explained by the sharp drop in income due to financial crisis 
coincided with fuel efficiency efforts as a result of record high prices. The estimated 
elasticities are consistent with the finding of Hughes et al. for the common sample 
periods.  Despite the best efforts, however, the endogeneity issue in estimating 
demand curve remains a challenge which may undermine the reduced elasticity 
estimation results especially for the recent years presented in the Table 3.12. The one 
of the causes of recent commodity boom is the increase in global demand for 
commodities including gasoline. The impact of endogeneity increases, i.e. elasticity 
gets smaller, if price changes are caused by demand shocks rather than supply shocks.  
1975-2013 1975-1980 2001-2008 2008-2013
β0 7.07 -8.14 9.33* 5.89
(5.39) (12.32) (5.12) (7.74)
ln(P) 0.47 -0.41*** 0.14* -0.07*
 (0.41) -0.19 (0.07) (0.04)
ln(Y) -0.74 0.86 -0.92* -0.57
(0.56) (1.27) (0.50) (0.74)
R-squared -9.45 0.37 -0.20 0.12
S.E. of regression 0.21 0.06 0.05 0.05
Durbin-Watson stat 0.11 1.30 1.57 1.28
Sum squared resid 20.74 0.18 0.20 0.12
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Table 3.12 Price and Income Elasticities – Alternative Specifications 
 
 
3.5.3 Stability of the Estimated Price Elasticity over Time 
The underlying assumption in the basic-log model is that the elasticities are 
constant over the estimated sample.  However, the level and change in gasoline prices 
as well as the regulatory implementations such as the Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) program may cause shifts in price elasticities during different 
periods. To examine whether price elasticity varies over time, Equation 1 is estimated 
on a 61-month period and estimation period is rolled one-month at a time. We include 
the macroeconomic variables in the estimation as there are several recession periods 
during the full sample. The Figure 3.5 plots the estimated price elasticities for the entire 
period from January 1980 through February 2013. Gasoline demand is more elastic in 
the early and late 1980s. It becomes inelastic briefly in the mid-1980s possibly as a 
result of declining gasoline prices and increases in the fuel economy due to CAFÉ 
standards. In the 1990s it remains in a narrow band between -0.05 and -0.10 until the 
2000s. In the early 2000s it moves up and remains positive briefly before it settles in a 
narrow range between -0.05 and 0. From the plot, we can infer that gasoline demand 
has become more inelastic over the years and even more permanently inelastic in the 
past decade.  
 
 
 
Ep Ei Ep Ei Ep Ei Ep Ei
Basic -0.04*** -0.02 -0.36*** 0.42*** -0.05*** 0.31*** -0.10*** -0.52*
Macroeconomic variables 
1-year Interest rate -0.04*** 0.72*** -0.21*** 0.20 -0.06 0.31*** -0.01 -0.18
Macroeconomic variables 
10-year Interest rate -0.04*** 0.71*** -0.23*** 0.31 0.01 0.27** -0.02 -0.20
Price-Income Interaction -0.01 -0.01 -0.21 0.18* -0.004*** 0.31*** -0.11 -0.68
Dynamic-lag model with 1 
month lag -0.01*** 0.00 -0.31*** 0.36*** -0.02*** 0.11** -0.06*** -0.33
Dynamic-lag model with 
12 month lag -0.05*** -0.01 -0.34*** 0.20 -0.05** 0.26*** -0.07*** -0.51**
IV estimations 0.47 -0.74 -0.41*** 0.86 0.14* -0.92* -0.07* -0.57
1975-1980 2001-2008 2008-20131975-2013
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Figure 3.5 Rolling Monthly Price Elasticity Estimates Jan. 1975 - Feb. 2013  
 
 
3.5.4 Vector autoregressive model (VAR) 
We first start with determining the lag length in VAR model for each sample 
period. Allowing for up to 12 lags, we estimate the VAR model and select 2, 3, 12 and 
12 lags for 1975-1980, 2001-2008, 2008-2013 and 1975-2013 samples, respectively 
based on the AIC. The model including seasonal dummies and the changes in gasoline 
price and demand with the respective lags are re-estimated. The impulse response 
coefficients have been normalized such that the coefficient estimates can be interpreted 
as elasticities which are displayed in Table 3.13 up to 12 months. The Figure 3.6 shows 
the time path of 12-month of the response of gasoline consumption to a 1% increase in 
gasoline prices in each sample period.  
 
A shock to the real gasoline price has a large and statistically significant impact 
on gasoline demand for the sample period 1975-1980 as shown in Table 3.13 and 
Figure 3.6.  Except for the first two months, all other months have statistically 
significant coefficients. The elasticity is -0.19 in the first month but increases in 
magnitude through the months and reaches -0.82 in one year which is larger than the 
elasticity calculated by the OLS models. Although they are not statistically significant, 
the elasticity estimates in the sample 2001-2008 are fairly consistent and vary between 
-0.04 to -0.05 and similar in magnitude to the estimate of the basic log model.  The 
elasticity estimates in 2008-2013 seem to be more volatile across the months and vary 
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from -0.22 to 0.39. For the full sample, the elasticity is -0.10 and is statistically 
significant in the second month and reaches -0.11 in one year. Davis and Kilian (2010) 
also find the one-year elasticity of -0.12 for a sample period of 1989-2008 using a 
similar VAR model. 
 
For robustness check we relax the assumption of perfect elastic supply curve 
(θ=0) in the VAR identification restriction matrix (A0) and allow for a various degree 
of feedback from demand shifts to the price of gasoline. We impose a value for θ that is 
greater than zero and solve numerically for the remaining unrestricted parameter of A0 
conditional on that identifying assumption. The choice of θ has implications for the 
supply curve. For θ > 0 the supply curve is upward sloping. Relative to the benchmark 
of no feedback, the one-year price elasticity is remarkably robust to these alternative 
assumptions. We replace the zero value of θ with 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 and find that the 
elasticities are not different from the ones obtained by the original assumption of flat 
supply curve.  
 
Table 3.13 Impulse Response Coefficients 
(Elasticities estimated with the VAR model) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
months 1975-2013 1975-1980 2001-2008 2008-2013
1 -0.054 -0.197 -0.045 0.389
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2 -0.108** -0.151 -0.067 0.241
(0.047) (0.127) (0.114) (0.416)
3 -0.084 -0.587*** -0.052 -0.114
(0.089) (0.218) (0.196) (0.643)
4 -0.124 -0.565*** -0.046 0.092
(0.114) (0.227) (0.195) (1.030)
5 -0.137 -0.606** -0.044 -0.186
(0.133) (0.279) (0.124) (0.133)
6 -0.114 -0.750** -0.047 -0.151
(0.151) (0.318) (0.061) (1.362)
7 -0.115 -0.725** -0.047 -0.086
(0.172) (0.361) (0.131) (1.502)
8 -0.122 -0.761** -0.048 -0.111
(0.178) (0.392) (0.111) (2.111)
9 -0.113 -0.803** -0.048 -0.219
(0.175) (0.381) (0.133) (1.809)
10 -0.151 -0.792** -0.048 0.068
(-0.948) (-2.694) (-0.265) (-0.177)
11 -0.092 -0.812** -0.047 -0.367
(-1.033) (-2.170) (-0.353) (-0.153)
12 -0.106 -0.822** -0.047 0.065
(0.196) (0.414) (0.106) (2.397)
   
107 
 
Figure 3.6 Cumulated Responses to 1% Structural Shocks with 1-Std Error 
Confidence Bands 
  
  
 
  Conclusions and Policy Implications 3.6
In this chapter we thoroughly examine the price and income elasticities of 
gasoline demand in the U.S. from 1975 to 2013 using various simple econometric 
techniques in addition to a dynamic VAR time series model. We split the full sample 
into several subsamples during which gasoline prices were high to make the results 
comparable to previous studies as well as to observe the elasticities in a similar price 
environment. Our results are comparable to the results of the recent studies. The 
estimated price elasticities in 1975-1980 seem to be more robust and range from -0.41 
to -0.21, however, they decline and become more inelastic in the following two 
subsamples (a range of -0.004 to -0.11). Similarly, the full sample results are weighed 
by the impact of the recent periods and also reveal more inelastic values of around -
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0.04. The estimation of elasticities in a 61-month window by rolling one month from 
1975 to 2013 confirms the varying and declining price elasticities over time. However, 
estimated smaller elasticity could be partly also due to endogeneity between demand 
and supply shocks determining the prices. If price changes are as a result of demand 
shocks instead of supply then endogeneity would reduce the size of the elasticity 
further. 
  
The VAR elasticity estimates of 1975-1980 period show significant and higher 
elasticity of -0.82 in one year. The sub-sample 2001-2008 has lower but not significant 
elasticity estimation of -0.05. The elasticities in 2008-2013 seem to be more volatile 
and insignificant. The full sample estimation with VAR model reveals a lower price 
elasticity of demand at -0.11. 
 
The income elasticity results are more consistent. They are positive and around 
0.36-0.42, 0.26-0.31 and 0.71-0.72 in 1975-1980, 2001-2008 and 1975-2013 samples, 
respectively. The income elasticity in the most recent sub-sample is estimated to be 
around -0.51 which seems puzzling at first but given the persistent high prices 
combined with fuel efficiency efforts and recovery in income level after a deep 
recession produces a negative income elasticity implying gasoline demand declines as 
income rises. Compared with the price elasticities, income elasticities appear to be 
declining but somewhat more stable, excluding the latest sample (2008-2013).  
 
Significantly declining price elasticities found in recent decades support the idea 
of structural change in demand for gasoline. The results suggest that on average, U.S. 
drivers appear less responsive in adjusting to gasoline price increases than in previous 
decades because of a structural change in the U.S. market for transportation fuel and 
may reflect changes in demographics, social or vehicle characteristics during the past 
several decades.  
 
There may be a number of potential explanations. First, the U.S. consumers 
have grown more dependent on automobiles for daily transportation than during the 
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1970’s and 1980’s and as a result, are less able to reduce vehicle miles traveled in 
response to higher prices. This could mean that drivers have less ability to respond to 
price changes because greater distances decrease the sustainability of non-motorized 
transportations. In addition, when demographic development patterns increase the 
distance between home and non-discretionary destinations such as the workplace, a 
greater share of the total vehicle miles traveled are fixed and cannot be reduced. An 
increase in multiple income households would further decrease flexibility if a greater 
share of the population requires a daily work commute. Finally, these effects are 
compounded if the availability of public transit is less than in earlier decades. 
 
Second, with the record gasoline prices, drivers may change their driving 
behaviors in the short-run to save fuel and may switch to more fuel efficient vehicles in 
the medium to long term. A driver’s response to higher prices is largely composed of a 
reduction in the amount of driving (vehicle miles traveled) and an increase in the fuel 
efficiency of driving. The fuel efficiency of driving can be increased through, for 
example, improved vehicle maintenance or changes in driving behavior such as slower 
acceleration or reduced vehicle speed. In addition, purchasing more fuel efficient 
vehicles by consumers may contribute to decline in low elasticities. 
  
Third, with the increasing income and wealth especially in the past decade, the 
share of gasoline consumption in total income has declined over the years, reducing the 
impact of an increase in gasoline prices on budget and making the consumers less 
sensitive to price increases. 
 
Finally, the overall improvement in vehicle fleet average fuel economy since the 
late 1970’s and early 1980’s may have also contributed to a decrease in the elasticity of 
price on gasoline demand.  As a result of the U.S. (CAFE) standard, the U.S. fleet 
average fuel economy improved from the 1980’s. Because the vehicle fleet has become 
more fuel efficient, a decrease in miles traveled today has a smaller effect on gasoline 
consumption which means if, for example, discretionary travel is diminished, the 
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resulting reduction in gasoline consumption today is less than in the 1980’s because 
today’s vehicles burn less fuel per mile driven.  
 
Fuel taxation can also play a significant role in fuel consumption and in 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, especially over the long term. However, for 
gasoline tax increases to be effective, the real fuel prices would have to rise faster than 
real incomes in order to offset their effect. Given the lower price elasticity of demand 
compared to the elasticity in previous decades, smaller reductions in gasoline 
consumption will occur for any given gasoline tax level. As a result, a tax would need 
to be significantly larger in order to achieve an equivalent reduction in gasoline 
consumption (Davis and Kilian (2010)). In the U.S., gasoline taxes have been 
politically difficult to implement. If imposing gasoline tax may not appear to be viable 
then it is very important to invest in research and technologies to improve vehicle fuel 
economy. An alternate measure to promote fuel efficiency would be an increase in the 
CAFE standard to achieve desired reductions in gasoline consumption which may 
compel the production of fuel efficient vehicles by auto makers and purchase of fuel 
efficient vehicles by private, business and public entities. Another alternative public 
policy would be to improve the network of public transportation in the areas where 
limited transportation exists and encourage the utilization of public transport. 
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3.A Appendix  
3.A.1 Data Sources 
Gasoline Consumption: MGFUPUS1, U.S. Product Supplied of Finished 
Motor Gasoline (Thousand Barrels), from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
which is calculated as domestic production plus imports, less exports and changes to 
stocks. 
Real total disposable income: Disposable personal income: Total, billions of 
chained (2005) dollars, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Economic 
Accounts. 
 
Gasoline price: Unleaded Regular Gasoline, U.S. City Average Retail Price, 
(Dollars per Gallon Including Taxes), Gasoline, unleaded regular, per gallon/3.785 
liters, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
CPI: CUSR0000SA0, Consumer Price Index - All Urban Consumers, U.S. city 
average,  
1982-84=100, from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, re-indexed to 2005. 
Inflation: Annual inflation is calculated using the CPI.  
Population: The Census Bureau's Population Estimates Program (PEP). 
1 and 10 year interest rates: 1 (GS1) and 10-year (GS10) Treasury Constant 
Maturity Rate: the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  
Unemployment: LNS14000000, Labor Force Statistics from the Current 
Population Survey, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Instrumental Variable: Refinery cost of crude oil: Refiner Acquisition Cost of 
Crude Oil, Composite (Dollars per Barrel), the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
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4 DEMAND AND SUPPLY SHOCKS IN THE U.S. 
AND U.K. GASOLINE MARKET 
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 Introduction   4.1
This chapter is an extension of Chapter 3 in which we aim to identify the 
underlying demand and supply shocks in gasoline markets in two structurally different 
countries: the U.S. and U.K. Understanding the source of gasoline price changes and 
the response of demand and supply to price changes would help formulate policy 
responses. Similar to other commodity prices, the level and volatility of motor gasoline 
prices have risen in the U.S. and U.K. in the past decade.  It is widely accepted that this 
surge in gasoline prices was part of a larger commodity price boom and caused by a 
sharp demand increase due to high global economic activity, while supply constraints 
had a limited effect on the prices. Both Hamilton (2009) and Kilian (2009) state that 
previous oil price shocks were primarily caused by physical disruptions of supply, but 
the record prices in 2008 were caused by strong demand coupled with stagnating world 
production.  
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the real gasoline price development in the U.S. and U.K. 
Overall both prices seem to follow a similar trend with the exception of small local 
price deviations and divergence. The level of price difference is striking; the price of 
one liter gasoline in the U.K. is nearly double the price of one liter in the U.S. In 2012, 
the real U.S. gasoline price in British pound pence seems to exceed the record levels 
reached in 2008.  
 
Figure 4.1 Real Gasoline Prices 
(Pence per liter) 
 
Source: The U.K. Department of Energy and Climate; the U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
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There are some similarities on the supply side in the U.S. and the U.K.; both 
extract and refine crude oil to produce gasoline and both are nearly self-sufficient in 
terms of production but they differ significantly in market and consumption structure. 
The U.K. has the highest excise tax rate among industrial countries and the U.S. has the 
lowest.
15
  Public transportation is widely available in the U.K. while it is essential to 
own and drive a car in the U.S. to be mobile. The most of the vehicle run on gasoline in 
the U.S. while the diesel fuel usage is higher than gasoline usage in the U.K. where 
diesel car sales doubled since the 2000’s increasing demand for diesel.  Finally, in 
terms of volume of consumption, the U.S. consumes more than 10 times the amount 
that the U.K. consumes.  
 
These differences are reflected in the gasoline consumption patterns which are 
shown in Figure 4.2. The volume and share of gasoline in total petroleum products 
consumed has been steadily declining in the U.K. since the early 2000s, due to an 
increase in usage of diesel. The financial crisis in 2008 followed by a recession did not 
make any changes on the down-trend. The actual volumes consumed in the U.S. have 
risen steadily since the 1990’s before dropping in 2008. Similarly, the share of gasoline 
consumption started to climb in the 2000s, before falling in 2008. However, both the 
share and volume began to recover in recent years, albeit at a slower pace. Because of 
these structural dissimilarities, the determinants of gasoline prices and the dynamics of 
supply and demand conditions would likely to be also different in these two markets.  
 
There is a large body of work on gasoline markets which mainly focuses on 
determining the short or long term sensitivity of gasoline consumption to changes in 
prices or income. There have been some studies such as Borenstein et al. (1997) 
attempting to link movements in crude oil and gasoline prices. A small number of 
research focused on the effect of retail energy price shocks on the economy (Edelstein 
and Kilian (2009)). However, none of these studies includes the supply conditions and 
                                                 
15 From January 4, 2011, the UK duty rate for the road fuels unleaded petrol, diesel, biodiesel and bioethanol is GB£ 
0.5895 per liter (£2.20 per U.S. gallon or about $3.56).  In the US, the federal excise tax on gasoline is 18.4 cents per 
gallon. In January 2011, motor gasoline taxes averaged 48.1 cents per gallon nationwide.  
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examines the effect of demand or supply shocks on gasoline prices or the reverse; effect 
of price changes on demand/supply in a dynamic framework until Kilian (2009) and 
Kilian (2010) developed two related structural VAR models.  
 
 Figure 4.2 Gasoline Consumption in the U.S. and U.K.
16
 
 
 
In the first model, Kilian (2009) constructs a structural VAR model of the 
global crude oil market in which he includes three variables: global oil production, 
global demand and oil price and measures the response of each variable to the shocks to 
the system. The second model Kilian (2010) built is an extension of the first in which 
the U.S. retail gasoline market is linked to the imported crude oil dynamics. This joint 
structural VAR model includes five variables: global oil production, real global 
economic activity, real price of imported oil, the real price of gasoline and finally the 
U.S. gasoline consumption. With this framework, he aims to understand the evolution 
of gasoline prices that includes both the crude oil demand and supply shocks that drive 
the global price of crude oil and the additional gasoline demand and supply shocks that 
affect the domestic retail gasoline market by allowing for feedback between these 
markets. The joint VAR model was useful to differentiate the global or local impact on 
                                                 
16
 Series are seasonally adjusted to exhibit the trend. 
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the gasoline prices. In both study, he argues that prices respond to demand and supply 
shocks differently in magnitude, pattern and persistence.  
 
In this chapter, we take the structural VAR model that was developed for the 
crude oil in Kilian (2009) and apply to the gasoline markets. Instead of linking the 
gasoline to crude oil market, we focus to understand the domestic gasoline fundamental 
dynamics in the U.S. and the U.K. In this set-up, not explicitly but the price and supply 
of crude oil are included indirectly through gasoline supply, since gasoline production 
depends on crude oil and its availability. Any shock to crude oil supply or price would 
impact gasoline supply.  Hence, we include the gasoline market fundamentals: supply, 
demand and prices in the VAR specification and then decompose the real price of 
gasoline into three fundamental components: supply shocks, global demand shocks and 
gasoline specific demand shocks and measure the responses of each variable. These 
responses would help us explain the fluctuations in the price of gasoline, but also 
understand how consumers react to gasoline price fluctuations. 
 
This chapter contributes to the empirical literature by attempting to explain the 
dynamic effects of shocks on gasoline markets in two distinctly different markets; the 
U.S. and U.K. during 1983-2010 and 1998-2010, respectively. Other than Kilian’s 
work on the gasoline and crude oil prices in the U.S., there is no study which applied 
this framework on any other country and compared the results.  Applying the same 
model to the U.S. and U.K. will be helpful to observe the different market dynamics 
and draw some policy conclusions in two structurally distinct markets.  
 
The plan of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature 
survey, section 3 explains the model that will be used for the estimations. Section 4 
describes the data. Section 4 presents the estimation results. Section 5 provides 
concluding remarks. 
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 Literature Survey 4.2
There is a large literature on price and income elasticities of gasoline demand 
across countries and time period. More recent studies, such as Hughes et al (2008) 
argue that structural change in the gasoline market in the U.S. caused insensitivity of 
gasoline demand to price changes in the last decade. Lin and Prince (2013) find that 
consumers appear to be less elastic in response to changes in gasoline prices when 
gasoline price volatility is medium or high, compared to when it is low. However, these 
studies focus only on response of demand to changes in price without investigating the 
possible changes in supply condition or dynamic interactions between supply, demand 
and price. This type of analysis usually suffers from endogeneity which undermines the 
estimated results.  To circumvent the endogeneity problem and examine the dynamic 
interaction among supply, demand and price, we adopt a structural VAR framework 
which was developed in Kilian (2009) and Kilian (2010). We briefly review these two 
models before we lay out our framework for empirical analysis. 
 
In Kilian (2009), a structural VAR model of the global crude oil market is 
constructed to identify the underlying demand and supply shocks in the global crude oil 
market. The structural VAR representation is as follows: 
  
      ∑      -      
  
   
  
 
where εt denotes the vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural innovations. 
A0
-1
 has a recursive structure such that the reduced-form errors et can be decomposed 
according to et = A0
-1
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The three variables that are jointly determined are the percent change in global 
crude oil production, the index of real economic activity (proxy for aggregate demand) 
and the real price of oil.  These variables are driven by three demand and supply shocks 
in the order as defined above: shocks to the current physical availability of crude oil 
(oil supply shocks), shocks to the current demand for crude oil driven by fluctuations in 
the global business cycle (aggregate demand shocks); and shocks driven by shifts in the 
precautionary demand for oil (precautionary demand shocks). Precautionary demand 
arises from the uncertainty about shortfalls of expected supply relative to expected 
demand. 
 
Based on these structural shocks, he finds that source of oil price increases may 
have very different effects on the real price of oil, depending on the underlying cause of 
the price increase. For example, an increase in precautionary demand for crude oil 
causes an immediate, persistent, and large increase in the real price of crude oil; an 
increase in aggregate demand for all industrial commodities causes a somewhat 
delayed, but sustained, increase in the real price of oil that is also substantial; and crude 
oil production disruptions cause a small and transitory increase in the real price of oil 
within the first year. 
  
Kilian argues that decompositions of fluctuations in the real price of oil show 
that oil price shocks historically have been driven mainly by a combination of global 
aggregate demand shocks and precautionary demand shocks, rather than oil supply 
shocks. For example, the surge in the price of oil after 2003 was driven primarily by the 
cumulative effects of positive global demand shocks. Likewise, the increase in the real 
price of oil after 1979 was driven by the superimposition of strong global demand 
driven by a booming world economy and a sharp increase in precautionary demand. 
Typically, disruptions of crude oil production play a less important role. When 
exogenous political events do affect oil prices, it is less the physical supply disruptions 
than the increased precautionary demand for oil triggered by increased uncertainty 
about future oil supply shortfalls that drives the price of oil. 
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In his second paper, Kilian (2010) uses a joint structural VAR model of the 
global market for crude oil and the U.S. market for gasoline during the sample period 
of 1975-2008 and 2002-2008. The VAR specification is the same as the one in Kilian 
(2009) and jointly explains the evolution of the five variables: the growth of world 
production of crude oil, the measure of global real economic activity, the real price of 
imported crude oil, the real price of gasoline in the U.S., and the growth of the quantity 
of gasoline consumed in the U.S. These five variables are driven by five structural 
shocks: (1) crude oil supply shocks (oil supply shocks); (2) shocks to the demand for all 
industrial commodities in global markets (aggregate demand shocks); (3) demand 
shocks that are specific to the global crude oil market (oil-market specific demand 
shocks); (4) shocks to the supply of gasoline in the U.S. (exemplified by refinery 
shocks); and (5) shocks to the U.S. demand for gasoline (gasoline demand shocks). The 
ordering and feedback structure of the VAR are shown below. 
 
 
 
He shows that, in the short run, 80% of the fluctuations in the real price of 
gasoline are determined by refining shocks and 20% by oil market specific demand 
shocks. In the long run, 54% of the variation in the real price of gasoline in the U.S. is 
driven by oil-market specific demand shocks, 41% by shocks to the global business 
cycle, and 4% by refining shocks with basically no role for domestic gasoline demand 
shocks or global oil supply shocks. Gasoline consumption shows a somewhat different 
picture. In the short run 96% of the variation in the growth rate of U.S. gasoline 
consumption is driven by gasoline demand shocks and 2% by shocks at the refining 
stage. In the long run, 83% of the variation in the growth rate of U.S. gasoline 
consumption is driven by domestic gasoline demand shocks, 3% by refining shocks, 
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4% by demand shocks specific to the crude oil market, 4% by shocks to the global 
business cycle, and 6% by oil supply shocks. 
 
The main conclusion of Kilian’s analysis is that each demand and supply shock 
has distinct dynamic effects on the real price of imported crude oil and on the retail 
price of gasoline in the U.S.  He concludes that the origin of the shocks mattered in 
assessing the responses of prices and consumption as they responded differently in 
magnitude, pattern and persistence to each demand and supply shock. He also showed 
that the surge in the gasoline price in the U.S. between 2002 and mid-2008 was due to 
positive demand shocks in global commodity market.   
 
For our analysis in this chapter, we adopt the VAR model that is developed in 
Kilian (2009) for crude oil market to gasoline market, instead of using Kilian (2010) 
which links the gasoline prices to crude oil prices. We choose to concentrate on the 
dynamics of gasoline demand, supply and prices, rather than examining the interaction 
between gasoline and crude oil markets. Because gasoline production and prices 
depend on crude oil supply and prices, any shock to crude oil price will affect the 
gasoline prices. The distinction of the source of crude oil price shock whether it is due 
to shortages of crude oil or increase in demand for crude oil is not the focus of our 
analysis. In the next section, we will lay out the specifications of VAR model for 
empirical testing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Methodology 4.3
We employ the reduced form VAR with recursive shock identification as 
specified in Kilian (2009) to disentangle the shocks to the gasoline prices. There are 
three variables in the model: total gasoline supply, industrial production as a proxy for 
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a measure of global real economic activity and the real price of gasoline. The VAR 
representation is as follows: 
   (1) 
where n is the lag order, εt represents the vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated 
structural innovations. A0
-1
 has a recursive structure such that the reduced-form errors et 
can be decomposed according to et = A0
-1
 εt 
 
 The recursive shock identifications are proposed as below 
 
               
It is proposed that these three variables are driven by three structural shocks: (1) 
shocks to the current physical availability of gasoline (supply shocks), (2) shocks to the 
current aggregate demand for all industrial materials including gasoline driven by 
fluctuations in the global business cycle (aggregate demand shocks); and (3) shocks 
driven by shifts in consumer demand in U.S. or U.K. (gasoline specific demand shock). 
 
With the ordering of these shocks, three restrictions are imposed on A0
-1
.  
 
The first restriction is that the short-run gasoline supply curve is very steep so 
that shifts in the demand curve do not produce immediate changes in supply.  The 
rationale for this assumption is that changing gasoline production is costly, because the 
production of gasoline involves two constraints: crude oil and refineries.  Both oil 
producers and refineries set production based on expected trend growth in demand not 
to unexpected variation in demand. So gasoline price responds immediately to a shift in 
demand to clear the market. If the demand shock persists then the supply response will 
lag by at least one month. Example of gasoline supply shocks are supply shocks to 
price or supply of crude oil in addition to refinery problems that shut down the 
operation of refiners and reduce the domestic supply of gasoline or changes in 
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regulation that restrict gasoline output. A distinction between the effect of a crude oil or 
refineries shock will not be made in this model. Both will be considered as a shock to 
supply of gasoline. 
 
The second restriction is related to the effect of shocks to the industrial or 
economic activity in the U.S. or U.K. and the rest of the world. This shock is 
interpreted as a shock to global precautionary demand; in other words, the change in 
price is driven by market participants to increase their inventories, reflecting 
expectations of tighter commodity supply markets in the near future. During the recent 
commodity boom, almost all commodity prices rose in tandem as a result of a surge in 
global demand. So it can be argued that the commodity markets are globally integrated 
and a global demand shock should have approximately the same impact on gasoline as 
on other commodities regardless of its origin. With this assumption, it is assumed that 
country’s industrial production will not respond immediately to the real gasoline price 
shocks but will respond with a lag. 
 
Finally, the third source of shocks is represented by the gasoline specific shocks 
which reflect shifts in consumer preferences, changes in demographic structure and the 
degree of urbanization and other shifts in gasoline demand for a given real price of 
gasoline. Any unanticipated shifts in gasoline supply or economic activity will result in 
an immediately response of the real price of gasoline.  
 
 Description of Data 4.4
The details on data and data sources are listed in Appendix 4.A.1.  The data are 
monthly from January 1983 to December 2012 for the U.S. and from January 1998 to 
December 2012 for the U.K. As a proxy for global economic activity, Industrial 
Production is used. But we also try the domestic demand to examine whether the results 
would differ. The gasoline prices are converted to real by using respective CPIs for 
both countries. Gasoline supply is domestic production plus imports, minus exports and 
changes to stocks. All variables are in logarithms. Summary statistics for the variables 
used in the estimations are provided in appendix Table 4.A.1.  The graphical 
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representation of variables is presented in Figure 4.3 and 4.4.  Both the demand and 
supply series exhibit a clear seasonal pattern. The VAR tests conducted with the non-
seasonally adjusted series along with 11 monthly dummies are presented in the text; the 
estimation results with seasonally adjusted series are included in Appendix. The unit 
root tests of seasonally adjusted series are also included in Appendix. The graphs show 
that most of the series have an apparent trend and are non-stationary.   All series except 
for demand in the U.S. are I(1) as the ADF test results presented in Table 4.1 In 
contrast, the first difference of the logs of all variables shows clear evidence of 
stationary in ADF and in Philips-Peron tests. However, Philips-Peron tests results 
reveal that the logs of demand and supply in the U.S. and supply in the U.K. turn to be 
I(0) .  
 
Table 4.1 Unit Root Tests 
 
 
Logs Augmented Dickey Fuller Phillips-Perron
t-statistics Probablity t-statistics Probablity
Lag length=6
Supply -1.70 0.43 -3.16 0.02
Price -2.01 0.28 -1.65 0.46
IP -1.51 0.53 -2.00 0.29
Log Differences
t-statistics Probablity t-statistics Probablity
Lag length=6
Supply -15.71 0.00 -43.15 0.00
Price -13.40 0.00 -10.36 0.00
IP -4.93 0.00 -17.84 0.00
U.S.
Log Augmented Dickey Fuller Phillips-Perron
t-statistics Probablity t-statistics Probablity
Lag length=6
Supply -2.07 0.26 -4.41 0.00
Price 0.11 0.97 -0.09 0.95
IP -1.75 0.40 -1.50 0.53
Log Differences
t-statistics Probablity t-statistics Probablity
Lag length=6
Supply -13.74 0.00 -19.92 0.00
Price -16.35 0.00 -16.24 0.00
IP -9.63 0.00 -9.65 0.00
U.K.
   
124 
 
Figure 4.3 U.S. Gasoline Fundamentals 
 (January 1983 – December 2012) 
 
 
Figure 4.4 U.K. Gasoline Fundamentals 
(January 1998 – December 2012) 
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 Estimation Results and Discussions 4.5
Three variables are used in the estimation: gasoline supply, industrial 
production as proxy for global economic activity or aggregate demand and gasoline 
price. We also replace the industrial production with domestic demand to examine 
whether the results will differ. The lag length in each VAR specification is calculated 
and included in the relevant table. The lag lengths were based on the results from 
Akaike information criteria (AIC). Due to high seasonality in the data, 11 monthly 
dummies are included in the regressions for the U.S. but not in the regressions for the 
U.K. as they did not make much difference in the results. The same tests are repeated 
with seasonally adjusted series and included in the Appendix. The industrial production 
and price series are expressed in log differences in the estimations for both the U.S. and 
U.K.  The supply series showed sign of I(0), so we performed the tests using both in log 
levels and in the log differences. However, supply in log level is not responsive to the 
shocks and makes the interpretation and comparison difficult. Therefore we include the 
results of estimation with the log difference of supply in the text. We add the results 
with supply log levels in Appendix. The order of variables in each of VAR estimation 
is explained in the methodology section.  The covariance matrix of reduced form 
residuals from estimated VAR models reveal that the correlation of residuals of 
variables are quite small indicating that the order would not make a big difference in 
the VAR results.
17
  
 
Each row in Figures shows the cumulated response of each variable to one 
percentage point shock to each one of three variables for a horizon of up to 24 months. 
All of these shocks are applied in a way that gasoline price will increase. Namely, the 
supply shock was normalized to represent a crude oil or refinery disruption, i.e. one 
percent point decline in supply.  The demand shock or economic activity shock was 
                                                 
17
 In fact, VARs estimated with a different ordering of the variables (industrial production, supply and price), the 
results did not differ much. 
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normalized to represent a demand expansion (one percent point increase in aggregate 
demand).   
 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the cumulated responses of each variable for the U.S. The 
first row shows the responses of supply to shocks to all variables in the model.  The 
first graph displays an unanticipated shock to gasoline supply persists for a long time 
and does not return to original levels. This result is statistically significant and reflects s 
slow adjustment in gasoline production in case of a disruption due to refinery outages. 
If it is not planned refinery maintenance then it is likely to take longer time to fix and 
bring the refinery back to the original level of production. The initial response of 
supply to an increase to in global growth is to rise but then to decline in 3-4 months. It 
goes back to the original levels in two years. The effect of a gasoline demand shock on 
supply is less dramatic and shows a slow adjustment. However, these results 
statistically insignificant.  Also the seasonality in supply data is evident in these 
responses.  
 
In the second row, the responses of aggregate demand are presented where 
results are not statistically significant and standard errors are large. In the last row, the 
responses of gasoline prices to shocks to all three variables in the model are exhibited. 
All of the results are statistically significant. Gasoline price increases and reaches a 
peak after two quarters in response to a negative supply shock. It declines and settles at 
a level slightly lower than the original level after 24 months.  The highest impact on 
gasoline price comes from a shock to the aggregate demand.  It increases by almost 4 
percent in about a year in response a one percent increase in economic activity. The 
effect declines yet remains high and becomes permanent after 2 years. Gasoline prices 
increase in the first quarter after a shock to gasoline demand but the effect dies down 
and the level goes back to the original level after two years.   
 
Overall, these results suggest that gasoline price in the U.S.is fairly responsive 
to supply and aggregate demand shocks. The responses of the seasonally adjusted price 
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series are similar to the non-seasonally adjusted series, they only look smoother and the 
magnitudes of the responses are somewhat smaller (Figure 4.A.3).  
 
Figure 4.6 exhibits the accumulated responses to one percentage shocks of each 
variable in the U.K. gasoline market.  In all cases the impact becomes permanent and 
the series do not go back to the original levels for the U.K. Also the adjustments to 
shocks are rather fast due to short lag length in VAR estimation. Gasoline supply 
recovers in a quarter after a negative supply shock. The supply also responds an 
aggregate demand shock by rising first then settling at a higher level than the original 
level. The result is statistically significant. Supply increases and reverts to the original 
levels after a shock to gasoline demand. In the next row, industrial production, or 
aggregate demand, is unresponsive to shocks to supply or gasoline demand and results 
are insignificant.  The most interesting result is the response of gasoline prices to 
aggregate demand. The prices rise and remain higher than the original level and 
statistically significant. A shock to supply does not create any permanent or significant 
impact on the price.  The graphs of responses with the seasonally adjusted series are 
included in appendix Figure 4.A.4 which shows similar results. There are more 
fluctuations in the series since the lag length turned to be for 4. Overall, supply and 
gasoline prices are more responsive to aggregate shocks in the U.K.  
 
The data sample for the U.S. cover longer period than that of the U.K.. So to 
make the results comparable, the VAR estimations are conducted with the same time 
period for the U.S. (1998-2012). The results are presented in Figure 4.7. There are more 
fluctuations in the responses to shocks as the lag length is 12. The results are similar to 
the results of full sample except for the response of price to supply shocks and 
aggregate demand shock. Gasoline price jumps in response to a supply shock and goes 
back to the original level in 24 months, in the full sample estimation; it remained below 
the initial levels. The most notable result is the response of price to a shock to 
aggregate demand growth which is statistically significant and even higher in terms of 
magnitude (8%) than the results with the longer sample period. Furthermore, the 
response of gasoline price to a shock to the aggregate demand is four times higher than 
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the response of gasoline price to a supply shock. This result confirms the argument that 
the increase in gasoline price was part of a larger commodity price boom and caused by 
a sharp demand increase due to high global economic activity, while supply constraints 
had a limited effect on the prices. 
 
To summarize, the VAR estimation results imply that the gasoline price in the 
U.S. is more responsive to aggregate demand and supply shocks. The response of 
gasoline price to aggregate demand is much larger than the response to supply shocks. 
The gasoline price in the U.K., however, seems to respond only to aggregate demand 
changes. The response of the U.S. gasoline price to growth in aggregate demand is 
nearly four times higher than the response of gasoline price in the U.K. to an aggregate 
shock.   
 
Figure 4.5 U.S. Cumulated Responses 1% Point Shock with 1-Std Error 
Confidence Bands 
 (Jan. 1983 – Dec. 2012, order: dlsupply dlip dlp, 11 monthly dummies Lag length=6) 
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Figure 4.6 U.K. Cumulated Responses 
(Jan. 1998 – Dec. 2012, order:dlsupply dlip dlp, Lag length=2) 
 
 
Figure 4.7 U.S. Cumulated Responses to 1% Point Shock with 1-Std Error 
Confidence Bands 
(Jan. 1998 – Dec. 2012, order: dlsupply dlip dlp, 11 monthly dummies, Lag length=12) 
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How much of the variation in U.S. and U.K. gasoline prices can be attributed to 
each demand or supply shock? This can be answered with the error variance 
decompositions based on the estimated VAR model. Table 4.2 reports the average 
contribution of each shock to the total variation in the real price of gasoline in 
percentage terms. The variation in price in the U.K. seems to be mainly determined by 
the gasoline demand and the aggregate demand, whereas supply has a very small 
impact.  The price variation in the U.S. however appears to come from all three; the 
gasoline demand, supply and aggregate demand, the impact of aggregate demand being 
slightly higher than that of supply in the earlier months of a shock. In addition, the 
share of the supply and aggregate demand is much higher than that of the U.K.. This 
confirms the argument that the increase in gasoline prices was partly due to the increase 
in global demand for commodities, while the share of the supply remained limited.  
 
Table 4.2 Variance Decomposition for Gasoline Price 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 Conclusions 4.6
In this study we employed a structural VAR model to measure the response of 
gasoline prices to aggregate demand and supply shocks as well as to examine the 
responses of demand and supply to gasoline price shocks.  We attempted to determine 
the source of gasoline price increases in the U.S. and U.K.  
 
The results for the U.S. in this chapter are comparable to the results in Kilian 
(2010).  All of the factors; supply, both aggregate and gasoline demand  play a role 
determining the price of gasoline in the U.S. but the impact of a positive aggregate 
Supply IP Price Supply IP Price
1 quarter 8.84 10.31 80.85 1.29 7.90 90.81
(3.75) (4.85) (6.11) (1.95) (4.16) (4.58)
2 quarter 14.90 15.28 69.82 1.34 7.94 90.71
(4.99) (5.85) (6.93) (2.01) (4.19) (4.63)
4 quarter 15.84 15.69 68.47 1.35 7.95 90.70
(5.34) (6.06) (6.88) (2.02) (4.20) (4.64)
8 quarter 15.87 15.72 68.41 1.35 7.95 90.70
(5.48) (6.14) (7.01) (2.02) (4.20) (4.64)
US UK
   
131 
 
demand shock is larger than that of the others. For the U.K., the impact of aggregate 
and local gasoline demand are important to determine the gasoline price but supply 
does have a limited effect.  
 
Our results also show that gasoline price increases were partly driven by the 
increase in demand for commodities due to the expansion in global economy which 
may also imply that gasoline prices, to some extent, are determined globally through 
the price of crude oil.  Despite the differences in structure of the market, the gasoline 
prices in the U.K. and the U.S responded to aggregate demand shocks at a varying 
degree. The gasoline price in the U.S. seems to be more responsive to aggregate 
demand and supply shocks. The response of gasoline price to an aggregate demand 
shock is much larger than the response to supply shocks. The gasoline price in the 
U.K., however, seems to respond only to aggregate demand changes, as the U.K. is a 
smaller country compared to the U.S. Furthermore, the crude oil and subsequent 
gasoline production has been declining in the U.K. and fuel imports have been 
increasing. Increasing dependency on imports provides a channel for transmitting the 
changes from the global into the domestic market. The response of U.S. gasoline price 
to an increase in aggregate demand is nearly four times higher than the response of 
gasoline price in the U.K. to an aggregate shock.   
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4.A Appendix  
4.A.1 Data Sources 
U.S.  
The CPI and IP are from Haver Analytics. 
Consumer Price Index: CPI-U: All Items (SA, 1982-84=100), PCU@USECON 
Industrial Production: Industrial Production excluding Construction (SA, 
2007=100), S111D@G10 
Data on gasoline are from the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_cons_psup_dc_nus_mbbl_m.htm 
Demand: MGFUPUS2: U.S. Product Supplied of Finished Motor Gasoline 
(Thousand Barrels per Day)  
Supply: MGFRPUS1:  U.S. Refinery and Blender Net Production of Finished 
Motor Gasoline (Thousand Barrels) divided by the number of days in each month 
Gasoline Prices: A103600002: U.S. Total Gasoline Retail Sales by Refiners 
(Cents per Gallon) 
 
U.K. 
The CPI and IP are from Haver Analytics. 
Consumer Price Index: All Items (NSA, 2005=100), D7BT@UK  
Industrial Production: Production Industries (SA, 2006=100), CKYW@UK 
Data on gasoline are from the Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC)  
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/source/oil/oil.aspx 
Demand: Table 3.13 Deliveries of petroleum products for inland consumption 
Supply: Table 3.12 Refinery throughput and output of petroleum products 
Gasoline Prices: Table 4.1.1 Typical retail prices of petroleum products and a 
crude oil price index (the price average of two different grades are taken (super and 
premium unleaded). 
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Table 4.A.3 Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
Table 4.A.4 Unit Root Tests for Seasonally Adjusted Series 
 
 
 
  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis Obs.
Levels
Supply 7691 7741 835 -0.02 2.06 360
Price 1.02 0.88 0.28 1.08 3.28 360
IP 77.5 83.6 16.2 -0.21 1.50 360
Log Levels
Supply 8.94 8.95 0.11 -0.20 2.14 360
Price -0.02 -0.13 0.25 0.69 2.49 360
IP 4.33 4.43 0.22 -0.37 1.65 360
Log Differences
Supply 0.001 0.002 0.032 -0.09 3.65 359
Price 0.000 -0.003 0.050 -1.17 12.23 359
IP 0.002 0.003 0.006 -1.47 11.06 359
U.S.
 Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis Obs.
Levels
Supply 1838 1819 242.4 -0.13 3.51 180
Price 91.8 89.2 13.61 0.56 2.31 180
IP 97.6 100.1 5.17 -0.88 2.17 180
Log Levels
Supply 7.32 7.35 0.17 -0.50 2.14 180
Price 4.51 4.49 0.14 0.33 2.21 180
IP 4.58 4.61 0.05 -0.91 2.20 180
Log Differences
Supply -0.004 -0.007 0.09 -0.25 4.42 179
Price 0.003 0.001 0.02 -0.25 5.28 179
IP -0.001 0.000 0.01 -0.82 7.27 179
U.K.
Logs Augmented Dickey Fuller Phillips-Perron
t-statistics Probablity t-statistics Probablity
Lag length=6
Supply -1.23 0.66 -1.73 0.41
Price -0.79 0.82 -1.12 0.71
IP -1.51 0.53 -2.00 0.29
Log Differences
t-statistics Probablity t-statistics Probablity
Lag length=6
Supply -8.23 0.00 -3.33 0.01
Price -8.25 0.00 -3.18 0.02
IP -4.93 0.00 -17.84 0.00
U.S. Seasonally Adjusted Series
Log Augmented Dickey Fuller Phillips-Perron
t-statistics Probablity t-statistics Probablity
Lag length=6
Supply 0.38 0.98 -0.09 0.95
Price -1.33 0.62 -1.27 0.64
IP 0.11 0.97 -0.09 0.95
Log Differences
t-statistics Probablity t-statistics Probablity
Lag length=6
Supply -4.98 0.00 -4.16 0.00
Price -5.40 0.00 -3.85 0.00
IP -16.35 0.00 -16.24 0.00
U.K. Seasonally Adjusted Series
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Figure 4.A.8  U.S. Cumulated Responses to 1% Point Shock of with 1-Std Error 
Confidence Bands 
(Jan. 1983 – Dec. 2012, order: lsupply dlip dlp, 11 monthly dummies, Lag length=12) 
 
 
Figure 4.A.9 U.K. Cumulated Responses 
 (Jan. 1998 – Dec. 2012, order: lsupply dlip dlp, Lag length=1) 
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Figure 4.A.10 The Impulse Response Functions for the U.S. with Seasonally 
Adjusted Supply and Price Series with 1-Std Error Confidence Bands 
(Jan. 1983 – Dec. 2012, dlsupply dlip dlp, Lag length=6) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.A.11 The Impulse Response Functions for the U.K. with Seasonally 
Adjusted Supply and Price Series with 1-Std Error Confidence Bands 
(Jan. 1998 – Dec. 2012, dlsupply dlip dlp, Lag length=4) 
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5 PROCYCLICALITY OF FISCAL POLICIES IN 
DEVELOPING OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES 
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 Introduction 5.1
Oil price volatility has increased in recent years. Large, unpredictable swings 
have a major impact on fiscal balances in developing oil-producing economies (Figure 
5.1).18 Even a small fall in prices, for example, may lead to a substantial increase in 
financing needs, as the exports of these countries are not diversified and oil revenue 
accounts for a large portion of total revenue.  The political, institutional, or budget 
structure of these countries, as well as their inability to accumulate financial assets or to 
gain access to credit markets, forces governments to react to oil price volatility by 
conducting procyclical fiscal policies.  A large number of studies show that procyclical 
fiscal policies have harmful implications for developing countries.19 When governments 
cut expenditure in response to a fall in oil revenue, the poor get hurt because of the 
weak safety net, and long-term growth is hampered as governments cut capital 
expenditure and withdraw resources from productive projects.  
 
Figure 5.1 Oil Price and Overall Fiscal Balance in Percent of GDP in Oil 
Producing Countries20 
 
                                                 
18
 Throughout this chapter, the term “oil” is used to refer to “hydrocarbon” or “petroleum” because gas is also an 
important resource in several countries (e.g., Algeria and Qatar). 
19
 See Lane (2003) who reviews neoclassical and Keynesian arguments related to optimal cyclicality in fiscal policy. 
20
 Simple averages. 
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This chapter examines whether fiscal behavior is indeed procyclical in 28 
developing oil- producing countries (OPCs) (Table 5.1) by employing rigorous 
econometric tests.  Although there is a growing number of studies on the topic, few 
have thoroughly studied the procyclicality of fiscal policies, particularly during the 
recent period of high oil prices.  With this analysis, the chapter contributes to the 
literature in three ways.   
 
Table 5.1 OPCs Classified by Income Level 
Low income Middle income High income 
Algeria             Angola 
Azerbaijan       Cameroon 
Chad                Congo 
Ecuador           Indonesia 
Iran                  Nigeria 
Sudan               Syria 
Vietnam    
Yemen 
Gabon 
Kazakhstan 
Libya 
Mexico 
Russia 
Venezuela 
 
Bahrain                        
Brunei 
Equatorial Guinea 
Kuwait  
Qatar                            
Saudi Arabia 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
UAE 
   Based on 2009 World Bank country classification (nominal GNI per capita). 
 
First, fiscal behavior is studied among different groups of OPCs by breaking 
down the country sample into three subgroups according to their level of development 
and conducting the cyclicality tests on the full sample, as well as on the subsamples.  
Since the OPCs are not a homogenous group, their fiscal policies are likely to respond 
differently to oil price shocks due to significant variations in the extent of their 
dependency on oil revenue, economic development, political and institutional structure, 
financial positions, the level of existing oil reserves, and the degree of maturity in oil 
production.21 Due to these differences, it is important to study the fiscal behavior not 
only in a large group but also in smaller groups, to see whether countries with certain 
characteristics show consistent fiscal policy patterns; this, in turn, may be useful for 
designing effective policies. Indeed, this study finds that the results are not uniform 
across income groups.  Total expenditure is highly procyclical in the low and middle-
                                                 
21
 There is a noteworthy negative correlation between the use of the additional fiscal oil revenue and the income or 
development level of OPCs (Davis, Ossowski, and Fedelino, 2003). 
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income groups, while it is countercyclical in the high-income countries. In addition, the 
estimation results show that political and institutional factors, as well as financing 
constraints, play a role in the cyclicality of fiscal policies in the OPCs, especially in the 
low-income group. 
 
Second, the cyclical behavior of several fiscal policy variables is tested:  total 
expenditure and its components, public consumption and investment; the non-oil 
primary balance; and non-oil revenue. Most studies use either expenditure or 
consumption as a dependent variable. However, this chapter examines total government 
expenditure as well as its components, which will be a key contribution of the chapter 
for the following reason.  Focusing only on aggregates can be misleading if their 
subcomponents move in offsetting ways. Thus, looking at the subcomponents 
separately may further explain the preferred direction of fiscal policy and reveal 
important policy implications; for example, a government may change either 
consumption or investment more in response to a change in output.  In fact, the 
estimation results in this chapter show that expenditure is countercyclical for the high-
income group, but its components move in different directions: consumption is 
procyclical while capital expenditure is countercyclical.  Similarly, Villafuerte and 
Lopez-Murphy (2010) and Arezki and Ismail (2010) indicate that, during oil price 
declines, governments reduce capital expenditure more than they reduce government 
consumption.  Furthermore, the non-oil primary balance as a dependent variable will 
measure the injection/use of oil revenue in the economy and the overall level of fiscal 
effort.  Finally, non-oil revenue will be a useful measure of the tax collection 
mechanism. All of these five fiscal variables show strong procyclical behavior in the 
full sample of OPCs.  
 
Third, there have been only a few econometric studies on the procyclicality of 
OPCs.  In this chapter, not only are various econometric methods employed to test 
procyclicality, but the possibility of reverse causality between output growth and the 
fiscal variable is taken into account.  Pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed-effect, 
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instrument variables (IV), and general methods of moments (GMM) estimations are 
used and their results compared.    
 
The plan of the chapter is as follows.  In the next section, some special 
characteristics of OPCs that are relevant to the analysis will be discussed.  In Section 3, 
the empirical specification and the data will be described.  In Section 4, the results will 
be presented, and Section 5 will conclude.  
 
 Literature Survey 5.2
Both the neoclassical and Keynesian theories support the idea that effective fiscal 
policy should smooth the volatility of output during the business cycle.  Barro’s (1973) 
“tax-smoothing” hypothesis of optimal fiscal policy suggests that, for a given path of 
government expenditure, tax rates should be held constant over the business cycle, and 
the budget surplus should move in a procyclical fashion. According to the Keynesian 
approach, however, if the economy is in recession, policy should increase government 
expenditure and lower taxes to help the economy out of the recession.  During 
economic booms, the government should save the surpluses that emerge from the 
operation of automatic stabilizers and, if necessary, go further with discretionary tax 
increases or spending cuts. As a result, fiscal policies are expected to follow 
countercyclical patterns through automatic stabilizers and discretionary channels. In 
other words, one would expect a positive correlation between changes in output and 
changes in the fiscal balance or a negative correlation between changes in output and 
changes in government expenditure. However, empirical studies show that fiscal 
policies are procyclical in developing countries and in OPCs.
22
 They increase spending 
with an increase in oil revenue during an oil price boom. They are forced to reduce 
spending because of a revenue decline as a result of a drop in oil prices.  Since, in 
general, these countries are not able to accumulate savings in years with high oil 
                                                 
22
 Gavin and Perotti (1997) find total spending and its components are highly procyclical in Latin America.  
Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2004) find that fiscal policy is procyclical in their subsample of 83 low- and middle-
income countries. 
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revenues, they can only finance deficits by cutting expenditure during  revenue 
shortfalls.  Fouad and others (2007), Abdih and others (2010), and Villafuerte and 
Lopez-Murphy (2010) find that oil-producing countries followed procyclical fiscal 
policies during the recent oil price cycle.  Baldini (2005) and De Cima (2003) also 
present evidence for the procyclicality of fiscal policies in two oil-producing countries, 
Venezuela and Mexico.  More recent studies, e.g. Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008), find, using 
instrumental variable regression, strong evidence of procyclical fiscal policy in 
developing countries. 
 
Two broad arguments that have been proposed as an explanation for procyclical 
policies in developing counties  also apply to OPCs: constraints on financing (or 
limited access to credit markets) and factors related to the  structure of the economy  
(the budget, political, power, and social structure, and weak institutions).  In general, 
these factors are presented separately but they go together and are likely to reinforce 
each other.  For example, weak institutions, the budget structure, or a corrupt 
government may hinder prudent fiscal policies, which may, in turn, affect fiscal 
sustainability and creditworthiness by amplifying the financing constraints. 
 
Liquidity and borrowing constraints emerge when a developing country needs 
financing the most--during a downturn--and that is when it is least likely to be able to 
obtain it.  Many countries do not have significant foreign assets or developed domestic 
financial markets to raise funds. When these countries face large terms of trade shocks 
(i.e., a sharp fall in oil prices in the case of OPCs), investors may lose confidence and 
be less likely to lend, because they fear that the lack of policy credibility and discipline 
may force the government to run up large budget deficits and to default.23 Governments 
in this situation will also experience recurring credit constraints in world capital 
markets (“sudden stops,” as explained in Calvo and Reinhart (2000)), which hamper 
their ability to conduct countercyclical policies.   
 
                                                 
23
 Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004), and Haussmann and others (1996). 
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Oil stabilization funds have been increasingly used by OPCs as an instrument to 
cope with oil revenue volatility. These funds are aimed at stabilizing budgetary 
revenues: when oil revenues are high, some portion of the revenue would be channeled 
to the stabilization fund; when oil revenues are low, the stabilization fund would 
finance the shortfall.  However, the creation of such funds is found to have no impact 
on the relationship between oil export earnings and government expenditure in 
countries where no sound and transparent fiscal and macroeconomic policies were 
implemented.24 Moreover, some oil funds have operated outside existing budget 
systems and are often accountable to only a few political appointees. This makes such 
funds especially susceptible to abuse and political interference. Therefore, stabilization 
funds should not be regarded as a substitute for sound fiscal management. 
 
The other argument proposed to explain the difficulty in implementing 
countercyclical policy focuses on procyclical government spending due to three aspects 
of the economy and the government: the budget structure, the weak political structure 
and institutions, and corruption in government.   
 
First, developing countries run procyclical fiscal policies because of their 
budget structure.  These countries have a few automatic stabilizers built into their 
budgets.  As a result, government spending in developing and emerging countries 
displays less of a countercyclical pattern than in industrial countries. For example, 
Gavin and Perotti (1997) note that Latin American countries spend much less on 
transfers and subsidies than do richer OECD economies (24 percent of total 
government spending, compared with 42 percent in the industrial countries).  
Furthermore, most developing countries and OPCs cannot raise revenue effectively 
through taxes since they usually suffer from inefficient tax collection systems, owing to 
the low level of compliance with tax laws, insufficient political commitment, and a lack 
                                                 
24
 Davis, Ossowski, and Fedelino (2003), Fasano-Filho (2000), and Ossowski and others (2008). 
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of capacity, expertise, and resources.25   Additionally, non-oil tax bases in these 
countries are in general very low.26 
 
Second, weak institutions and political structure encourage multiple powerful 
groups in a society to attempt to grab a greater share of national wealth by demanding 
higher public spending on their behalf.  This behavior, called the “voracity effect” by 
Tornell and Lane (1999), results in fiscal procyclicality arising from  common pool 
problems, whereby a positive shock to income leads to a more than proportional 
increase in public spending, even if the shock is expected to be temporary.  This is 
discussed extensively in “resource curse” literature as a reason for low economic 
growth in resource-rich countries.27  Moreover, fiscal policies are more intense in 
countries with political systems having multiple fiscal veto points and higher output 
volatility (Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti, 1998;and Talvi and Végh, 2000).  Similarly, Lane 
(2003) and Fatas and Mihov (2001) find that countries with power dispersion are likely 
to experience volatile output and procyclical fiscal behavior. 
  
Lastly, Alesina and Tabellini (2005) argue that a more corrupt government 
displays more procyclical fiscal policies as voters, who do not trust the government,  
demand higher utility when they see aggregate output rising.  This behavior would be 
more prevalent in democracies since a corrupt government is accountable to the voters, 
whereas, in a dictatorship, the government would not be accountable and, even if 
corruption were widespread, voters could not influence fiscal policy.  Alesina and 
Tabellini conclude that corrupt governments in democracies, rather than credit market 
imperfections, are the underlying cause of procyclical fiscal policy. 
  
                                                 
25
 Davis, Ossowski, and Fedelino (2003).  Furthermore, some countries until recently did not have even a full-
fledged modern value-added tax (VAT) system. See Crandall and Bodin (2005). 
 
26
 Most OPCs have quasi-fixed exchange rate regimes, which, coupled with high international capital mobility, limit 
the role of monetary policy.   
 
27
 Collier (1999), Sachs and Warner (1995), and Klare (2001). 
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 This study is very through in understanding the fiscal behavior in crude oil 
producing countries and differs from the earlier ones for a number of reasons. First, 
there are not many studies that investigated the political and institutional aspects of 
fiscal policies in oil producing countries by looking at a wide range of political and 
institutional factors. Second, fiscal behavior is studied among different groups of OPCs 
by breaking down the country sample into subgroups according to their level of 
development and conducting the cyclicality tests on the full sample, as well as on the 
subsamples. This approach may reveal general characteristics of oil producing 
countries as well as specifics to subgroups. Previous studies normally looked at one set 
of countries. The second, the aggregate as well as the component of the fiscal indicators 
are tested to observe whether individual components’ movement offsets each other.  
Most studies only investigated the aggregate components such as total expenditure or 
primary balance. Finally, various techniques have been applied to tackle the 
endogeneity as it was ignored in some of the earlier empirical studies. 
  
 Methodology and Data 5.3
5.3.1 Methodology 
The specification for estimation is based on the following framework which has 
been widely used in the literature where changes in fiscal balance reflects changes in 
output, terms of trade cycles (particularly in the case of commodity producing small 
open economies), changes in its own lagged value (a term that limits the long-run 
movement of the balance from its initial equilibrium) and other political and 
institutional control variables that have been shown or would be tested in this study for 
having an impact on the fiscal policy.28 
 
                                                 
28
 Gavin and Perotti (1997), Alesina and Tabellini (2005) and Lledo, Yackovlev, and  Gadenne (2009). 
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Δ(log(Fiscalt)) =α + β Δ(log(non-oil GDPit))+ θ Δ(log(TOTit)) + δ Δ(log(Fiscalit-
1)) + δ Zit+  ηi + eit           (1)        
 
t=1,… T,    i= 1,...,N, 
 
where Fiscal represents a fiscal variable. The independent variables on the right-hand 
side are non-oil GDP, an index of the country’s terms of trade, TOT, the lagged fiscal 
variable, a set of other control variables as Z, fiscal shocks as eit and ηi as an 
unobserved, country fixed effect. The i and t denote the country and the time period, 
respectively.   
 
Equation (1) is a fiscal reaction function where fiscal policy responds to 
contemporaneous output changes, terms of trade, the lagged fiscal variable, other 
control variables, and fiscal shocks (eit).  The variables included in equation (1) are in 
in growth rate while other papers scale the variables in total GDP or take the deviations 
of GDP and fiscal variables from their long-run trends by using the Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) filter. However, both transformations have shortcomings. In the former, the 
cyclical
 
stance of fiscal policy may be dominated by the cyclical behavior
 
of total 
output. In the later, the HP-based measures of cyclicality produce misleading results 
when samples have different levels of volatility. Furthermore, de-trending is not 
necessary in this study because it does not attempt to differentiate between 
discretionary fiscal policy and automatic stabilizers (likely very small in OPCs) and 
focuses on the evolution of actual fiscal balances (rather than the cyclically adjusted 
balances, which better reflect discretionary behavior). 
 
The terms of trade variable is important for developing countries in general but 
especially for OPCs, as their fiscal balances and economies are highly prone to terms of 
trade shocks, which usually originate from outside the domestic economy.  Each 
individual country does not have control over the oil price; thus, including TOT 
provides a control for external shocks to the economy.  Furthermore, the shocks to the 
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fiscal balance or policy decisions in the previous year may have lasting effects on the 
following period, so the lagged dependent variable is included in the specification to 
allow for long-term mean reversion in fiscal behavior.   
 
The cyclicality of fiscal policy is determined by gauging the sign and the size of 
coefficient β, which measures the elasticity of the fiscal variable with respect to output 
growth. When fiscal policy is procyclical, a positive β for most of the fiscal measures, 
except for the non-oil primary balance, is expected.  Government expenditure, 
consumption, revenues, and investment should move in the same direction as output. If 
output increases during booms, the fiscal variables also increase, while the opposite 
happens in recessions.  An estimated β value above 1 implies a more-than-
proportionate response of the fiscal variable to output fluctuations. 
 
 The issue of endogeneity needs to be addressed with equation (1) which 
emerges from three different channels. 
 
The first is the endogeneity of the output growth with respect to 
contemporaneous fiscal policy shocks, eit, or, as stated in recent studies (e.g., Ilzetzki 
and Végh, 2008), as the reverse causality between output growth and fiscal policy.
29
 
 
The second is the correlation between output growth and unobserved country-
specific and time-invariant effects η:  countries that are able to generate higher growth 
in their fiscal balances will, on average—as captured by higher values of the fixed 
effects η—tend to have a higher (or lower, depending on the sign of cyclicality) level of 
output growth; if this is not properly accounted for, the unobserved country fixed 
                                                 
29
 Rigobon (2004) and Jaimovic and Panizza (2007) question whether the fiscal policy shocks drive 
output and not the other way around.  However, Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) conduct a set of econometric 
tests to show that causality goes in both directions. But, once they take endogeneity into account, they 
find overwhelming evidence of procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries. 
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effects will exert an upward (or downward) bias on the estimated fiscal policy response 
to output growth.
30
 
 
The third is serial correlation between the error term and the lagged dependent 
variable, which can cause endogeneity.  Although the log differences of the variables 
are taken, endogeneity may still exist in the error term, if there was a persistent shock to 
the growth of the fiscal variable in the previous period. 
  
In this linear panel framework, pooled OLS and dynamic fixed-effect 
estimations assume strict exogeneity of explanatory variables; however, this does not 
hold for this specification, and they produce biased and inconsistent estimators.  
Similarly, the IV estimates are also biased, and the precision of the IV estimates is 
lower than that of the OLS estimates.  In the presence of weak instruments, the loss of 
precision will be severe, and the IV estimates may be no improvement over the OLS 
(Baum, 2007).  However, all three sources of endogeneity bias can be addressed by 
using both difference (Diff-) and System (Sys-) GMM estimators (Arellano and Bond, 
1991), as is commonly used in the literature.  The Diff-GMM uses first-differenced 
equations with suitable lagged levels as instruments.  The Sys-GMM augments the 
former by stacking the equation in first differences and the equation in levels together 
in a system of equations and employs both lagged levels and differences as instruments.   
 
In general, if the explanatory variables are highly persistent, their lagged levels 
might only be very weak instruments for the first-differenced equations, due to serial 
correlation between the instruments and the error terms. As a result, the first-
differenced GMM estimator potentially suffers from a downward bias (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998). An additional set of first-differenced instruments and equations in levels 
is used to make the system GMM estimator more efficient by overcoming the weak 
instrument problem inherent in the first-differenced GMM estimator. However, the 
                                                 
30
 Since the variables are differenced, the fixed effects may be eliminated. However, there may be fixed 
effects in the growth rates of the series. 
   
148 
 
Sys-GMM imposes more restrictions.  As a result,  equation (1) is estimated using both 
methods and the results are compared.  Both methods take care of endogenity by 
instrumenting GDP growth and the lagged dependent variable. Widely used 
instruments are past values of the explanatory variables (Gali and Perotti, 2003; and 
Lane, 2003).  In all GMM regressions, two lags of all endogenous variables (output 
growth and the lagged dependent variable) are used as instruments.  In addition, the 
export-weighted GDP growth of a country’s trading partners is used as an instrument 
for GDP growth, as in other studies (Jaimovic and Panizza, 2007). 
 
The Diff-GMM and Sys-GMM estimation results with two statistics are 
reported in order to verify the appropriateness of the choice of instruments: p-values for 
the Hansen overidentification  test of  orthogonality restrictions, and the Arellano-Bond 
(1991) test for autocorrelation in first and second differences to verify the absence of 
serial correlation.  
 
5.3.2 Data and Variable Descriptions 
The key explanatory variable is the growth of real GDP, excluding the oil sector 
(non-oil GDP).  Non-oil GDP is more relevant to assess the status of economic 
conditions and the use of the labor factor, as the oil sector is typically an enclave sector, 
highly capital intensive with limited spillovers to the rest of the economy. Similarly, 
Barnett and Ossowski (2002), among others, argue that non-oil measures are more 
reliable variables of fiscal policy in OPCs than the overall balance, since oil revenue 
originates from abroad and non-oil variables are largely under the control of the 
authorities. The fiscal measurements used as dependent variables are real total general 
government expenditure, real general government consumption, real government 
capital expenditure, real non-oil revenue, and real non-oil primary balance.
31,32
 
                                                 
31
 Instead of central government data, general government data are used to capture the response of the total 
government to output changes. Nevertheless, the distinction is small for most of the countries. 
 
32
 Another policy instrument that may be useful is government tax rates, but data limitations for the sample countries 
prevent us from using these rates as a dependent variable.  
(continued) 
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After testing the basic specification,  the following robustness checks are 
performed by introducing additional control variables: 
  
 Two credit constraint variables are included to examine the origin of the 
possible credit constraint: domestic and external.  As for domestic financing 
constraints, there are also two variables: credit to the private sector scaled in 
GDP as a proxy for the depth of the domestic credit market, and the real central 
bank interest rate to indicate the cost of domestic financing. As for the external 
financing constraint, the degree of access to international financing is measured 
by the ratio of net capital flows to GDP.  
 
 As indicators of institutional quality and political structure, several variables 
from the International Country Risk Guide database are used: bureaucracy 
quality, corruption, and law and order. In addition, the composite index of 
institutional quality will be included, representing all of these. Furthermore, for 
political structure, variables such as political competition, democracy, 
constraints on the decision-making authority, and checks and balances from the 
Polity IV Project data set will be added
33
. 
 To control for the vulnerability of the country to oil price changes, as well as to 
serve as a proxy for dependence on oil income, oil revenue as a share of total 
revenue is used.  
 
The macroeconomic data come from Villafuerte and Lopez-Murphy (2010), 
updated by the World Economic Outlook database of the IMF for the period 1991 – 
2009. The frequency is annual. The availability of data varies by country.  All variables 
                                                                                                                                              
 
33
 The Polity IV Project has data on the political authority characteristics of states in 163 countries. 
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are converted to real values by deflating with each country’s respective CPI’s.34  The 
data sources are listed in Table 5.A.1. 
 
5.3.3 Estimation Results  
 Descriptive statistics in Table 5.A.2 in the Appendix describes the main 
variables.  The data show that in general the growth of non-oil GDP and fiscal variables 
is more volatile in low income OPCs than in high-income OPCs.  Average expenditure 
growth tends to be higher in low-income countries in part due to average higher growth 
in capital expenditure, while average consumption growth is higher in high-income 
countries. The non-oil primary balance shows more volatility than the other variables, 
as expected, since it is in growth form and obtained as a residual from the others. 
 
 Simple correlations between fiscal variables and some relevant macroeconomic, 
financial, political, and institutional variables are presented in Appendix Table 5.A.3, 
where correlations higher than 30 percent are highlighted. GDP per capita seems to be 
positively correlated with the fiscal variables, except for the non-oil primary balance, 
for both the full sample and the low-income group, which may indicate that countries in 
different income groups have consistently different fiscal behavior patterns. There is no 
clear correlation pattern in the full sample as there may be a large variation in series 
among countries.   For the high-income group, gross international reserves and oil 
wealth show strong correlations; data reveal that the higher the income, the greater the 
accumulation in savings and oil wealth.   
 
Various econometric techniques are applied to equation (1), and the same tests 
are repeated for the five different fiscal variables as dependent variables for the three 
income groups, as well as for the full sample.  First, to provide a benchmark, a bivariate 
pooled OLS regression of fiscal variables and the output variable are carried out; then, 
the equation is tested with the fixed-effects method to control for country effects. Next 
                                                 
34
 CPI is used as a deflator since a non-oil GDP deflator was not available across the sample countries. 
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the IV estimation is run, together with the fixed effects, to introduce the instrument 
variables. Finally, the Diff-GMM and the Sys-GMM methods are used.  Only the Diff-
GMM estimation results are presented in the tables below; the other test results are 
presented in Appendix Tables 5.A.4 through 5.A.23.   
 
The estimated coefficients for all fiscal variables for the full sample, except for 
the primary balance, are positive and statistically significant.  It is worth noting that the 
OLS, fixed-effects, IV, and GMM results are qualitatively and quantitatively very 
similar.  The results indicate that pooled OLS estimates had an upward bias and the 
fixed-effects model had a downward bias, confirming the appropriateness of using the 
GMM method for the model.  
 
Estimates obtained from the Diff-GMM and Sys-GMM methods are consistent 
and in general are very close (Tables 5.2–5.6 and Appendix Tables 5.A.19–5.A.23).  
The estimation results show that most Diff-GMM estimations were overidentified with 
exogenous instruments.35   Most p-values of AR(1) are low, and, as a result, the null of 
no autocorrelation is rejected.36 However, the Sys-GMM estimations also point to an 
overidentified equation, with a high Hansen test p-value--in fact, the value is too high 
to cast doubt on the satisfaction of the moment conditions.  As a result, Diff-GMM is 
chosen as the preferred method, and its results are reported in the text. The results of 
Sys-GMM are presented in Appendix Tables 5.A.19–5.A.23.  
 
The results in Tables 5.2–5.6 below show that the cyclicality coefficient β in 
equation (1) is always significant and positive for expenditure and consumption 
variables for the full, low and middle-income countries. Only high-income countries 
show an indication of countercyclical policy on total expenditure-- perhaps because 
their greater accumulation of financial assets eases their financial constraints when 
                                                 
35
 The p-values for the Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions were high enough. 
36
 Differenced errors are expected to follow an MA(1) process. But most of the p-values of AR(2) are high, so  the  
null of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected, suggesting that the GMM estimator is consistent. 
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funds are needed. Non-oil revenue growth is strongly procyclical, especially in the 
middle-income sample, suggesting an increased tax collection as well as spillover 
effects of increased oil revenues.  Capital expenditure growth also follows output 
growth positively and is significant for the full and low-income groups.  Capital 
expenditure is countercyclical only for high-income countries.  Again, as part of the 
countercyclical fiscal policies, high-income countries can afford to increase capital 
expenditure in recessions to stimulate the economy and to cut back during boom times 
to smooth output fluctuation. The non-oil primary balance is procyclical, and the sign 
of the coefficient is negative; as output grows, the non-oil primary balance declines, 
implying that spending exceed revenue, leading to a negative balance. 
 
Table 5.2 Differenced GMM, Expenditure as Dependent Variable 1991–2009 
Independent Variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.56*** 0.94*** 1.43*** -0.57*** 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.32) (0.07) 
Δ(log(Tot. Expend(t-1))) 0.10*** -0.15*** 0.07 0.14*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.21) (0.02) 
Δ(log(TOT)) 0.22*** 0.24*** -0.15* 0.25*** 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) 
     
Observations 416 209 80 127 
No of countries 28 14 6 8 
AR(1) test-p 0.0245 0.0843 0.0830 0.130 
AR(2) test-p 0.155 0.0660 0.671 0.352 
Hansen test-p 0.764 0.998 1 1 
Table 5.3 Differenced GMM, Consumption as Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.72*** 1.16*** 0.57* 0.17 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.32) (0.19) 
Δ(log(Consump(t-1))) -0.18*** -0.13*** -0.16 -0.41*** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.10) (0.10) 
Δ(log(TOT)) 0.14*** 0.21*** -0.22 0.11*** 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.15) (0.03) 
     
Observations 408 204 78 126 
No of countries 28 14 6 8 
AR(1) test-p 0.000685 0.0122 0.0493 0.0443 
AR(2) test-p 0.481 0.741 0.274 0.754 
Hansen test-p 0.773 1.000 1 1 
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Table 5.4 Differenced GMM, Non-oil Revenue as Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.71*** 0.93*** 2.22** 0.11 
 (0.04) (0.17) (1.08) (0.41) 
Δ(log(Revenue(t-1))) -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.21*** -0.39*** 
 (0.00) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) 
Δ(log(TOT)) 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09) 
     
Observations 404 203 79 122 
No of countries 28 14 6 8 
AR(1) test-p 0.00556 0.0942 0.0944 0.0839 
AR(2) test-p 0.348 0.830 0.986 0.758 
Hansen test-p 0.797 0.999 1 1.000 
 
Table 5.5 Differenced GMM, Capital Expenditure as Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 1.34*** 1.43*** 1.30 -0.81* 
 (0.06) (0.21) (1.05) (0.48) 
Δ(log(Capital Exp.(t-1))) -0.12*** -0.24*** -0.22* 0.17 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.13) (0.17) 
Δ(log(TOT)) 0.15*** 0.42*** -0.20 -0.19*** 
 (0.04) (0.11) (0.17) (0.03) 
     
Observations 394 199 75 120 
No of countries 28 14 6 8 
AR(1) test-p 0.00109 0.0256 0.204 0.0293 
AR(2) test-p 0.290 0.0853 0.442 0.383 
Hansen test-p 0.552 0.994 1 1 
 
Table 5.6 Differenced GMM, Non-oil Primary Balance as Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) -3.70*** -1.45 -0.60 -10.02 
 (0.17) (0.96) (3.45) (6.18) 
Δ(log(Primary Bal.(t-1))) -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.12** -0.27*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.02) 
Δ(log(TOT)) 1.52*** 0.61*** 0.15 7.43*** 
 (0.02) (0.10) (0.39) (1.57) 
     
Observations 416 209 80 127 
No of countries 28 14 6 8 
AR(1) test-p 0.684 0.161 0.111 0.537 
AR(2) test-p 0.247 0.284 0.648 0.700 
Hansen test-p 0.707 1.000 1 1 
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Before introducing the control variables related to financial constraints, as well 
as the political and institutional factors, into the regressions, the oil revenue share in 
total revenue is added to the estimation; this turns out to be significant. This variable 
indicates the country’s degree of dependency on oil revenue. Then the financial 
constraint control variables are included in the regression. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show the 
estimates of expenditure as a dependent variable with control variables for the full 
sample and subgroups, respectively.  
 
The full sample results with financial constraints in Table 5.7 show that both the 
external and domestic credit markets matter for the full sample as they are significant.  
The results for the interest rate and the capital flows are weaker than those for  the 
depth of financial markets (private credit to GDP). The sign of lagged net capital flows 
is negative, suggesting the countercyclical flow of external capitals, which is the 
opposite of what we had expected. 
  
Only the significant results for the subgroups are presented in Table 5.8; the 
results are somewhat poor (the Hansen test p-values are very high). For the low-income 
group, the lagged central bank interest rate is significant but zero.  For the middle- and 
high- income groups, the coefficients of lagged capital flows to GDP are significant and 
countercyclical, albeit very small. 
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Table 5.7 Financing Constraints, Impact on Procyclicality, 1991–2009 
 
Table 5.8 Financing Constraints, Impact on Procyclicality, 1991–2009 
 
 
(Dependent variable: Expenditure, two-step, difference GMM estimates, full sample) (Dependent variable: Expenditure, two-step, difference GMM estimates, full sample)
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.41*** 0.06** 0.33*** 0.43*** 0.21*** 0.45***
(0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Δ(log(Tot. Expend(t-1))) 0.18*** 0.01 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.05*** 0.17***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Δ(log(TOT)) 0.22*** 0.42*** 0.20*** 0.28*** 0.37*** 0.25***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
oilrevshare 0.38*** 0.11* 0.38***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
lagged real central bank interest rate 0.01*** 0.00***
(0.00) (0.00)
lagged net capital flows to GDP -0.05*** -0.04***
(0.01) (0.00)
lagged pivate credit to GDP 0.16*** 0.16***
(0.02) (0.02)
Observations 325 165 384 338 183 400
No of countries 27 24 28 27 24 28
AR(1) test-p 0.0211 0.167 0.0133 0.0196 0.132 0.00921
AR(2) test-p 0.168 0.269 0.120 0.127 0.282 0.129
Hansen test-p 0.824 0.977 0.744 0.754 0.894 0.644
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
All regressions include country fixed effects. GDP growth is instrumented using the growth of trading partners weighted by 
exports and past values of real GDP growth.  For the lagged dependent variable, the past values are used as instrument.
(Dependent variable: Expenditure, two-step, difference GMM estimates)
Low to middle 
income
Upper-middle 
income
High income Low to middle income
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 1.09*** 0.00 -1.49***
(0.30) (0.00) (0.38)
Δ(log(Tot. Expend(t-1))) -0.25*** -6.88 -0.07
(0.03) (4.42) (0.11)
Δ(log(TOT)) 0.19*** 4.59 0.46***
(0.06) (3.05) (0.06)
oilrevshare 0.39*** -2.60* 0.66**
(0.13) (1.46) (0.31)
lagged real central bank interest rate -0.00***
(0.00)
lagged net capital flows to GDP -0.06* -0.04*
(0.04) (0.02)
Observations 160 26 39
No of countries 13 4 7
AR(1) test-p 0.0982 - 0.233
AR(2) test-p 0.115 0.00708 0.415
Hansen test-p 1.000 1 1.000
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
All regressions include country fixed effects. GDP growth is instrumented using the growth of trading partners 
weighted by exports and past values of real GDP growth.  For the lagged dependent variable, the past values are used 
as instrument.
(Dependent variable: Expenditure, two-step, difference GMM estimates)
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Finally, the estimation results for the full sample, including the institutional and 
political control variables, are presented in Table 5.9. Among the political variables, 
bureaucracy quality, democracy, constraints on the decision-making authority 
(constraints on the executive), political competition, and checks and balances are 
significant.  Except for democracy and checks and balances, the coefficients for the 
other variables are negative.  From these results, it can be interpreted that fiscal 
behavior is more procyclical when the bureaucracy quality, the constraints on the 
executive and political competition are low.  The coefficient for checks and balances is 
significant but very small.  The coefficient for democracy is positive, indicating the 
higher the democracy variable,  the higher is the expenditure, which partially supports 
the claim of Alesina and Tabellini (2005) that corrupt governments in democracies run 
procyclical fiscal policies.  
 
Table 5.9 Political Factors, Impact on Procyclicality , 1991–2009  
 
(Dependent variable: Expenditure, two-step, difference GMM estimates, full sample) (Dependent variable: Expenditure, two-step, difference GMM estimates, full sample)
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 1.00*** 0.98*** 0.93*** 0.90*** 0.48*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.46***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) -0.03
Δ(log(Tot. Expend(t-1))) -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.12*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) -0.02
Δ(log(TOT)) 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.15*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.18***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) -0.02
oilrevshare 0.36*** 0.41*** 0.44*** 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.41***
(0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) -0.05
bureaucracy quality -0.62***
(0.09)
composite index -0.00
(0.01)
law and order 0.02
(0.38)
risk for international liquidity -0.19***
(0.03)
democracy 0.09***
(0.01)
constraints on executives -0.03***
(0.00)
political competition -0.03***
(0.00)
checks and balances 0.00***
(0.00)
Observations 377 377 377 377 382 382 382 387
No of countries 26 26 26 26 27 27 27 28
AR(1) test-p 0.00860 0.00760 0.00756 0.00914 0.0320 0.0345 0.0345 0.0277
AR(2) test-p 0.370 0.409 0.369 0.306 0.150 0.146 0.146 0.159
Hansen test-p 0.889 0.860 0.860 0.836 0.928 0.869 0.874 0.767
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
All regressions include country fixed effects. GDP growth is instrumented using the growth of trading partners weighted by 
exports and past values of real GDP growth.  For the lagged dependent variable, the past values are used as instrument.
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As for the groups, most of the variables are significant for the low-income 
group, whereas only the composite index and checks and balances are significant for 
middle-income countries (Table 5.10). None of the variables are significant for the 
high-income group.  However, the validity of the estimation is poor, as the p-values for 
the Hansen statistics are too high. The full sample and low-income results seem to be 
similar, which suggests that the latter   group constitutes a large share of the full 
sample. 
 
Table 5.10 Political and Institutional Factors, Impact on Procyclicality, 1991–2009  
 
 
 
(Dependent variable: Expenditure, two-step, difference GMM estimates)
Low to middle income Upper-middle income
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.96*** 0.94*** 0.70*** 0.82*** 0.55** 0.63** 0.13*** 1.71 3.41 9.27**
(0.24) (0.19) (0.18) (0.20) (0.23) (0.25) -0.05 (2.77) (2.64) -4.35
Δ(log(Tot. Expend(t-1))) -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.18*** -0.24*** -0.24*** 0.85*** -0.37 0.36 -1.82*
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) -0.18 (1.30) (0.26) -1.09
Δ(log(TOT)) 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.10** 0.14*** 0.15*** -0.21*** -0.41* -0.12 -1.41**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) -0.04 (0.24) (0.14) -0.62
oilrevshare 0.56*** 0.53*** 0.54*** 0.43*** 0.39*** 0.36*** 0.43*** 0.09 -0.62 3.84*
(0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) -0.1 (2.18) (1.46) -2.03
bureaucracy quality -0.93***
(0.18)
composite index 0.08**
(0.04)
law and order 0.37***
(0.11)
risk for international liquidity -0.13*** -0.58*
(0.05) (0.34)
democracy 0.08***
(0.02)
-0.02***
(0.00)
-0.02**
(0.01)
checks and balances 0.00*** -0.10*
(0.00) -0.05
Observations 186 186 186 191 191 191 184 80 80 76
No of countries 13 13 13 14 14 14 14 6 6 6
AR(1) test-p 0.120 0.158 0.238 0.143 0.176 0.252 0.181 0.0545 0.291 0.035
AR(2) test-p 0.139 0.0551 1.48e-07 0.0410 0.0253 0.00352 0.0312 0.457 0.446 -
Hansen test-p 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
All regressions include country fixed effects. GDP growth is instrumented using the growth of trading partners weighted by 
exports and past values of real GDP growth.  For the lagged dependent variable, the past values are used as instrument.
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 Conclusions and Policy Implications 5.4
This chapter analyzes the cyclicality of fiscal behavior thoroughly in 28 OPCs 
during 1991-2009. It examines five fiscal variables—non-oil revenue; the non-oil 
primary balance; and total expenditure and its components, consumption and capital 
expenditure— for the full sample and subgroups divided by their development levels 
and by correcting the endogeneity bias between the fiscal variables and the output 
variable.  Since the OPCs are not a homogenous group, it is important to divide them 
into groups and observe whether their fiscal policies show different patterns by groups 
if so, this may help in designing effective fiscal policies. Indeed, the results are not 
uniform across income groups, and total expenditure is highly procyclical in the full 
sample, in the low and middle-income groups. The low-income group constitutes a 
large share of the full sample, therefore weighing heavily in the results of the full 
sample. But it is countercyclical in the high-income countries-- perhaps due to their 
greater accumulation of financial assets, which eases their financial constraints when 
funds are needed. It is also important to look at the aggregate fiscal variables, as well as 
at their subcomponents separately, since the subcomponents may move in offsetting 
ways. In fact, the estimation results show that, although expenditure is countercyclical 
for the high-income group, its components move in different directions: consumption is 
procyclical, while capital expenditure is countercyclical.   
 
The results confirm that political and institutional factors, as well as financing 
constraints, play a role in the cyclicality of fiscal policies in the OPCs. Most of the 
variables on the quality of institutions and the political structure appear to be significant 
for the low- income group. Two of the variables are significant for the middle-income 
countries: the composite institution index and checks and balances. None of the 
institutional variables turns out to be significant for the high-income countries. 
Domestic financing constraints seem to matter for the low-income group. But fiscal 
policy is affected more by the external financing constraint in the middle- and high-
income groups, as they may be more integrated into the global financial system than the 
low-income countries.   
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Despite their many differences, all the OPCs face volatile and unpredictable oil 
revenues, a situation that makes fiscal management challenging.  For this reason, it is 
imperative for them to formulate effective countercyclical fiscal policies by which they 
can smooth government expenditure, decouple it from the volatile oil revenues, and 
prevent boom-and-bust cycles.  Breaking away from a procyclical fiscal policy will 
enable them to sustain long-term growth and keep the safety net that the poor need.  
Sound fiscal policies and discipline require strong institutions, a higher-level 
bureaucracy, and more transparency. Strong institutions and transparency would also 
help reduce the “voracity effect,” which, in turn, would facilitate the accumulation of 
financial assets and build up confidence among investors to raise funds when needed. 
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5.A Appendix  
Table 5.A.11 Definitions and Sources of Variables 
Variable Source Description 
Independent variable 
Real non-oil GDP growth             WEO                      Growth in nominal GDP deflated 
using the CPI 
Dependent variables          Villafuerte and Lopez-Murphy (2010) and WEO 
Real total government spending                          Growth in nominal GDP deflated 
using the CPI 
Real government consumption           
Real capital spending            
Real non-oil primary balance                    
Real non-oil revenue                        
 
Financial constraints variables 
Domestic  
Real central bank interest rate                                  WEO/IFS 
Private credit to GDP             WDI 
External 
Net foreign capital flows             WEO 
Debt-GDP ratio              WDI 
Inflation               WEO 
 
Political and Institutional Variables 
Bureaucracy Quality  ICRG (Rating 0 to 4: low rating, low bureaucracy quality) 
Composite Risk Rating    ICRG (Rating 0 to 100; 0 is high risk, 100 is low risk) 
Corruption     ICRG (Rating  0 to 6; 0 is high, 6 is low corruption) 
Law & Order      ICRG (Rating 1 to 3; low rating, low law obedience)  
Democracy                                                      Polity4 database, polity2 variable    Difference between a 
democracy index (0 
to 10) and an 
autocracy index (0 
to 10) 
Constraints on the executive                           Polity4 database, xconst variable     Extent of 
institutionalized 
constraints on the 
decision making 
powers of chief 
Political competition                                       Polity4 database, Polcom variable   Degree of 
institutionalization 
of political 
competition 
combined with the 
extent of 
government 
restriction on 
political 
competition, from 1 
to 10 
Other Control Variables 
Oil revenue as share of total revenue       WEO   
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Table 5.A.12 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low to 
middle 
income
Upper-
middle 
income
High 
income
All 
countries
Real Non-oil GDP Mean 3.8 4.3 7.2 5.0
Growth Median 5.5 4.5 3.9 4.8
St. Dev. 12.9 9.0 12.0 12.0
Observation 241 89 155 485
Real Government Mean 5.0 5.5 6.4 5.6
Spending Growth Median 6.2 5.2 6.1 6.0
St. Dev. 23.2 17.1 25.5 23.0
Observation 244 98 173 515
Real Government Mean 4.0 5.9 5.6 4.9
Consumption Growth Median 7.2 5.9 5.1 6.2
St. Dev. 23.3 16.4 13.6 19.3
Observation 238 92 162 492
Real Government Mean 9.3 9.3 8.9 9.2
Investment Growth Median 7.1 9.3 4.1 7.1
St. Dev. 42.2 33.5 29.5 36.8
Observation 227 88 153 468
Real Non-oil Primary Mean -0.5 -18.3 45.2 10.9
Balance Growth Median 5.6 0.1 6.7 5.8
St. Dev. 216.7 194.0 637.9 402.2
Observation 244 100 165 509
Real Non-oil Revenue Mean 4.5 4.1 4.7 4.5
Growth Median 6.2 5.5 4.3 5.6
St. Dev. 24.1 22.4 34.8 27.7
Observation 238 97 160 495
Countries 14 6 9 29
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Table 5.A.13 Correlation between Fiscal Variable and Other Relevant Variables  
 
 
Low income
Total 
expenditure Consumption
Capital 
expenditure
Non-oil 
revenue
Non-oil 
primary 
balance
Gross international reserve 0.414 0.414 0.351 0.356 -0.374
Share of oil revenue in total revenue -0.330 -0.326 -0.274 -0.417 -0.018
Debt to GDP ratio -0.301 -0.287 -0.331 -0.257 0.306
Inflation -0.095 -0.094 -0.091 -0.100 0.048
Oil wealth 0.331 0.353 0.315 0.093 -0.782
GDP per capita 0.955 0.943 0.903 0.902 -0.684
The size of public sector -0.368 -0.359 -0.347 -0.382 0.169
Capital flows 0.129 0.088 0.250 0.183 -0.015
Population 0.746 0.729 0.655 0.785 -0.310
Military expenditure (in % of GDP) -0.291 -0.284 -0.260 -0.310 0.113
Domestic credit to private sector (%  of GDP) 0.625 0.602 0.689 0.560 -0.579
Bureaucracy quality 0.470 0.472 0.436 0.427 -0.370
Corruption 0.002 -0.039 0.133 -0.011 -0.083
Composite index 0.152 0.126 0.245 0.113 -0.237
Law and order 0.113 0.092 0.215 0.053 -0.263
Risk for international liquidity 0.155 0.160 0.102 0.160 -0.066
Democracy 0.198 0.217 0.122 0.234 0.011
Constraints on executives 0.100 0.104 0.081 0.106 -0.037
Political competition 0.088 0.094 0.059 0.097 -0.017
Middle income
Gross international reserve -0.083 -0.058 -0.131 -0.048 0.095
Share of oil revenue in total revenue 0.025 0.030 0.014 -0.029 -0.094
Debt to GDP ratio 0.111 0.090 0.183 0.132 -0.035
Inflation 0.443 0.392 0.574 0.548 -0.227
Oil wealth 0.555 0.593 0.430 0.551 -0.576
GDP per capita -0.200 -0.202 -0.194 -0.212 0.167
The size of public sector 0.365 0.342 0.424 0.356 -0.353
Capital flows -0.242 -0.247 -0.225 -0.236 0.242
Population -0.186 -0.157 -0.218 -0.152 0.198
Military expenditure (in % of GDP) -0.087 -0.084 -0.083 -0.060 0.102
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) -0.187 -0.175 -0.216 -0.179 0.145
Bureaucracy quality -0.282 -0.302 -0.241 -0.274 0.280
Corruption -0.047 -0.082 0.010 -0.010 0.122
Composite index -0.343 -0.344 -0.431 -0.337 0.283
Law and order -0.320 -0.362 -0.237 -0.243 0.403
Risk for international liquidity 0.322 0.336 0.287 0.282 -0.357
Democracy 0.460 0.464 0.441 0.490 -0.361
Constraints on executives 0.399 0.395 0.395 0.435 -0.288
Political competition 0.362 0.367 0.349 0.405 -0.260
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Estimation with OLS 
Table 5.A.14 Pooled OLS, expenditure as dependent variable 
Independent variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Base Regression 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.78*** 1.18*** 1.24*** -0.06 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.16) (0.17) 
Constant 0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 477 233 89 155 
R-squared 0.17 0.43 0.41 0.00 
Regression with control variables 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.62*** 1.10*** 1.25*** -0.16 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.17) (0.16) 
Δlog(TOT) 0.30*** 0.24*** -0.10 0.45*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) 
Δ(log(Tot. Expend(t-1))) 0.03 -0.10** -0.00 0.14* 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) 
Constant 0.02** 0.01 0.02 0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 460 223 86 151 
R-squared 0.19 0.41 0.40 0.19 
High income
Gross international reserve 0.827 0.788 0.932 0.832 -0.837
Share of oil revenue in total revenue 0.045 0.024 0.067 0.004 -0.055
Debt to GDP ratio 0.160 0.182 0.039 0.123 -0.107
Inflation -0.021 -0.048 0.224 0.012 -0.022
Oil wealth 0.845 0.819 0.883 0.859 -0.839
GDP per capita 0.293 0.306 0.298 0.302 -0.355
The size of public sector -0.198 -0.199 -0.263 -0.199 0.206
Capital flows 0.090 0.076 0.215 0.029 -0.132
Population 0.942 0.950 0.804 0.889 -0.913
Military expenditure (in % of GDP) -0.111 -0.113 -0.120 -0.121 0.127
Domestic credit to private sector (%  of GDP) 0.366 0.376 0.279 0.364 -0.367
Bureaucracy quality -0.122 -0.125 -0.128 -0.087 0.092
Corruption -0.581 -0.596 -0.527 -0.552 0.608
Composite index -0.038 -0.054 -0.071 0.009 0.032
Law and order 0.151 0.148 0.034 0.121 -0.107
Risk for international liquidity -0.037 -0.032 -0.049 0.004 0.067
Democracy -0.703 -0.713 -0.624 -0.638 0.684
Constraints on executives -0.661 -0.668 -0.582 -0.590 0.623
Political competition -0.502 -0.514 -0.471 -0.473 0.524
   
164 
 
 
Table 5.A.15 Pooled OLS, consumption as dependent variable 
Independent Variables Full sample Low  income Middle income High income 
Base Regression 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.85*** 1.12*** 1.00*** 0.35*** 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.17) (0.09) 
Constant 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Observations 472 229 88 155 
R-squared 0.29 0.40 0.29 0.10 
Regression with control variables 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.73*** 1.00*** 1.03*** 0.29*** 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.17) (0.08) 
Δlog(TOT) 0.15*** 0.25*** -0.21** 0.12** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.10) (0.05) 
Δ(log(Consump(t-1))) -0.08** -0.09* -0.10 -0.19*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) 
Constant 0.02** 0.01 0.04* 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Observations 452 218 84 150 
R-squared 0.26 0.39 0.31 0.17 
 
Table 5.16 Pooled OLS, non-oil revenue as dependent variable 
Independent variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Base Regression 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.82*** 0.97*** 0.99*** 0.51** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.21) (0.22) 
Constant 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Observations 466 227 89 150 
R-squared 0.14 0.28 0.21 0.04 
Regression with control variables 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.91*** 1.02*** 1.04*** 0.69*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.22) (0.23) 
Δ(log(Revenue(t-1))) -0.24*** -0.27*** -0.11 -0.26*** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) 
Δlog(TOT) 0.07 0.08 -0.03 0.08 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.13) (0.12) 
Constant 0.03** 0.03** 0.02 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Observations 448 217 85 146 
R-squared        0.20      0.31       0.22       0.12 
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Table 5.A17 Pooled OLS, capital expenditure as dependent variable 
Independent variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Base Regression 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.89*** 1.37*** 2.03*** 0.26 
 (0.13) (0.21) (0.35) (0.20) 
Constant 0.05*** 0.04 0.01 0.07** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
     
Observations 465 213 86 153 
R-squared 0.09 0.23 0.29 0.01 
Regression with control variables 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 1.12*** 1.37*** 2.06*** 0.33 
 (0.15) (0.21) (0.38) (0.23) 
Δ(log(Capital Exp.(t-1))) -0.15*** -0.24*** -0.06 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) 
Δlog(TOT) 0.14 0.40*** -0.01 -0.11 
 (0.08) (0.13) (0.21) (0.12) 
Constant 0.04** 0.04 0.01 0.07** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
     
Observations 438 213 81 144 
R-squared 0.13 0.23 0.29 0.02 
 
Table 5.A.18 Pooled OLS, non-oil primary balance as dependent variable 
Independent variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Base Regression 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) -0.24 1.46 2.06 -4.80 
 (1.55) (1.11) (1.44) (4.42) 
Constant 0.16 -0.07 -0.12 0.84 
 (0.20) (0.15) (0.14) (0.62) 
     
Observations 477 233 89 155 
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Regression with control variables 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) -0.99 1.53 1.78 -5.90 
 (1.68) (1.28) (1.42) (4.43) 
Δ(log(Primary Bal.(t-1))) -0.05 -0.09 0.07 -0.08 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) 
Δlog(TOT) 2.97*** 0.22 0.30 7.01*** 
 (1.01) (0.81) (0.81) (2.54) 
Constant 0.14 -0.09 -0.08 0.77 
 (0.21) (0.16) (0.14) (0.63) 
     
Observations 460 223 86 151 
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.06 
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Estimation with Fixed effects 
Table 5.A.19 Fixed Effects, expenditure as dependent variable 
Independent variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.55*** 1.10*** 1.24*** -0.31 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.24) (0.22) 
Δlog(TOT) 0.31*** 0.23*** -0.10 0.49** 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.14) (0.23) 
Δ(log(Tot. Expend(t-1))) -0.00 -0.12 -0.04 0.09 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.13) (0.26) 
Constant 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07* 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
     
Observations 460 223 86 151 
R-squared 0.16 0.38 0.38 0.21 
No of countries 29 14 6 9 
 
Table 5.A.20 Fixed Effects, consumption as dependent variable 
Independent variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.67*** 0.98*** 1.02*** 0.16 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.20) (0.11) 
Δ(log(Consump(t-1))) -0.12* -0.11 -0.12 -0.30*** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Δlog(TOT) 0.15*** 0.25*** -0.21 0.14*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.13) (0.05) 
Constant 0.02** 0.01 0.04** 0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
     
Observations 452 218 84 150 
R-squared 0.24 0.36 0.30 0.22 
No of countries 29 14 6 9 
 
Table 5.A21 Fixed Effects, non-oil revenue as dependent variable 
Independent variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.88*** 0.98*** 1.09*** 0.64** 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.35) (0.28) 
Δ(log(Revenue(t-1))) -0.26*** -0.28** -0.11 -0.27* 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) 
Δlog(TOT) 0.06 0.08 -0.04 0.07 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.16) 
Constant 0.03** 0.03* 0.02 0.04 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
     
Observations 448 217 85 146 
R-squared 0.18 0.28 0.22 0.12 
No of countries 29 14 6 9 
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Table 5.A.22 Fixed Effects, capital expenditure as dependent variable 
Independent variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 1.08*** 1.39*** 1.92*** 0.20 
 (0.24) (0.31) (0.57) (0.25) 
Δ(log(Capital Exp.(t-1))) -0.18*** -0.27*** -0.11 -0.02 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) 
Δlog(TOT) 0.15 0.40** 0.01 -0.09 
 (0.11) (0.16) (0.28) (0.18) 
Constant 0.05** 0.04 0.03 0.08** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
     
Observations 438 213 81 144 
R-squared 0.13 0.23 0.26 0.01 
No of countries 29 14 6 9 
 
Table 5.A.23 Fixed Effects, non-oil primary balance as dependent variable 
Independent variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) -3.24 2.16** 1.67* -11.54 
 (3.91) (0.91) (0.92) (9.59) 
Δ(log(Primary Bal.(t-1))) -0.12 -0.14 0.05 -0.17 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.16) 
Δlog(TOT) 3.32 0.00 0.49 8.10 
 (2.69) (0.56) (0.69) (6.64) 
Constant 0.26 -0.11 -0.08 1.20 
 (0.33) (0.16) (0.13) (1.06) 
     
Observations 460 223 86 151 
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.11 
No of countries 29 14 6 9 
 
Estimation with 2SLS and Fixed effects 
Table 5.A.24 2SLS with Fixed Effects, expenditure as dependent variable 
Independent variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.55*** 1.10*** 1.24*** -0.31 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.24) (0.22) 
Δlog(TOT) 0.31*** 0.23*** -0.10 0.49** 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.14) (0.23) 
Δ(log(Tot. Expend(t-1))) -0.00 -0.12 -0.04 0.09 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.13) (0.26) 
Constant 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07* 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
     
Observations 460 223 86 151 
R-squared 0.16 0.38 0.38 0.21 
No of countries 29 14 6 9 
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Table 5.A.25 2SLS with Fixed Effects, consumption as dependent variable 
Independent variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.67*** 0.98*** 1.02*** 0.16 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.20) (0.11) 
Δ(log(Consump(t-1))) -0.12* -0.11 -0.12 -0.30*** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Δlog(TOT) 0.15*** 0.25*** -0.21 0.14*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.13) (0.05) 
Constant 0.02** 0.01 0.04** 0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
     
Observations 452 218 84 150 
R-squared 0.24 0.36 0.30 0.22 
No of countries 29 14 6 9 
 
Table 5.A.26 2SLS with Fixed Effects, non-oil revenue as dependent variable 
Independent variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(Revenue(t-1))) -0.26*** -0.28** -0.11 -0.27* 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) 
Δlog(TOT) 0.06 0.08 -0.04 0.07 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.16) 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.88*** 0.98*** 1.09*** 0.64** 
 (0.13) (0.10) (0.35) (0.28) 
Constant 0.03** 0.03* 0.02 0.04 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
     
Observations 448 217 85 146 
R-squared 0.18 0.28 0.22 0.12 
No of countries 29 14 6 9 
 
Table 5.A.27 2SLS with Fixed Effects, capital expenditure as dependent variable 
Independent variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(Capital Exp.(t-1))) -0.18*** -0.27*** -0.11 -0.02 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) 
Δlog(TOT) 0.15 0.40** 0.01 -0.09 
 (0.11) (0.16) (0.28) (0.18) 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 1.08*** 1.39*** 1.92*** 0.20 
 (0.24) (0.31) (0.57) (0.25) 
Constant 0.05** 0.04 0.03 0.08** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
     
Observations 438 213 81 144 
R-squared 0.13 0.23 0.26 0.01 
No of countries 29 14 6 9 
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Table 5.A28 2SLS with Fixed Effects, non-oil primary balance as dependent 
variable 
Independent variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(Primary Bal.(t-1))) -0.12 -0.14 0.05 -0.17 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.16) 
Δlog(TOT) 3.32 0.00 0.49 8.10 
 (2.69) (0.56) (0.69) (6.64) 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) -3.24 2.16** 1.67* -11.54 
 (3.91) (0.91) (0.92) (9.59) 
Constant 0.26 -0.11 -0.08 1.20 
 (0.33) (0.16) (0.13) (1.06) 
     
Observations 460 223 86 151 
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.11 
No of countries 29 14 6 9 
 
Estimation with System GMM 
Table 5.A.29 System GMM, expenditure as dependent variable 
Independent variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.64*** 1.16*** 1.50*** -0.32** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.50) (0.16) 
Δ(log(Tot. Expend(t-1))) 0.05*** -0.10*** -0.25 0.10 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.30) (0.07) 
Δ(log(TOT)) 0.24*** 0.19*** -0.26 0.29*** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.19) (0.05) 
Constant 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02* 0.07*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
     
Observations 444 223 86 135 
No of countries 28 14 6 8 
AR1 0.0128 0.0464 0.135 0.196 
AR2 0.151 0.0810 0.816 0.348 
Hansen test-p 1.000 1 1 1 
Table 5.A.30 System GMM, consumption as dependent variable 
Independent variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 0.91*** 1.04*** 1.03 3.00** 
 (0.05) (0.16) (0.87) (1.42) 
Δ(log(Consump(t-1))) -0.11*** -0.13* -0.13 -0.27 
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.37) (0.20) 
Δ(log(TOT)) 0.12*** 0.21*** -0.13 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.21) (0.07) 
Constant 0.01*** 0.01 0.03 -0.16 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.11) 
     
Observations 436 218 84 134 
No of countries 28 14 6 8 
AR1 0.000267 0.0109 0.250 0.167 
AR2 0.822 0.879 0.844 0.182 
Hansen test-p 1.000 1 1 1 
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Table 5.A.31 System GMM, non-oil revenue as dependent variable 
Independent Variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 1.00*** 0.87** 1.92 5.26* 
 (0.02) (0.31) (4.87) (2.69) 
Δ(log(Revenue(t-1))) -0.20*** -0.18 -0.02 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.13) (0.36) (0.15) 
Δ(log(TOT)) 0.05*** 0.05 -0.14 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.09) (0.28) (0.07) 
Constant 0.02*** 0.03 -0.03 -0.32 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.20) (0.20) 
     
Observations 432 217 85 130 
No of countries 28 14 6 8 
AR1 0.00495 0.0850 0.250 0.00356 
AR2 0.0988 0.435 0.944 0.00998 
Hansen test-p 1.000 1 1 1 
 
Table 5.A.32 System GMM, capital expenditure as dependent variable 
Independent variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) 1.61*** 1.95*** 2.71 -0.16 
 (0.16) (0.24) (3.29) (1.49) 
Δ(log(Capital Exp.(t-1))) -0.15*** -0.26*** -0.17 0.26 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.47) (0.17) 
Δ(log(TOT)) 0.11*** 0.39*** -0.18 -0.17*** 
 (0.02) (0.10) (0.20) (0.03) 
Constant 0.02** 0.02*** -0.01 0.08 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.08) (0.11) 
     
Observations 422 213 81 128 
No of countries 28 14 6 8 
AR1 0.000508 0.0177 0.0690 0.0329 
AR2 0.347 0.0788 0.888 0.285 
Hansen test-p 1.000 1 1 1 
 
Table 5.A.33 System GMM, non-oil primary balance as dependent variable 
Independent variables Full sample Low income Middle income High income 
Δ(log(non-oil GDP)) -1.17*** -0.34 -3.16 -5.59*** 
 (0.11) (1.25) (10.85) (1.46) 
Δ(log(Primary Bal.(t-1))) -0.04*** -0.10*** -0.18 -0.08*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) 
Δ(log(TOT)) 1.76*** 0.44*** 0.23 6.18*** 
 (0.01) (0.11) (0.64) (0.12) 
Constant 0.22*** 0.02 0.17 0.86*** 
 (0.00) (0.04) (0.39) (0.14) 
     
Observations 444 223 86 135 
No of countries 28 14 6 8 
AR1 0.237 0.163 0.174 0.0639 
AR2 0.758 0.317 0.788 0.531 
Hansen test-p 1.000 1 1 1 
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6 CAUSALITY BETWEEN COMMODITY PRICES 
AND CURRENCIES IN COMMODITY 
EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
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 Introduction 6.1
Volatile commodity prices are costly and have negative effects on the 
economies of commodity exporting countries. One channel through which the volatility 
of commodity prices is transmitted to the economy is through the volatility in their 
floating exchange rates
37
. Their currencies appreciate during a commodity price boom 
due to the increase in the relative demand for their home currencies as a result of large 
amount of export earnings which leads to a balance-of-payment surplus and 
accumulation of foreign reserves. Due to this strong link between commodity prices 
and currencies, earlier studies called the currency of these countries “commodity 
currencies”. As an example, nearly 50% of Brazil’s total exports were primary 
commodity exports in 2011. In the third quarter of 2011 when commodity prices were 
at record high level, the Brazilian Real appreciated against the USD by 12%.  Usually 
the reverse occurs, e.g. currencies depreciate, when commodity prices declines and 
subsequently reduce the export revenues. For example, from the third quarter of 2008 
to last quarter with the collapse of commodity prices, the Brazilian Real depreciated by 
27%.  
 
High price volatility during the past commodity boom which lasted over 10 
years proved that forecasting commodity prices and understanding their effect on the 
exchange rates and economies of commodity producing countries is of key importance.  
Not only properly gauging commodity price movements is critical for inflation control, 
but it is also important for fiscal and production planning. That is why the interaction 
between commodity prices and exchange rates received a lot of attention in literature. 
  
The majority of earlier research devoted to explaining the interaction between 
commodity prices and exchange rate is predominantly empirical and built on 
fundamental based exchange rate models. Commodity prices are used as part of 
                                                 
37
 Many countries adopted floating exchange rate regime after the demise of the Breton Woods system of fixed 
exchange rates in 1973.  
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determining the behavior of nominal or real exchange rates. These studies usually start 
with the observed correlation between the terms of trade (the value of a country's 
exports relative to that of its imports) and real exchange rates in commodity-exporting 
countries. Then they move on to show the long-run real effects of changes in 
commodity prices on the exchange rate as well as on the macroeconomic fundamentals; 
interest rate, money supply, trade balance, wages, employment, and output.
38
 Some of 
the other studies investigate the impact of commodity prices or terms of trade shocks on 
growth and macroeconomic performance of the country under alternative exchange rate 
regimes.
39
 Others examine the phenomenon called “Dutch disease” which is the 
negative effect of a booming commodity export sector on other sectors of the economy 
through a real appreciation of the county’s exchange rate which hurts the other 
exporters and producers in the import-competing sector by increasing the cost and 
making them less competitive.
40
  
 
The large body of research on this topic found some evidence of the link 
between fundamentals and exchange rates in the long run.
41
 However, none of the 
result of these studies managed to overturn the findings of Meese and Rogoff (1983) 
who showed that economic fundamentals were insufficient in explaining and very 
ineffective in forecasting exchange rates over short time horizons. The many of these 
studies found that forecasts from economic fundamentals might work well for some 
currencies during certain sample periods but not for other currencies or sample periods. 
Main explanation for this is because the fundamental variables are themselves 
endogenous to exchange rates and jointly determined with exchange rates in 
equilibrium. For example exchange rates might Granger-cause money supplies because 
monetary policy makers react to the exchange rate in setting the monetary policy. 
                                                 
38 Edwards (1985), Cashin, Cespedes, and Sahay (2004), Chen and Rogoff (2003). 
39 Mendoza (1995), Broda (2004) and Edwards and Yeyati (2005). 
40 Corden (1984), Corden and Neary (1982), Neary and van Wijnbergen (1986). 
 
41
 Engle, Mark and West (2007).  
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Recent studies pursue asset-pricing approach to the exchange rates and 
emphasize the endogeneity for the failure of fundamentals determining the exchange 
rates. They turn the argument around and argue that the exchange rates should be the 
predictor of fundamentals.
42
 Chen, Rogoff and Rossi (2010) (CRR thereafter) follow 
this approach, take the exchange rates as prices of forward looking financial assets and 
argue that exchange rates would be better predictor of exogenous variables such as 
commodity prices than vice-versa, because the exchange rate is fundamentally forward 
looking; i.e. incorporates expectations about the values of its future fundamentals 
whereas commodity prices tend to be very sensitive to even small changes in current 
demand or supply balances. This would especially apply to currencies of commodity 
exporting small countries, because world commodity prices can reasonably be assumed 
to be independent of their exchange rates. CRR found a robust relationship between 
commodity price movements and exchange rate fluctuations for a group of commodity 
producing countries. They also showed that combined exchange rates of this set of 
countries can detect movements in the aggregate world commodity price index. 
  
This chapter pursues the asset-pricing approach and explores the dynamic 
relationship between exchange rates and commodity prices for a group of advanced and 
developing commodity-exporting economies with a sufficiently long history of market-
based floating exchange rates. The analysis includes testing Granger causality for both 
directions; from the exchange rates to commodity prices and vice versa, checking for 
parameter instability in Ganger-causality tests and finally testing out-of-sample 
forecasting ability of the exchange rates and commodity prices.   
 
This study makes two contributions to the literature.  First, it analyzes a broader 
range of emerging and advanced countries which have a significant portion of their 
production and exports in primary commodity products. In addition to the countries that 
were examined almost in all earlier studies such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, 
                                                 
42 Campbell and Shiller (1987) and Engel and West (2005). 
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Chile and South Africa, we expand  our set of countries and include countries that have 
not been studied before such as Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Norway and Korea. Second, 
we focus on the type of commodities these countries produce to see if that creates 
different dynamics between commodity prices and currencies. For example, Korea 
heavily depends on semiconductor chip exports whereas countries such as Chile or 
Mexico predominantly produce one type of mineral source (copper and crude oil, 
respectively).  However, other countries such as Brazil, Australia or Canada produce 
and export minerals as well as various crops (sugar cane, coffee, soybean and wheat) 
where the farmers have the ability and efficiency to switch from one crop to another 
depending on the return from the crops which may cause a sustained 
strength/appreciation in the currency. Although there are a number of research papers 
on this topic, there is not any study which differentiates the type of commodity the 
country heavily exports and its impact on the currency.  
 
We find in-sample evidence of Granger causality from exchange rates to 
commodity prices for most of the countries in the sample. However, the out-of-sample 
forecasting results are not as robust as CRR found.  
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the next section, a brief review of the 
link between commodity prices and currencies and the theoretical basis are presented. 
In Section 3, the methodology and empirical specification are laid out. Then in Section 
4, data, estimations and results are presented. Finally Section 5 has the conclusion 
remarks. 
 
 Literature Review 6.2
Sound theories in the earlier exchange rate literature rarely translated into sound 
empirical results mainly due to unaddressed endogeneity in the econometric testing. 
The standard exchange-rate fundamentals such as cross-country differences in money 
supply, interest rates, output, or inflation rate are fundamentally endogenous and jointly 
determined with exchange rates in equilibrium. Furthermore, they may directly react to 
exchange rate changes through policy responses. In this setting, a positive conclusion 
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that exchange rate Granger-causes fundamentals could just be the outcome of 
endogenous response or reverse causality. For example, if one finds that exchange rates 
Granger-cause money supply or interest rate changes, this may be the direct result of 
monetary policy responses to exchange-rate fluctuations, as would be the case with a 
Taylor interest rate rule  (Taylor (1993)) that targeted consumer price index (CPI) 
inflation. Exchange rate changes may also precede inflation movements if prices are 
sticky and pass-through is gradual. In this case, positive Granger-causality results for 
these standard fundamentals are difficult to interpret as the direction of interaction is 
not clear and cannot be taken as evidence for the present-value framework, unless the 
fundamental under consideration is exogenous to exchange-rate movements.
 43
   
 
Commodity prices are a unique exchange-rate fundamental for these countries 
because they can be taken as an exogenous measure of terms of trade and are not 
determined endogenously with the exchange rate in the model or in the individual 
countries. Commodities represent a large portion of exports of commodity currency 
countries, but their share of exports in the total world commodity trade is still small. 
Although to a degree they exert some market power, their influence over the individual 
commodity prices is not large. Substitution across various commodities would also 
diminish the market power these countries have; even within the specific markets they 
appear to be strong. Hence they can be treated as price takers as commodity prices are 
determined by the global demand supply conditions. Finally world commodity prices 
unlike other fundamentals are easy to observe from the global exchanges and they 
come in high frequency as exchange rate data.  
 
The traded/nontraded goods model of Rogoff (1992) can explain why, for a major 
commodity producer, the real (and nominal) exchange rate should respond to changes 
in the expected future path of the price of its commodity exports. This model assumes 
fixed factors of production and a bonds-only market for intertemporal trade across 
                                                 
43
 Chen, Rogoff and Rossi (2010). 
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countries (i.e., incomplete markets). The real exchange rate depends at any point in 
time on the ratio of traded goods consumption to nontraded goods consumption; but 
traded goods consumption depends on the present value of the country’s expected 
future income (and on nontraded goods shocks, except in the special case where utility 
is separable between traded and nontraded goods.) Thus the real exchange rate 
incorporates expectations of future commodity price earnings. If factors are completely 
mobile across sectors, the real exchange rate will depend only on the current price of 
commodities. But as long as there are costs of adjustment in moving factors, the real 
exchange rate will still contain a forward-looking component that incorporates future 
commodity prices. In general, therefore, the nominal exchange rate will also 
incorporate expectations of future commodity price increases. In addition to CRR 
(2010),  Campbell and Shiller (1987) and Engel and West (2005) tested the present-
value models of exchange rate determination and showed that since the nominal 
exchange rate reflects expectations of future changes in its economic fundamentals, it 
should help predict them.  
 
Finally, financial markets for commodities also tend to be far less developed and 
much more regulated than those for the exchange rate. As a result, commodity prices 
tend to be a less accurate barometer of future conditions than are exchange rates. 
 
 Methodology  6.3
First we start with a general expression for the spot exchange which relates the 
nominal exchange rate st to its fundamentals ft and its expected future value Et st+1 as 
shown below.  
 
st = β' ft + Et st+1 ,                         (1) 
This approach brings forth to a present-value relation between the nominal exchange 
rate and the discounted sum of its expected future fundamentals as, 
 
    st = γ ∑  
 
    
j
 Et( ft+j |It) ,       (2)  
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where ψ and γ are parameters imposed by the specific structural model and Et is the 
expectation operator given information It. This present-value equation shows that 
exchange rate s should Granger-cause its fundamentals f. We focus on the nominal 
exchange rate rather than the real exchange rate here, as it is measured more accurately 
and at very high frequency, as are commodity prices. But in principle the real exchange 
can also be used.
44
 
 
To analyze the dynamic relationship between commodity prices and exchange rate, we 
put the equation (2) in an explicit form as exchange rate Granger Causes commodity 
prices: 
EtΔcpt+1 = β0 + β1 Δst + β2 Δcpt (3)  
 
where commodity prices and exchange rates are in first differences.
45
 We also test the 
reverse where commodity prices determine exchange rates.  
 
EtΔst+1 = β0 + β1 Δct + β2 Δst  (4) 
  
Here we do not consider cointegration but use first differences in a simple OLS 
framework because our main interest is in short-term interaction not to measure the 
long-term behavior of a specific model. Chen and Rogoff (2003) showed that, in 
analyzing real exchange rates, dynamic OLS estimates of cointegrated models and 
estimates of models in differences produce very similar results. 
 
We first test the null hypothesis of β0= β1=0 in equations (3) and (4) where we assume 
that the relationship is stable and coefficients are constant throughout the sample 
period. However, this assumption is hardly plausible since all of the commodity 
currency countries as well as commodity markets have gone through major structural 
                                                 
44 CRR (2010) argue that from a practical point of view, real and nominal exchange rates behave similarly. 
45 As standard unit root tests cannot reject the hypothesis that these series contain unit roots, we analyze the data in 
first differences, which we denote with a Δ. 
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and regulatory changes in the past several decades. One of the important changes was 
the adoption of inflation targeting by most of commodity producing countries in the 
1990s where the focus was keeping the inflation under control by adjusting interest 
rates instead of concentrating on output growth. The countries and years that they 
adopted the inflation targeting are as follow: New Zealand (1990), Chile (1991), 
Canada (2001), Brazil (1999), Australia (1993), Mexico (1999) and South Africa 
(2000). The other important changes that took place in the commodity exchange 
markets in 2000. First, the Intercontinental Exchange was established which served as a 
global risk management platform for agricultural and energy commodities. The same 
year, in the United States, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act passed which 
allowed pension funds and other investors to enter into commodity futures index 
trading. Both events raised the liquidity considerably going into commodities in the 
following decade turning them into another class of assets. We therefore incorporate 
the possibility of structural breaks in our analyses by allowing parameter instability and 
test the joint null hypothesis that β0 = β0t =0 and β1 = β1t=0 in equations (3) and (4). 
After we conduct in-sample Granger causality tests, we move on to examine the out-of-
sample forecasting ability of exchange rates and commodity prices using the same 
equations. 
 
 Data and Estimation Results 6.4
6.4.1 Data 
We use quarterly data over the following time periods: Australia (1983:1-
2012:4), Brazil (1995:1-2012:4), Canada (1974:1-2012:4), Chile (1989:1-2012:4), 
Indonesia (1998:1-2012:4), Korea (1998:1-2012:4), Mexico (1995:1-2012:4), New 
Zealand (1995:1-2012:4), Norway (1993:1-2012:4) and South Africa (1998:1-2012:4). 
Although the sample period spans until the end of 2012, we run two sets of estimations; 
one with which the data period ends before the financial crisis (2008Q1) and the other 
which the data end in 2012Q4, although this reduces the number of observations in 
estimation, it may provide a useful insight to observe the impact of the financial crisis 
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and the collapse of commodity prices on the dynamics between commodity prices and 
currencies.
46
 
 
For each country, we aggregate the relevant dollar spot prices in the world 
commodity markets to construct country-specific, export-earnings-weighted 
commodity price indices (labeled cp in equation 3 and 4. Individual commodity price 
data are collected from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
United Nations UNCTAD commodity databases. Some of the export weights are taken 
from CRR (2010) and others are calculated by export data from the United Nations 
UNCTAD database. Table 6.A.1 in appendix provides the country-specific weights 
used to aggregate individual world commodity prices into country-specific indices. For 
countries such as Chile, Mexico and Korea, only one commodity price is used as one 
major commodity dominates their export composition (copper for Chile, crude oil for 
Mexico and semiconductor for Korea). Except for these 3 countries, all other indices 
are based to 100 in the beginning of the sample. 
 
For nominal exchange rates (labeled as s in equations 3 and 4), we use the end-
of-period U.S. dollar rates from Bloomberg. We choose the sample period for each 
country during which exchange rate policy would be as close to free floating exchange 
rates. In addition, we use exchange rates denominated in non-USD currencies for two 
reasons. First, the strength of the U.S. dollar has an effect on commodity prices as most 
of them are priced in the U.S. dollar which can be a possible source of endogeneity. 
Second, the United States accounts for roughly 25% of total global demand in some 
major commodity groupings, and therefore its size might be an issue. As a result, 
testing the individual country currency relative to the US dollar and the commodity 
prices in the U.S dollar may induce endogeneity. In order to overcome this issue as well 
as to check for robustness, first we conduct the test with the individual country 
currencies relative to the US dollar, and then we repeat the same test with the 
                                                 
46 Our data sample is not exactly the same as in CRR. In addition, some of their series start in earlier years. Some of 
the commodity index compositions may be also different. 
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currencies relative to the British pound and the Japanese Yen. Finally, we conduct the 
same tests using nominal effective exchange rates (from the International Finance 
Statistics, IFS).
47
 We take the logarithms of the series. Summary statistics of the series 
are provided in the appendix, in Table 6.A.2. The skew and kurtosis values of the levels 
data indicate asymmetric series skewed towards to the right and more peaked than a 
Gaussian distribution. The differenced series however show more asymmetry toward to 
the left with accentuated peak compared to a Gaussian distribution. 
 
In Figure 6.1, the charts with the raw data of USD exchange rate and 
commodity index for each country show that most of the commodity indices with the 
exception of Korea start to move up in 2004. Their rise accelerates and peaks in 2008 
then is briefly stalled in 2009 before starts again later in 2009. The exchange rates of 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Indonesia, Norway and New Zealand clearly follow the 
movement of commodity indices starting in the mid-2000’s. The Brazilian Real was 
depreciated dramatically in the late 1990’s with the start of economic crisis; however it 
stabilized first and then moved up along with the commodity prices with the onset of 
commodity boom. The exchange rates of Chile, Mexico and South Africa show 
somewhat similar trends with commodity indices. However, they are not as pronounced 
as previous ones mentioned which may suggest the possibility of not fully floating 
exchange rate regime and intermittent intervention. Korea, on the other hand, depicts a 
completely different picture. In contrast to other commodity prices, the semiconductor 
prices have been declining since 2000 due to increased competition and efficiency in 
production and rapid technological development which reduced the prices of existing 
products.
48
 A quick glance at the charts in Figure 6.1 indicates no apparent similarities 
in the movement of the exchange rate and the semiconductor prices. The continuous 
decline in prices is not reflected in the currency except for the period from 2000 to 
2001 when both currency and semiconductor prices went down. 
                                                 
47 Nominal effective exchange rate is not available for Indonesia, so the estimate with other currencies is conducted 
and with NEER is skipped.  
48 IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2001. 
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In Figure 6.2, the charts with the transformed data in log of changes of the 
exchange rate and the commodity indices are shown. The sharp drop in commodity 
prices in 2009 is evident in most of the indices except for Chile and Korea. The high 
volatility in the Canadian commodity prices is worth noting which may be due to large 
share of metals and energy prices in the commodity index as their prices have become 
more volatile in the past decade compared to that of agricultural commodities. The 
sharp fluctuations in the Indonesian exchange rate in the late 1990’s are as a result of 
financial crisis.   
 
Figure 6.1 The USD exchange rate and Commodity price Indices   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USD exchange rate (right axis) Commodity price/index (left axis) 
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Figure 6.1- continued.  The USD exchange rate and Commodity price Indices 
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Figure 6.2 Changes of the log of the USD exchange rate and Commodity price 
Indices  
 
 
 
 
 
USD exchange rate Commodity prices/indices 
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6.4.2 Estimation and Results 
6.4.2.1 In-Sample Granger Causality Tests 
We start our analysis with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-
Perron (PP) unit root tests which are presented in Appendix Table 6.A.3. For most of 
the series in levels we cannot reject the hypothesis that these series contain unit roots. 
However, when the series are differenced we reject the existence of unit root, so we 
proceed to analyze the data in first differences. We continue with the levels with the 
series which do not have unit roots.
49
 Then we move to investigate the empirical 
evidence on Grange causality (GC thereafter) between exchange rates and commodity 
indices, first ignoring the parameter instability. If there is GC we should reject the 
hypothesis that β0 = β1 = 0 in equations (3) and (4). We performed heteroscedasticity- 
and serial correlation–consistent Wald test and imposed restriction of  β0 and β1 being 
zero for 2 set of samples one ending in 2008Q1 and the other ending in 2012Q4. 
Furthermore, we repeated the tests by including other lags into the regression but the 
result has not changed significantly so we present the result with one lag which are 
included in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 with some evidence of causality especially for 
Korea. The results show that 4 different exchange rates for Korea consistently GC 
commodity prices in both samples, although the opposite is not true; commodity prices 
do not GC exchange rates. In addition to Korea, the results for Australia, New Zealand 
and S. Africa indicate causality from exchange rates to commodity prices in both 
sample periods. Exchange rates GC commodity prices in one sample but not in the 
                                                 
49
 Except for a few exchange rates; JPY for Australia, USD and GBP for Indonesia and GBP and NEER for Korea. 
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others; Canada, Brazil, Indonesia and Norway for example. For others such as Brazil. 
Chile, Indonesia, Norway and New Zealand, the direction of causality runs in both 
directions depending on the sample or the currency. In their study CRR found evidence 
of GC for Chile and South Africa. 
 
Table 6.1 Bivariate Granger-Causality Tests, ending in 2008Q1*, null β0 = β1 = 0 
Panel (a): EtΔcpt+1 = β0 + β1 Δst + β2 Δcpt 
 
Panel (a): EtΔst+1 = β0 + β1 Δct + β2 Δst 
 
USD NEER GBP JPY 
  
USD NEER  GBP JPY 
Australia  0.03** 0.44 0.44 0.41 
 
Australia  0.65 0.95   0.92 0.50 
Brazil  0.17 0.07* 0.24 0.11 
 
Brazil  0.04** 0.71 0.02** 0.61 
Canada  0.05* 0.28 0.22 0.30 
 
Canada  0.71 0.93 0.96 0.42 
Chile  0.21 0.64 0.18 0.11 
 
Chile 
 
0.00*** 0.95 0.48 0.16 
Indonesia  0.09* 
 
0.08 0.08* 
 
Indonesia  0.24 
 
 0.07* 0.07** 
Korea  .00*** 0.01** 0.00*** 0.01** 
 
Korea  0.56 0.18 0.81 0.82 
Mexico  0.20 0.22 0.11 0.33 
 
Mexico  0.16 0.13 0.24 0.68 
Norway  0.12 0.24 0.19 0.33 
 
Norway  0.67 0.78 0.03** 0.69 
New 
Zealand  0.04** 0.48 0.20 0.20 
 
New 
Zealand  0.16 0.53 0.12 0.55 
S. Africa  0.06* 0.17 0.05** 0.15 
 
S. Africa  0.52 0.30 0.20 0.50 
 
Table 6.2 Bivariate Granger-Causality Tests, ending in 2012Q4*, null β0 = β1 = 0 
Panel (a): EtΔcpt+1 = β0 + β1 Δst + β2 Δcpt 
 
Panel (b):  EtΔst+1 = β0 + β1 Δct + β2 Δst 
 
 USD NEER GBP  JPY 
  
USD NEER  GBP JPY 
Australia 0.01** 0.44 0.18 0.12 
 
Australia 0.96 0.66   0.98 0.22 
Brazil 0.03** 0.72 0.19 0.06** 
 
Brazil 0.38 0.69   0.35 0.74 
Canada 0.59 0.50 0.32 0.27 
 
Canada 0.13 0.16   0.81 0.20 
Chile 0.03** 0.96 0.04** 0.02** 
 
Chile 0.10 0.91   0.78 0.12 
Indonesia 0.35 
 
0.27 0.41 
 
Indonesia 0.78 
 
  0.76 0.17 
Korea 0.00***   0.01** 0.01** 0.00*** 
 
Korea 0.70 0.25   0.61 0.41 
Mexico 0.13 0.32 0.54  0.42 
 
Mexico 0.19 0.14   0.22 0.31 
Norway 0.01** 0.30 0.05**  0.15 
 
Norway 0.11 0.87   0.16 0.16 
New 
Zealand 0.03** 0.48 0.09*  0.17 
 
New 
Zealand 0.95 0.68 0.03** 0.77 
S. Africa 0.01** 0.21 0.16  0.27 
 
S. Africa 0.57 0.32 0.40 0.43 
*Both tables report p-values for the GC test. Asterisks indicates rejection at the 1%(***), 5%(**), and 10%(*) 
significance levels, respectively indicating the evidence of Granger Causality. 
 
After performing simple GC tests, we move to test for the parameter instability. 
As mentioned earlier commodity markets as well as commodity exporting countries 
went through significant policy as well structural changes in the past decades which 
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should be taken into account in the tests. Table 6.3 and 6.4 report results from the 
parameter instability test for 2 sample periods, based on Andrews (1993), for the 
bivariate GC regressions. However, contrary to what we expect, we did not obtain 
strong evidence of time-varying parameters. Only country showed sign of structural 
change was Australia in the second quarter of 2008. CRR found structural breaks for 
Australia and South Africa in the early 2000’s. 
 
Table 6.3 Granger-Causality, Andrew’s QLR test, ending in 2008Q1* 
  
Table 6.4 Granger-Causality, Andrew’s QLR test, ending in 2012Q4* 
*The p-values are reported for Andrew’s (1993) QLR test of parameter stability. Asterisks denote rejection at the  
1%(***), 5%(**), and 10%(*) significance levels, respectively, indicating evidence of instability with the estimated 
break-dates in the parenthesis.   
Panel (a): EtΔcpt+1 = β0 + β1 Δst + β2 Δcpt Panel (b): EtΔst+1 = β0 + β1 Δct + β2 Δst 
 
USD NEER GBP JPY 
  
USD NEER GBP JPY 
Australia 0.84 0.69 0.76 0.68 
 
Australia 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 
Brazil 0.97 0.83 0.86 0.68 
 
Brazil 0.99 0.94 1.00 1.00 
Canada 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 
 
Canada 0.68 0.87 1.00 1.00 
Chile 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 
 
Chile 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Indonesia 1.00 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
Indonesia 0.64 
 
0.42 0.54 
Korea 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Korea 0.99 1.00 0.96 0.99 
Mexico 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Mexico 0.95 0.99 1.00 1.00 
Norway 1.00 0.81 1.00 0.99 
 
Norway 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.00 
New 
Zealand 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.99 
 
New 
Zealand 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 
S. Africa 0.52 0.71 0.50 0.88 
 
S. Africa 0.78 0.96 0.84 0.57 
Panel (a): EtΔcpt+1 = β0 + β1 Δst + β2 Δcpt Panel (b): EtΔst+1 = β0 + β1 Δct + β2 Δst 
 
USD NEER GBP JPY 
  
USD NEER GBP JPY 
Australia 0.01***  0.83 0.11 0.25 
 
Australia 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 
 (2008Q2)          
Brazil 0.41 0.99 0.76 0.86 
 
Brazil 1.00 0.94 0.99 1.00 
Canada 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Canada 0.68 0.87 1.00 1.00 
Chile 1.00 0.97 0.92 1.00 
 
Chile 0.81 0.99 0.96 1.00 
Indonesia 0.99 
 
1.00 1.00 
 
Indonesia 0.20 
 
0.13 0.75 
Korea 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 
Korea 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 
Mexico 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.00 
 
Mexico 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 
Norway 0.97 0.94 1.00 0.98 
 
Norway 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 
New 
Zealand 0.83 0.96 0.96 1.00 
 
New 
Zealand 1.00 0.95 0.97 1.00 
S. Africa 0.97 0.99 0.94 0.97 
 
S. Africa 0.99 1.00 0.97 1.00 
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6.4.2.2 Out of Sample Forecasts 
After in-sample testing, now we turn to check whether in-sample Granger 
causality translates into out-of-sample forecasting ability. We employ a rolling forecast 
scheme based on equation (3) and (4).  We estimate parameters in these two equations 
using the size equal to half the total sample size, then roll the sample forward one 
quarter, use the parameter estimates to generate out-of-sample forecasts, and repeat the 
procedure until we exhaust all of the out-of-sample observations. Although structural 
breaks did not emerge in the Andrew’s test, we choose the rolling forecast procedure 
rather than a recursive one, as it adapts more quickly to the presence of time-varying 
parameters, and requires no explicit assumption on the nature of the time variation in 
the data.  
 
In order to gauge the performance of our forecasts we follow CRR’s approach 
and use two benchmark models. First, we estimate equations (3) and (4) and produce 
forecasts as explained above, then we compare them against the forecasts obtained with 
the same method from an autoregressive (AR) model of order one (for commodity 
prices EtΔcpt+1 = γ0t + γ1tΔcpt and for exchange rates EtΔst+1 = γ0t + γ1tΔst ).
50
 Second, 
we estimate a random walk without a drift model as it is the most common benchmark 
in the exchange-rate literature. For the random walk benchmark, we produce forecasts 
using the equations EtΔcpt+1 = β0t + β1tΔst and EtΔst+1 = β0t + β1tΔcpt. and compare the 
results relative to EtΔcpt+1 = 0 and EtΔst+1 = 0, respectively, i.e no change. 
Once we generate the forecasts from each model, we calculate mean squared 
prediction errors (MSPE) as the squared difference between the predicted and actual 
values. Then we make pairwise comparison between the models’ MSPE’s and calculate 
the statistics suggested by Diebold and Mariano (1995) and improved by Clark and 
West (2007). For example, suppose we calculate two MSPEs based on two models; 
                                                 
50
 The order of benchmark autoregressive model is selected by testing up to 4 lags. The results showed that the 
Bayesian information criteria (BIC) values didn’t vary so much for some countries but one lag has the lowest BIC 
value for others. 
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MSPE1(t) and MSPE2(t). We then take the difference as d(t)= MSPE2(t) - MSPE1(t). A 
significant negative value implies that model two has smaller squared errors than the 
model one so its predictive ability is better than the model one.  
The null of equal predictive accuracy is: H0: E[d(t)]=0 
The Diebold-Mariano test statistics:  DM= 
 
√   
        where   
 
 
∑           
  is a consistent estimate of the long-run variance of T
1/2đ that takes into account of 
the serial correlation introduced by overlapping observations. The null hypothesis states 
that there is no difference in forecasting accuracy between the candidate model and the 
benchmark model. The DM statistics is asymptotically normally distributed; DM ~ N 
(0,1). According to DM statistics the null of equal predictive accuracy can be rejected 
at the 5% level if |DM|>1.96. However, Clark and West (2006, 2007) show that the 
asymptotic DM test statistics is undersized because of the limiting distribution of the 
DM under the null hypothesis that is not standard normal when nested models are 
compared. This means that it may not detect statistical significance (i.e., that the 
structural model outperforms the random walk model) even when it exists. Clark and 
West 
(2006) propose a new asymptotic test for nested models, the CW, that builds on the 
asymptotic DM test. The CW test statistic takes into account the fact that the two 
models compared are nested by assuming that, under the null hypothesis, the exchange 
rate follows a random walk. Clark and West (2006) suggest one should reject the null 
hypothesis of equal forecasting power when the CW ≥1.282 at 10 percent and CW ≥ 
1.645 at 5 percent.  
 
After we produce the one-quarter forward forecasts and calculate the DM 
statistics as described above for each model pair, we end up with four sets of numbers 
for each country as show in Table 6.5. Panel A reports the performance of equations (3) 
and (4) with respective to AR model. Similarly, Panel B shows the forecast 
performance statistics between the random walk comparable version of our equations 
and random walk of no change in forecast. The negative values indicate that the model 
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forecasts are better than the AR or random walk model. The first equation, exchange 
rate’s forecasting commodity prices, yields more negative values then the second 
equation, commodity prices’ forecasting exchange rates. Just looking at the signs of the 
results show the forecasting ability of first (equation (3)) is better than that of the 
second (equation (4)) relative to AR or random walk model.  
 
A further review of the numbers reported in Table 6.5 reveals that the forecast 
performance statistics are quite small. Moreover, they are very close in magnitude 
especially in Panel A which may suggest that these two specifications are not too 
different. Finally, none of the statistics we obtain are higher than the critical values 
proposed by DM or CW; i.e. 1.96 or 1.65 at 5%. The calculated p-values are also too 
high for rejection of the null. Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
random walk is better over the proposed structural models.  Contrary to our results 
CRR found significant evidence of out-of-sample ability for pretty much all countries 
in their sample especially with the AR benchmark model.    
 
Table 6.5 DM-Statistics for Out-of-Sample Forecasting Ability, ending 20012Q4* 
Panel A: Autoregressive Benchmark 
Australia Brazil Canada Chile Indonesia Korea Mexico Norway 
New 
Zealand 
S. 
Africa 
A. MSFE differences: model: EtΔcpt+1 = β0t + β1tΔcpt + β2tΔst vs.   AR(1): EtΔcpt+1 = γ0t + γ1tΔcpt 
-0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 
 B. MSFE differences: model: EtΔst+1 = β0t + β1tΔst + β2tΔcpt vs.     AR(1): EtΔst+1 = γ0t + γ1tΔst 
0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.04 
Panel B: Random Walk Benchmark 
Australia Brazil Canada Chile Indonesia Korea Mexico Norway 
New 
Zealand 
S. 
Africa 
A. MSFE differences: model: EtΔcpt+1 = β0t + β1tΔst vs. random walk: EtΔcpt+1 = 0 
-0.10 -0.08 0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.11 -0.01 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 
          B. MSFE differences: model: EtΔst+1 = β0t + β1tΔcpt vs. random walk: EtΔst+1 = 0 
  0.06 0.07 -0.04 0.03 0.13 0.05 -0.10 0.02 0.05 0.11 
 
 Conclusions 6.5
In this chapter we examined the dynamics between exchange rates and 
commodity prices for 10 commodity exporting countries with different commodity 
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exporting profile, history of exchange rate policies and level of economic development. 
We applied some of the methodologies that CRR (2010) developed. Similar to their 
work, we focused on the structural link between exchange rates and commodity prices 
through the terms-of-trade and income effects and tested the resulting dynamic 
relationship between commodity price movements and exchange rate fluctuations. Our 
results could not show as robust relations as theirs did.  We found stronger evidence of 
in-sample causality from exchange rates to commodity prices for most of the countries 
in our sample.  
One interesting result was the consistent significant causality from exchange rates 
to commodities for Korea across all different denominated currencies, although the 
initial plot of Korean Won/USD currency and semiconductor prices did not seem to 
interact. Our findings did not uncover as many structural breaks as CRR did in the 
commodity price or exchange rate series. Furthermore, our out-of sample forecasts do 
not outperform the random walk forecasts.    
Our results differed from that of the CRR. Perhaps, some of the underlying 
assumptions may not hold. For example, the link between the exchange rates and 
commodity prices are not as robust as claimed to be. Or maybe the relationship works 
well for some currencies during certain sample periods but not for other currencies or 
sample periods. Another possibility is that commodity prices may not be fully 
exogenous to the exchange rates and they are not independently determined. 
Additionally, commodity producing countries may have bigger market power than 
assumed. Especially in the recent commodity boom which is demand driven, along with 
tight balances, a supply disruption in any commodity producing country creates great 
pressure on the world commodity prices. Furthermore, during a commodity boom 
which lasted as long as the recent one, many farmers/exporters are well financed. So 
when domestic currencies appreciate farmers/exporters receive less for their 
commodity which discourages them from selling creating temporary shortages which in 
turn pushes the prices higher. Finally, some of the countries may not have adopted 
flexible exchange rate regime fully and may intervene to change the course of the 
currency time to time. 
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6.A Appendix  
Table 6.A.6 Data Coverage and Trade Weights 
Country Commodity Weight Country Commodity Weight 
Australia: 1983Q1-20122012Q4   Indonesia: 1998Q1-2012Q4   
  Aluminum 16% 
 
Coal 18% 
  Beef 8% 
 
Copper 8% 
  Coal 26% 
 
Crude oil 23% 
  Copper 3% 
 
Nat gas 26% 
  Cotton 3% 
 
Palm oil 15% 
  Gold 10% 
 
Rubber 10% 
  Iron ore 10% 
  
  
  LNG 5% Korea: 1998Q1-2012Q4   
  Nickel 3% 
 
Semi-conductor 100% 
  Sugar 3% 
  
  
  Wheat 9% Mexico: 1995Q1-2012Q4   
  Wool 4% 
 
Crude oil 100% 
Brazil: 1995Q1-2012Q4 
   
  
  Chicken meat 8%  
  Coffee Arabica 10% New Zealand: 1995Q1-2012Q4 
  Iron ore 27% 
 
Aluminum 10% 
  Orange juice 5% 
 
Beef 11% 
  Soybean oil 15% 
 
Butter 8% 
  Soybeans 16% 
 
Cheese 10% 
  Sugar 13% 
 
Fish 8% 
  Wood Pulp 7% 
 
Lamb 15% 
Canada: 1974Q1-2012Q4 
 
Timber+logs 10% 
  Aluminum 5% 
 
Whole MP 19% 
  Beef 9% 
 
Wool 9% 
  Copper 2% 
  
  
  Crude oil 23% Norway: 1993Q1-2012Q4   
  Gold 3% 
 
Crude oil 67% 
  Lumber 15% 
 
Fish 7% 
  Nat gas 12% 
 
Nat gas 26% 
  Nickel 3% 
  
  
  Wheat 4% South Africa: 1998Q1-2012Q4 
  Wood Pulp 22% 
 
Coal 22% 
  Zinc 3% 
 
Gold 48% 
Chile: 1989Q1-2012Q2 
  
Platinum 30% 
  Copper 100% 
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Table 6.A.7 Summary Statistics for the Full Sample 
 
 
Levels First differenced logs
Mean
Standard 
deviation Skewness Kurtosis Mean
Standard 
deviation Skewness Kurtosis
Australia
USD exchange rate 0.76 0.13 0.35 3.13 0.00 0.06 -0.51 3.84
Commodity Index 133.65 66.91 1.58 4.20 0.01 0.07 -2.31 19.99
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate 92.70 12.70 0.48 3.05 0.00 0.04 -1.53 8.33
Brazil
USD exchange rate 0.58 0.22 0.92 2.79 -0.01 0.09 -1.14 5.78
Commodity Index 152.77 84.02 1.01 2.53 0.01 0.10 -2.24 17.23
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate 134.12 41.90 0.82 2.53 -0.01 0.08 -1.43 9.00
Canada
USD exchange rate 0.82 0.11 0.23 2.15 0.00 0.03 -0.07 5.35
Commodity Index 191.64 100.60 1.54 4.61 0.01 0.09 -0.07 6.81
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate 94.29 11.71 0.70 2.27 0.00 0.03 -0.30 5.27
Chile
USD exchange rate 0.00 0.00 0.36 2.54 -0.01 0.04 0.63 3.29
Commodity Index 2150.34 489.72 0.22 1.75 0.00 0.09 0.14 3.15
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate 101.92 8.73 0.08 2.65 0.00 0.04 -0.29 3.29
Indonesia
USD exchange rate 0.11 0.01 0.11 6.48 0.00 0.12 -0.98 10.59
Commodity Index 224.04 123.98 0.60 1.96 0.02 0.10 -2.02 10.50
Korea
USD exchange rate 0.09 0.01 0.51 2.52 0.00 0.05 -0.21 3.63
Commodity Index 160.22 143.89 1.29 3.36 -0.05 0.12 0.12 5.28
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate 91.16 10.24 0.03 2.19 0.00 0.05 -1.06 9.38
Mexico
USD exchange rate 0.10 0.02 1.00 3.94 -0.01 0.06 -1.64 6.82
Commodity Index 48.64 32.25 0.72 2.19 0.03 0.15 -1.91 10.80
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate 108.01 22.82 0.66 2.96 -0.01 0.04 -1.61 7.02
New Zealand
USD exchange rate 0.64 0.12 -0.37 2.16 0.00 0.06 -0.21 3.00
Commodity Index 121.50 38.19 0.79 2.25 0.01 0.06 -1.52 10.52
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate 89.58 8.62 -0.63 2.29 0.00 0.04 -0.42 2.71
Norway
USD exchange rate 0.15 0.02 -0.04 2.53 0.00 0.05 -0.17 4.43
Commodity Index 228.47 151.27 0.80 2.29 0.02 0.11 -1.38 7.32
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate 97.78 4.48 0.03 2.11 0.00 0.02 -1.64 10.37
South Africa
USD exchange rate 0.16 0.05 1.14 3.48 -0.01 0.08 -0.17 4.91
Commodity Index 184.05 111.54 0.96 2.45 0.02 0.07 -1.73 13.79
Nominal Effective Exchange Rate 103.06 30.46 0.87 2.70 -0.01 0.06 -0.54 3.93
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Table 6.A.8 Unit Root Tests, sample ends in 2012Q4 
 
  
Log levels  First differenced logs
ADF PP ADF PP
t-statistics p-value t-statistics p-value t-statistics p-value t-statistics p-value
Australia
Index -0.88 0.79 -0.52 0.88 -6.97 0.00 -6.55 0.00
usd -1.46 0.55 -1.55 0.51 -10.26 0.00 -10.24 0.00
neer -1.20 0.67 -1.41 0.58 -9.36 0.00 -9.30 0.00
gbp -1.66 0.45 -1.61 0.48 -11.53 0.00 -11.53 0.00
jpy -2.79 0.06 ** -2.80 0.06 ** -10.62 0.00 -10.62 0.00
Brazil
Index -0.92 0.77 -0.66 0.85 -5.96 0.00 -5.94 0.00
usd -2.02 0.28 -2.02 0.28 -6.98 0.00 -6.90 0.00
neer -2.09 0.25 -2.09 0.25 -7.03 0.00 -6.94 0.00
gbp -1.96 0.31 -1.95 0.31 -7.33 0.00 -7.29 0.00
jpy -1.49 0.53 -1.51 0.52 -6.92 0.00 -7.23 0.00
Canada
Index -1.14 0.70 -1.00 0.75 -9.74 0.00 -8.65 0.00
usd -1.54 0.51 -1.63 0.46 -10.63 0.00 -10.65 0.00
neer -1.72 0.42 -1.44 0.56 -8.64 0.00 -8.71 0.00
gbp -2.60 0.10 -2.32 0.17 -10.67 0.00 -10.68 0.00
jpy -1.90 0.33 -1.90 0.33 -11.25 0.00 -11.24 0.00
Chile
Index -1.95 0.31 -2.15 0.23 -5.81 0.00 -5.79 0.00
usd -2.30 0.18 -2.26 0.19 -6.62 0.00 -6.60 0.00
neer -2.12 0.24 -2.10 0.25 -6.99 0.00 -6.75 0.00
gbp -1.59 0.48 -2.15 0.23 -5.96 0.00 -5.97 0.00
jpy -1.87 0.34 -1.93 0.32 -7.35 0.00 -8.44 0.00
Indonesia
Index -0.79 0.81 -0.60 0.86 -5.67 0.00 -4.12 0.00
usd -4.70 0.00 *** -4.81 0.00 *** -5.10 0.00 -11.56 0.00
gbp -2.95 0.05 * -3.54 0.01 ** -5.93 0.00 -11.86 0.00
jpy -2.78 0.07 -2.70 0.08 -12.88 0.00 -12.51 0.00
Korea
Index -2.35 0.16 -2.24 0.19 -6.38 0.00 -6.38 0.00
usd -2.24 0.20 -2.35 0.16 -7.29 0.00 -7.29 0.00
neer -2.57 0.11 -2.62 0.09 * -6.39 0.00 -6.40 0.00
gbp -3.52 0.01 ** -3.44 0.01 ** -9.49 0.00 -9.61 0.00
jpy -1.40 0.58 -1.57 0.49 -7.29 0.00 -7.32 0.00
Norway
Index -0.76 0.82 -0.20 0.93 -6.19 0.00 -5.52 0.00
usd -1.40 0.58 -1.50 0.53 -8.15 0.00 -8.15 0.00
neer -1.93 0.32 -2.11 0.24 -7.86 0.00 -7.83 0.00
gbp -0.62 0.86 -0.79 0.82 -11.09 0.00 -10.97 0.00
jpy -2.58 0.10 -2.63 0.09 -9.13 0.00 -9.13 0.00
Mexico
Index -0.77 0.82 -0.80 0.81 -6.85 0.00 -6.02 0.00
usd -1.96 0.31 -1.92 0.32 -8.51 0.00 -8.66 0.00
neer -2.25 0.19 -2.24 0.20 -7.79 0.00 -7.78 0.00
gbp -1.82 0.37 -1.79 0.38 -8.69 0.00 -8.70 0.00
jpy -0.98 0.76 -0.77 0.82 -8.72 0.00 -9.30 0.00
New Zealand
Index -1.08 0.72 -0.71 0.84 -4.80 0.00 -4.46 0.00
usd -0.89 0.78 -1.16 0.69 -6.74 0.00 -6.74 0.00
neer -1.94 0.31 -1.73 0.41 -6.19 0.00 -6.20 0.00
gbp -0.66 0.85 -0.68 0.84 -8.71 0.00 -8.70 0.00
jpy -2.15 0.23 -2.28 0.18 -7.80 0.00 -7.80 0.00
South Africa
Index -0.07 0.95 0.19 0.97 -6.28 0.00 -6.00 0.00
usd -1.96 0.30 -2.00 0.29 -7.69 0.00 -7.71 0.00
neer -1.73 0.41 -1.74 0.41 -7.19 0.00 -7.19 0.00
gbp -2.28 0.18 -2.27 0.18 -7.89 0.00 -7.89 0.00
jpy -1.50 0.53 -1.49 0.53 -7.89 0.00 -8.83 0.00
   
195 
 
                                                
 
 
 
7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
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The recent commodity boom started in the early 2000’s and lasted more than a 
decade during which the prices of all commodities rose, then crashed in 2008 after the 
onset of financial crisis and rebounded in 2009 before reaching to or above the pre-
crisis levels in 2011. The large fluctuations in commodity prices have great impacts on 
the demand of individual consumers as well as on the economies of commodity 
producing and consuming countries. There have been a number of changes in the global 
market structure since the last commodity price boom during the 1970s which caused a 
structural shift in supply, demand and inventory dynamics of commodities markets. 
Hence, it is important to revisit and have a comprehensive analysis with the recent data 
to observe the impact of high and volatile commodity prices which is the focus of this 
thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 examined the implications of commodity inventory levels on the 
futures price curves. This chapter adopted a comprehensive self-exciting threshold 
approach which included both inventories and interest rates along with spot and futures 
prices and found that there was a long-run cointegrating relationship between base 
metal spot prices, futures prices, inventories, and interest rates. When the system is 
away from equilibrium in response to a temporary shock, it adjusts back towards the 
steady state over time. The dynamics of this adjustment, however, vary across metals 
and depend on the initial state of the market. 
 
Second, this study presented some evidence that a temporary scarcity shock, 
modeled as a spot price shock which changes the slope of the futures curve, does cause 
a reaction in commodity markets somewhat consistent with a theoretical model. In 
particular, inventories are drawn down and spot prices gradually fall back towards their 
initial level. However, the initial state of the market is an important conditioning factor 
for the subsequent adjustment. In a contangoed market with abundant inventories, spot 
price shocks produce a much more gradual inventory response, while the effect on price 
levels can be permanent. In contrast, in a backwardated market the inventory drawdown 
occurs much faster and the rise in both spot and futures prices are temporary.   
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Third, the results showed that the adjustment of prices and inventories back 
towards equilibrium was much more gradual in a contangoed market. But prices adjust 
much faster in a backwardated market where physical market is tight, even a small 
supply disruption can have large price effects, but these typically prove to be short-
lived. These findings may have implications for consumers, producers and inventory 
holders of commodities. In particular, results suggest that market participants should 
prepare their response to market signals during periods of unusual conditions on the 
state of the inventory cycle, which is typically reflected in the slope of the futures 
curve.  
 
Chapter 3 investigated whether the demand elasticity of gasoline price and 
income in the U.S. has changed in recent years compared to earlier periods which 
experienced similar high gasoline prices. The results are comparable to those of recent 
studies and confirmed the structural change in the U.S. market where consumers 
became insensitive to gasoline price changes. The estimated price elasticities in 1975-
1980 are high however; they declined and became more inelastic in the following two 
subsamples. Similarly, the full sample results showed more inelastic values.  The 
estimation of elasticities in a 61-month window by rolling one month from 1975 to 
2013 also confirmed the varying and declining price elasticities over time. The VAR 
elasticity estimates of 1975-1980 period showed significant and higher elasticity than 
that of estimates of simpler models. The full sample estimation with VAR model 
revealed a lower price elasticity of demand. The income elasticity results were more 
consistent, although they too diminished over the last decade. The income elasticity too 
became inelastic in the recent decade and in the most recent sub-sample was estimated 
to be around -0.51 which may reflect the persistent high prices combined with fuel 
efficiency efforts and recovery in income level after a deep recession which produced a 
negative income elasticity implying gasoline demand declines as income rises. 
 
There may be a number of potential explanations for the change in elasticities 
over time. First, the U.S. consumers have grown more dependent on automobiles for 
daily transportation than during the 1970’s and 1980’s and as a result, are less able to 
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reduce vehicle miles traveled in response to higher prices. Second, with the record 
gasoline prices, drivers may change their driving behaviors in the short-run to save fuel 
and may switch to more fuel efficient vehicles in the medium to long term. Third, with 
the increasing income and wealth especially in the past decade, the share of gasoline 
consumption in total income has declined over the years, reducing the impact of an 
increase in gasoline prices on budget and making the consumers less sensitive to price 
increases. Finally, the overall improvement in vehicle fleet average fuel economy since 
the late 1970’s and early 1980’s may have also contributed to a decrease in the 
elasticity of price on gasoline demand.  Given the lower price elasticity of demand 
compared to the elasticity in previous decades, smaller reductions in gasoline 
consumption will occur for any given gasoline tax increase. As a result, instead of 
imposing gasoline tax, investing in research and technologies to improve vehicle fuel 
economy, imposing higher fuel efficiency standards and improving public 
transportation system would be more viable solutions to reducing the gasoline 
consumption and subsequently reducing the carbon dioxide emissions produced by the 
transport sector. 
 
Chapter 4 examined the dynamic effect of demand and supply shocks on 
gasoline prices in two very different markets: the U.S. and U.K. The results showed 
that all of the factors; supply,  aggregate and gasoline demand  played a role 
determining the price of gasoline in the US but the impact of a positive aggregate 
demand shock was larger than that of the others. For the U.K., the impact of aggregate 
and local gasoline demand were important to determine the gasoline price but supply 
did have a limited effect.  
 
Chapter 5 examined the procyclicality of fiscal policies in 28 developing crude 
oil-producing countries. The results were not uniform across income groups, and total 
expenditure was highly procyclical in the full sample, in the low and middle-income 
groups. The low-income group constitutes a large share of the full sample, therefore 
weighing heavily in the results of the full sample. But it is countercyclical in the high-
income countries-- perhaps due to their greater accumulation of financial assets, which 
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eases their financial constraints when funds are needed. It was also important to look at 
the aggregate fiscal variables, as well as at their subcomponents separately, since the 
subcomponents may move in offsetting ways. In fact, the estimation results showed 
that, although expenditure is countercyclical for the high-income group, its components 
move in different directions: consumption is procyclical, while capital expenditure is 
countercyclical.   
 
The results confirm that political and institutional factors, as well as financing 
constraints, play a role in the cyclicality of fiscal policies in the OPCs. Most of the 
variables on the quality of institutions and the political structure appear to be significant 
for the low- income group. Two of the variables are significant for the middle-income 
countries: the composite institution index and checks and balances. None of the 
institutional variables turns out to be significant for the high-income countries.  
Domestic financing constraints seem to matter for the low-income group. But fiscal 
policy is affected more by the external financing constraint in the middle- and high-
income groups, as they may be more integrated into the global financial system than the 
low-income countries.   
 
Chapter 6 examined the dynamic relationship between exchange rates and 
commodity prices to determine whether commodity prices Granger cause exchange rate 
or exchange rates Granger cause commodity prices for a group of advanced and 
developing commodity-exporting economies.   
 
This study found stronger evidence of in-sample causality from exchange rates 
to commodity prices for most of the countries in the sample.  One of the key findings 
was the consistent significant causality from exchange rates to commodities for Korea 
across all different denominated currencies. This study found a limited number of 
structural breaks compared to the earlier studies. Furthermore, the out-of sample 
forecasts do not outperform the random walk forecasts. These results may be related to 
the underlying assumption of the model tested. First, the link between the exchange 
rates and commodity prices may not be as robust as claimed to be. Another possibility 
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is that commodity prices may not be fully exogenous to the exchange rates and they are 
not independently determined. Additionally, each country which produces the 
commodity has bigger market power than assumed. Especially in the recent commodity 
boom which was mainly demand driven, along with tight balances, a supply disruption 
in any commodity producing country resulted in pushing the prices higher indicating 
the power of the each producing country in the market.  
 
There are some areas where further empirical research can be pursued. The 
structural VAR model for gasoline can be implemented for diesel fuel markets in the 
U.S. and the U.K. as the usage of diesel is higher in the U.K., consumer may be more 
responsive to price fluctuations of diesel. Furthermore, a joint VAR model of crude oil-
gasoline and crude oil-diesel would be tested for the U.K. to measure the degree of 
linkage of the domestic fuel markets to the global energy markets. 
 
None of the institutional variables turned out to be significant for high-income 
oil producing countries, yet they manage to run countercyclical fiscal policies. It would 
be interesting to examine whether institutional quality does not matter when countries 
are able to accumulate funds? Or they can accumulate funds because of different 
characteristics of their economy or political structure. In addition they can be jointly 
tested with the advanced oil producing countries such as Norway.  
 
Another extension of research on the interaction between exchange rates and 
commodity prices would be to explore the determinants of exchange rates for countries 
that heavily dependent on the commodity imports. Similar to commodity exporting 
countries, they are also considerably vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices.  
 
Finally, the present-value approach can be applied to another asset class and the 
linkage between equity, commodity and the exchange rate markets can be explored 
together. One can link the financial linkage across asset markets, where equity or bond 
markets in these countries may offer useful information for commodity market 
behavior. 
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